The Rising Chinese Communist Party Espionage Problem

America and Australia face a serious, escalating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) espionage problem that reaches deep into critical infrastructure, government, business, and diaspora communities. While President Trump returned from his Beijing summit praising Xi Jinping and touting "successful" trade talks, Beijing's intelligence apparatus continues aggressive operations on US and allied soil with little apparent restraint.

Recent cases illustrate the breadth of the threat. In California, Arcadia Mayor Eileen Wang pleaded guilty to acting as an unregistered Chinese agent, using her position and a community news site to push CCP propaganda, including denial of documented Uyghur abuses in Xinjiang. In New York, a man was convicted for operating a clandestine "secret police station" in Chinatown, part of Beijing's global network of over 100 such outposts used for transnational repression against dissidents.

These are not isolated incidents. China's espionage machine functions like an industrial-scale vacuum cleaner: stealing AI know-how through "distillation" of US frontier models, smuggling billions in restricted advanced chips, recruiting insiders (including military personnel), and running influence operations. Chinese-linked biolabs have turned up in residential areas across the US. Cyber intrusions are even more alarming.

The Salt Typhoon campaign saw Chinese hackers penetrate more than a dozen major US telecom companies, accessing call logs, text messages, and even "lawful intercept" systems used by law enforcement. Similar probes have hit Australian telecommunications networks. Australia's ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess has warned that Chinese state-linked groups like Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon are actively targeting critical infrastructure: telecoms, energy, water, transport, for both espionage and potential pre-positioning for sabotage. Burgess bluntly stated in late 2025 that Australia has crossed the threshold for "high-impact sabotage" risk.

Volt Typhoon, in particular, has focused on embedding in US critical infrastructure for disruptive potential in a crisis, precisely the scenario that should alarm both Washington and Canberra given their deep alliance ties.

Under Xi Jinping, these operations have grown bolder, more systematic, and more brazen. They blend traditional espionage, cyber warfare, elite capture, and diaspora influence. The goal is clear: accelerate China's military modernisation, erode Western technological edges, and prepare leverage for future conflict, especially over Taiwan.

Yet defences appear strained. US officials and analysts warn that resource shifts (including FBI redeployments) and cuts to agencies like CISA have weakened counter-espionage and infrastructure protection. Australia, while more publicly vigilant in recent years, still faces persistent probing of its own vital systems.

This is not routine great-power competition. It is a sustained, state-directed campaign by an adversary that views the US and its allies as primary targets. Trade deals and diplomatic niceties will not neutralize it. Beijing will only dial back when the costs of continued infiltration, through prosecutions, expulsions, technology controls, and hardened defences, clearly outweigh the benefits.

Until then, America and Australia must treat Chinese espionage as the core national security threat it is: not a niche issue for intelligence professionals, but a strategic reality demanding far stronger political will, inter-agency coordination, and public awareness. Complacency or distraction risks waking up one day to find critical systems already compromised when they are needed most.

https://spectator.com/article/america-has-a-serious-chinese-spying-problem/