Voting Machines Can Steal Elections After All, By Chris Knight (Florida)

In a moment that sent shockwaves through a high-level Cabinet meeting, Tulsi Gabbard, the United States Director of National Intelligence, dropped a revelation that could rattle the core of American democracy: evidence, she claimed, now exists proving electronic voting machines have been tampered with to manipulate election outcomes! The words landed like a grenade, confirming for some what has long simmered as suspicion—that the very machinery of the nation's electoral system is not just flawed but compromised. Gabbard, tasked with untangling the web of politicised intelligence and election interference, didn't stop at sounding the alarm. She painted a picture of systemic vulnerability, arguing that these machines have been open to hackers for years, ripe for exploitation by anyone with the know-how to tilt the scales. Her solution? A return to the humble paper ballot, a call to restore faith in a process that, for many, feels increasingly shaky.

This isn't a bolt from the blue for those who've followed the warnings. The Gateway Pundit, a beacon for conservative sceptics, has long amplified concerns about voting machines, and Gabbard's statement feels like a vindication of their many articles:

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2025/04/tulsi-gabbard-drops-bomb-voting-machines-says-evidence/

But it's not just pundits ringing bells—some of the world's sharpest hackers have been proving the point for years at DEF CON's Voting Village, an annual gathering in Las Vegas where voting machines face a gauntlet of digital probes. Last year, from Friday to Sunday, these cyber sleuths tore into the equipment slated for November's elections, uncovering a laundry list of vulnerabilities. Harri Hursti, a co-founder of the event, didn't mince words: the flaws are extensive, glaring, and maddeningly consistent with findings from years past. Basic fixes, he fumed to Politico, simply aren't happening, leaving him both worried and angry. It's not a new story—back in 2017, DEF CON hackers made headlines when one cracked a machine in just 90 minutes, voting remotely as if the system were a cheap lock on a screen door.

The problem runs deeper than a few clever hacks. Scott Algeier, head of the Information Technology-Information Sharing and Analysis Center, laid bare the logistical nightmare: even if a flaw is spotted today, patching it before an election is like trying to rebuild a car mid-race. States and local officials, often strapped for cash and time, can't just roll out fixes like a Tuesday Microsoft update. It's a "complicated process," Algeier said, one that drags on far beyond the 90 days most tech patches need. The result? Machines that remain vulnerable, elections that invite doubt, and a public left wondering if their vote even counts.

Where does this leave us? Gabbard's bombshell demands action, but the road ahead is a minefield of politics and practicality. If evidence of tampering exists, her team must lay it bare—carefully, without spilling sensitive sources, but enough to silence sceptics who'll cry partisan foul. Independent audits by cybersecurity experts, ideally watched by both parties, could confirm whether these machines are as porous as claimed and map out fixes. Battleground states, where trust hangs by a thread, should be first in line. Paper ballots sound like a clean fix, and Gabbard's push for them taps into a yearning for something tangible, something you can hold and count. But let's not kid ourselves—paper isn't foolproof. It's slow, expensive, and open to old-school tricks like lost boxes or fudged tallies. A smarter play might be a hybrid: machines for speed, paper for proof, backed by open-source code and regular hackathons to keep the systems honest.

Congress needs to step up, too, throwing money at states to replace creaky machines and train election workers, rather than leaving small counties to scrape by. But timing's tight, midterms are around the corner, and a full overhaul by 2028 feels ambitious. Smaller elections could be testing grounds, trailing voter ID, hand-counted audits for tight races, or bans on internet-connected machines that practically beg for trouble. A national commission, packed with sceptics from Left and Right, could cut through the noise, setting standards that don't just patch holes but build confidence. This isn't about relitigating old votes, it's about making sure no hacker, insider, or rogue can pull the strings again.

Gabbard's claim is a spark, and whether it lights a fire for reform or fizzles into another shouting match depends on what happens next. If she's got the goods, it's a chance to fix a system creaking under distrust. If it's overblown, only transparency will calm the storm. Either way, the hackers at DEF CON aren't waiting, they've shown the locks are weak. Now it's on us to decide if we'll keep using them or build a better door.