Time for a Nuclear South Korea? By James Reed

South Korea is rightly concerned about having a hostile North Korea with nuclear weapons, posing an existential threat to it. The tension has been raised by the mutual defence pact signed with Putin. This may go so far as the supply of Russian technology for North Korea's nuclear program. Faced with this threat, South Koreans are moving to the line that it needs its own nuclear weapons program, and not rely upon the United States, with over two thirds of South Koreans supporting a national nuclear weapons program.

Politicians are arguing that it is unlikely that the US would allow cities such as New York to be reduced to radioactive wastelands to save South Korea, so they will have to save themselves. Likewise for Japan. Both countries could acquire nuclear weapons in record time given the level of technology in each country. I say, good for them; Australia should have acquired nuclear weapons in the post World War II period instead of the "populate or perish" ideology, which has morphed into the Great Replacement and Asianisation.

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/is-it-time-for-south-korea-to-get-the-bomb/

"The Russo–Ukrainian war is reshaping security concerns around the world. Washington's proxy war against Moscow encouraged the latter to strike back globally, challenging American policy in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Most dramatic may be Russia's revival of relations with North Korea.

Highlighted by President Vladimir Putin's trip to Pyongyang, the two governments signed a new mutual defense pact and intimated that ties go well beyond the sale of artillery shells and missiles to Moscow. Putin appears to have implicitly accepted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a nuclear power. Moreover, Western policymakers fear Russian technical support for the North's missile and nuclear programs.

Although the Putin government has reason for caution in aiding Pyongyang, U.S. support for Ukraine has helped the latter kill Russian personnel and destroy Russian materiel. Moscow must be tempted to empower the North to strike America rather as Washington has enabled Kiev to hit Russia.

This has helped fuel rising support in the Republic of Korea for a tougher line toward the DPRK. For many South Koreans, that means backing a homegrown nuclear program to match the North. A newly released survey by the Korea Institute for National Unification, conducted before the Putin-Kim summit, found that two thirds of those polled supported the ROK's acquisition of nuclear weapons, up from 60 percent last year. Some 45 percent preferred producing nukes over maintaining an American military garrison, compared to just 34 percent last year.

In the past popular support for a nuclear option failed to generate significant political backing. Official policy is to rely ever more tightly on the U.S., clinging to the Washington Declaration, by which the Biden administration promised to risk the incineration of American cities to protect the ROK. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell opined "that the mechanisms that we've put in place ... the Washington Declaration and the strategic initiatives that have been launched to underscore the added signification of American extended deterrence, particularly in situations like Korea, I think it's given us what we need to work with now." South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is publicly on board. So is Won Hee-ryong, a former cabinet minister running to head the ruling People Power Party: "We need to boost our nuclear deterrence against North Korean threats by ensuring the effectiveness of the declaration."

However, burgeoning Russian-North Korean military cooperation is challenging the status quo. Observed Allison Hooker, a member of President Donald Trump's National Security Council staff, "I think we cannot rule out the fact that South Korea continues to move, maybe more rapidly, towards its own nuclear program." Last year, President Yoon observed that if the North Korean threat "becomes more serious, we could acquire our own nuclear weapons, such as deploying tactical nuclear weapons here in ROK." Senior members of his party are now taking up the issue.

For instance, Han Dong-hoon, who also is running for PPP leader, contended that "we should move at least to the point of equipping ourselves with potential capabilities to go nuclear whenever we decide to do so, just like Japan is now." He added, "The global security situation is constantly changing, so there are limitations to relying solely on our allies." Nevertheless, fearing sanctions, he opposes moving directly to building nuclear weapons.

Assemblywoman Na Kyung-won, another candidate for party head, went further: "The history of the international community shows that only countries with the power to suppress external threats have survived. This is why we must keep all doors open and consider nuclear armament now." She added that "even if nuclear weapons development is restricted due to Korea-U.S. relations or international norms, we will prepare to develop nuclear weapons in a short period of time right now."

More radical is Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo, who proposed withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He asked, "Can the United States defend Seoul while risking New York turning into a sea of fire," as threatened by the DPRK? Indeed, six decades ago French President Charles de Gaulle asked a similar question, withdrawing his nation from NATO's integrated military command structure and producing nuclear weapons.

"Now is the time that we show our determination like de Gaulle's," declared Hong. He also pointed out that "Ukraine was the world's third-largest nuclear power, but it disarmed its nuclear weapons following security assurances from the U.S., Britain and Russia and as a result, Ukraine is now facing Russia's nuclear attack."

Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, a potential PPP presidential candidate, contended that the ROK required "an 'active nuclear umbrella' or its own nuclear weapons," since "a 'passive nuclear umbrella' that depends entirely on the will of the United States is inadequate." Other officials who previously pushed the nuclear option include National Assemblyman Cho Kyoung-tae and retired general Leem Ho-young.

Hong articulated the essential flaw in the doctrine of extended deterrence, by which Washington guarantees the security of many, indeed, most of its allies through use of nuclear arms, if necessary. For what are Americans prepared to turn their homeland into a battleground? The Cold War infused such promises with greater credibility. Even more important, in the case of North Korea, the U.S. seemed safe since Pyongyang lacked both nukes and ICBMs. War would be costly, but only the Korean peninsula would be at risk.

That is no longer the case. The North is a nuclear power. It could have hundreds of nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. It is developing ICBMs along with multiple warheads. Virtually no one believes that the North will surrender its arsenal. Given the risks of military preemption, the U.S. and ROK must learn to live with a nuclear North Korea.

A Second Korean War could end with a North Korean nuclear attack on American cities. Of course, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to launch a first strike, which would guarantee his own destruction. If Washington endangered his regime, he could respond by threatening mutual Götterdämmerung. What American president would risk the American homeland for an alliance that, despite its closeness, is not vital for his or her nation's survival?

South Koreans realize this. Yoon admitted last year, "What we call extended deterrence was also the U.S. telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything, but now, it's difficult to convince our people with just that."

As for Washington's boilerplate affirmations of eternal affection and love, South Koreans should remember the toothless Budapest Memorandum, issued to encourage Ukrainians to yield their Soviet-era nuclear weapons. The Washington Declaration offers no greater assurance.

To suggest that Uncle Sam cannot be believed generates mild hysteria in Washington. The Declaration is cited as if possessing talismanic powers, able to ensure America's continued protection of South Korea without risk. Not everyone is so sanguine, however.

A few years ago, the Hoover Institution's Michael Auslin pointed out,

While few believe Kim Jong Un would launch an unprovoked nuclear strike, most seasoned Korea watchers believe that he would no doubt use his arsenal once it became clear he was about to lose any war that broke out. As this risk increases, Washington will find it increasingly difficult to avoid reassessing the country's multi-decade alliance with South Korea. The threat to American civilians will be magnified to grotesque proportions, simply because Washington continues to promise to help South Korea.

What if the U.S. drops its defense guarantee? The argument for America to provide the conventional defense of the ROK is long expired. The South is far wealthier than its northern neighbor. The former has a larger population and is a major international actor. Seoul can handle its own conventional defense.

Nevertheless, the DPRK's nuclear weapons pose a unique danger. Perhaps powerful conventional weapons would offer sufficient deterrence. Perhaps not. Would South Koreans accept the risk of going naked, so to speak? If not, Seoul would have to build its own nuclear arsenal.

Of course, the idea is a lot simpler in theory than when transformed into policy. The opposition Democratic Party rejects the idea. And there are real downsides. More nukes create more opportunities for proliferation and accidents. Nuclear powers China and Russia would be opposed, though they might do little in practice to punish Seoul. Japan would be plunged into a fractious debate about following suit. The ROK's civilian nuclear export industry would be vulnerable to international restrictions.

Still, all that would really matter would be Washington's reaction. No doubt, nonproliferation lobbyists would battle alliance advocates. There would be a blizzard of competing webinars, podcasts, op-eds, and policy papers on the issue. If opposed, the U.S. could apply diplomatic pressure, organize international opposition, impose economic penalties, propose UN sanctions, withdraw American military forces, downgrade or even end the alliance, or take some combination of these actions.

However, if Washington forthrightly dropped extended deterrence, it could not easily demand that the South remain exposed to North Korea's growing nuclear capability. The U.S. can easily disengage since it possesses an overwhelming nuclear deterrent. The ROK understandably might then choose to deploy its own deterrent. Which Seoul could shape to meet its own needs and control to defend its own interests.

Nonproliferation would suffer, but North Korea's arsenal already has ruptured the NPT regime. Moreover, the US accommodated its British and French allies when they went nuclear, closed its eyes and ears when Israel chose the atomic option, and reluctantly abandoned sanctions when India and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons. It is a bit late for Uncle Sam to declare that interest and honor prevent acceptance of a ROK bomb."