“The Times They are A-Changin’”Alright! By James Reed
The title comes from a Bob Dylan song, a Leftist protest song from 1964. How things are set to change, even from that time, for those who are of the Leftist tribe. For example, George Christensen at Nation First in a subscribers only piece, draws our attention to an important article byN.S. Lyons' recent piece "American Strong Gods" in The Upheaval, which introduces the idea of the present time being the end of the ideological 20th century, and its ruling neo-liberal globalist, cosmopolitan and woke concepts and ideologies.
N.S. Lyons' essay American Strong Gods presents a compelling argument about the resurgence of foundational ideals—what he calls "strong gods"—as a necessary response to the fragmentation of modern American society. He contends that the decline of traditional structures such as family, faith, and national identity has left individuals unmoored, leading to cultural instability and social alienation. In Lyons' view, the 20th century's emphasis on hyper-individualism and secularism systematically dismantled the very institutions that once provided people with a sense of belonging and purpose. The current societal unrest, he argues, stems from this loss, as humans naturally seek shared values and communal identity.
Lyons critiques the dominance of what he calls "weak gods," such as excessive tolerance and relativism, which have fostered division rather than unity. He suggests that societies require a firm moral and cultural foundation, and without it, people become more vulnerable to ideological extremism and social discord. This is why, he argues, America is witnessing a revival of these once-dismissed strong gods—because people instinctively recognize the need for something greater than themselves.
His argument holds significant merit. The erosion of shared values has undoubtedly contributed to cultural fragmentation. While tolerance and inclusivity are important up to a point, they cannot serve as the sole basis for a cohesive society, the fallacy of multiculturalism. Lyons rightly points out that abstract principles without a grounding in concrete institutions fail to provide the deep sense of meaning that people crave. A society built on nothing but fluid identities and ever-changing moral standards struggles to maintain cohesion. Strong families, shared national identity, and a commitment to faith have historically provided not just structure but also resilience in the face of adversity.
Furthermore, the idea that the revival of strong gods is inherently dangerous is flawed. While critics may fear the return of nationalism, traditionalism, or religious conviction as oppressive forces, Lyons' argument suggests that these ideals do not necessarily have to be exclusionary or authoritarian. Instead, they can offer a framework for unity and purpose. Rather than seeing this revival as a reactionary retreat into the past, it can be understood as a natural correction—a balancing act between the excesses of modern liberalism and the enduring human need for communal belonging.
Lyons' essay is a crucial contribution to the conversation about America' and the West's future. If societies want to rebuild a sense of shared purpose, they must acknowledge the importance of strong cultural and moral foundations. The resurgence of "strong gods" is not a step backwards, but a necessary recalibration—a reminder that people thrive when they are part of something greater than themselves.
https://nationfirst.substack.com/p/the-establishment-is-in-panic
https://theupheaval.substack.com/p/american-strong-gods
"Instead of producing a utopian world of peace and progress, the open society consensus and its soft, weak gods led to civilizational dissolution and despair. As intended, the strong gods of history were banished, religious traditions and moral norms debunked, communal bonds and loyalties weakened, distinctions and borders torn down, and the disciplines of self-governance surrendered to top-down technocratic management. Unsurprisingly, this led to nation-states and a broader civilization that lack the strength to hold themselves together, let alone defend against external threats from non-open, non-delusional societies. In short, the campaign of radical self-negation pursued by the post-war open society consensus functionally became a collective suicide pact by the liberal democracies of the Western world.
But, as reality began to intrude over the past two decades, the share of people still convinced by the hazy promises of the open society steadily diminished. A reaction began to brew, especially among those most divorced from and harmed by its aging obsessions: the young and the working class. The "populism" that is now sweeping the West is best understood as a democratic insistence on the restoration and reintegration of respect for those strong gods capable of grounding, uniting, and sustaining societies, including coherent national identities, cohesive natural loyalties, and the recognition of objective and transcendent truths.
Today's populism is more than just a reaction against decades of elite betrayal and terrible governance (though it is that too); it is a deep, suppressed thumotic desire for long-delayed action, to break free from the smothering lethargy imposed by proceduralist managerialism and fight passionately for collective survival and self-interest. It is the return of the political to politics. This demands a restoration of old virtues, including a vital sense of national and civilizational self-worth. And that in turn requires a rejection of the pathological "tyranny of guilt" (as the French philosopher Pascal Bruckner once dubbed it) that has gripped the Western mind since 1945. As the power of endless hysterical accusations of "fascism" has gradually faded, we have – for better and worse – begun to witness the end of the Age of Hitler.
Energetic national populism is, then, a rejection of all the core obsessions and demands of the twentieth century and the open society consensus that so dominated it. The passionless reign of weakness, tolerance, and drab universalist utilitarianism being held up as moral and political ideals seems to be ending. And that means the gerontocracy of the Long Twentieth Century is finally dying off too. This is what Trump, in all his brashness, represents: the strong gods have escaped from exile and returned to America, dragging the twenty-first century along behind them.
Abroad and in Washington, this brash attitude has caused much consternation and confusion ("Why is Trump threatening to invade Mexico, bully Canada, and annex Greenland from a NATO ally? Wasn't he supposed to be an isolationist?") But the principle behind all Trump's behavior here actually appears to be quite straightforward: he is willing to use American might however may benefit the nation, rather than caring very much about protecting the status quo liberal international order for its own sake or adhering to polite fictions like international law. Turns out "you can just do things" on the world stage too. Diplomacy and alliances are logically seen as of value only insofar as they benefit America. This is indeed what "America First" always meant. In this way the Trump Doctrine is simply a rejection of the neurotic, confrontation-avoidant post-war consensus in favor of the restoration of standard muscular, Western Hemisphere-focused, pre-twentieth century American foreign policy, in the style of a president Andrew Jackson, William McKinley, or Teddy Roosevelt.
New Secretary of State Marco Rubio has even explicitly described the idealism of the global U.S.-enforced liberal international order as an "anomaly," noting that it "was a product of the end of the Cold War" and that "eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet." This revitalization of the spirit of national sovereignty and international competition seems to already be spreading and inspiring a turn back towards stronger gods around the world. As Hungary's conservative-nationalist prime minister, Viktor Orbán, recently put it to a gathering of European populists, "Our friend Trump, the Trump tornado, has changed the world in just a couple of weeks. An era has ended. Today, everyone sees that we are the future."
So while at a surface level the vibe of the Trump revolution might be mistaken as merely marking a return to circa-1990s libertarianism, with its individual freedom and "greed is good" free-market mindset, he represents a far more significant shift than that: back – or rather forward – more than a century. The globalist neoliberalism, interventionist one-world internationalism, and naive social progressivism of the 90s open society is dead and gone. Despite his political alliance with the Right-Wing Progressives of Silicon Valley, Trump's new world is in a real sense distinctly post-liberal."
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