The Folly of Not Seeing China as an Existential Threat to the West, By James Reed and Chris Knight (Florida)
As tensions simmer across the Indo-Pacific, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues its relentless march toward global dominance. Recent reports detail an unprecedented military buildup, including expanded nuclear capabilities, advanced cyber operations, and a naval fleet that now rivals, and in some metrics surpasses, that of the United States. Yet, amid this escalation, a troubling chorus of voices in Western academia and policy circles persists in downplaying the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This mindset, often dubbed "threat deflation," represents not just intellectual shortsightedness but a perilous folly that could undermine the very foundations of Western security, economy, and values.
Threat deflation is the tendency to minimise the PRC's aggressive intentions and capabilities, often by emphasising internal challenges, bureaucratic hurdles, or purported weaknesses within the PLA. It's a perspective rooted in wishful thinking, mirror-imaging Western constraints onto China, and sometimes, unwitting susceptibility to CCP disinformation. Over the past three decades, this approach has dominated U.S. foreign policy, leading to strategic miscalculations that have allowed Beijing to close the gap in military prowess while entangling the West in economic dependencies. As we stand on the brink of a new Cold War, or perhaps something hotter, the failure to recognise China as an existential threat risks repeating the mistakes of history, where complacency paved the way for authoritarian expansion.
Consider the PLA's recent organisational reforms, particularly the creation of the Information Support Force (ISF) in April 2024. This new entity, emerging from the dissolution of the Strategic Support Force, is designed to integrate network information systems, enhancing joint operations across domains like cyber, space, and electronic warfare. It's a strategic pivot under Xi Jinping to build a "modern military force system" that supports theatre commands and enables multi-domain dominance. Proponents of threat deflation, such as Joel Wuthnow in his April 2025 article "A New Step in China's Military Reform" published in the National Defense University's Joint Force Quarterly, argue that this reorganisation reveals weaknesses: bureaucratic management issues, resource allocation challenges, and a limited focus on regional rather than global operations. Wuthnow suggests Xi's part-time role as CMC chairman hampers effective oversight, and that the ISF doesn't signal a broader global ambition.
Such conclusions are dangerously misguided. They ignore the exponential growth in China's dce budget, surging year-over-year for decades, far outpacing Western assumptions of fiscal constraints. The ISF isn't a sign of frailty; it's a force multiplier for information dominance, crucial in modern warfare where cyber and data superiority can decide battles before they begin. Moreover, dismissing Xi's control overlooks the centralised nature of CCP command, where operational decisions are executed with ruthless efficiency, as evidenced by recent dual-carrier exercises east of the second island chain and air operations over distant regions like Egypt.
This deflationary lens extends to assessments of Xi's purges within the PLA. In a July 2025 Foreign Affairs piece, "Is China's Military Ready for War? What Xi's Purges Do—and Don't—Mean for Beijing's Ambitions," MIT Professor M. Taylor Fravel posits that the removal of high-ranking officers, amid corruption scandals, has degraded combat readiness and eroded leadership confidence. Fravel claims these actions highlight systemic flaws, making ambitious operations like a Taiwan invasion less feasible. Yet, this view lacks empirical backing. Under Xi's 13-year tenure, PLA activities have intensified: aggressive incursions into Taiwan's airspace, circumnavigations of Australia with live-fire drills, and a sustained anti-piracy presence in the Gulf of Aden for 17 years. The purges, far from weakening the military, appear to consolidate Xi's control, rooting out disloyalty while accelerating modernisation.
The folly here is in viewing China's military in isolation, snapshotting momentary "weaknesses" without tracing the strategic trendline. Over 25 years, the PLA has evolved from a coastal defence force to a blue-water powerhouse with global reach. By 2025, China's navy boasts over 370 ships, including advanced carriers and submarines, enabling power projection from Djibouti to the Solomon Islands. Its nuclear arsenal is expanding rapidly, with projections of over 1,000 warheads by 2030, challenging U.S. deterrence. Joint exercises in far-flung locales, from Egypt to the South China Sea, demonstrate not regional containment but ambitions for worldwide influence.
Beyond the military, China's threat is multifaceted and existential. Economically, the West's reliance on Beijing for rare earths, pharmaceuticals, and supply chains creates vulnerabilities that could be weaponised in conflict. Cyber operations, bolstered by the ISF, target critical infrastructure, intellectual property, and democratic institutions. Political warfare through United Front tactics sows division, influences elites, and erodes alliances. The CCP"s "no-limits" partnership with Russia amplifies these risks, potentially coordinating threats across Eurasia. Framing China merely as a competitor ignores its ideological drive to supplant liberal democracy with authoritarian control, as articulated in Xi's vision of a "community with a shared future for mankind," code for Beijing-led hegemony.
The consequences of this folly are stark. Threat deflation has left the West lagging in shipbuilding, munitions production, and technological self-sufficiency. It fosters complacency, delaying necessary investments in deterrence and alliances like AUKUS or the Quad. As one analysis warns, underestimating China's scale risks misjudging its capacity for great-power competition. In a worst-case scenario, it could embolden Beijing to act decisively, over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or beyond, catching the West unprepared.
To counter this, we must adopt a worst-case analysis: rigorous, evidence-based assessments that connect daily PLA developments into a coherent threat picture. This isn't alarmism; it's prudence. As the FBI's primers on the "China Threat" underscore, awareness is the first step in safeguarding our freedoms. The West must decouple economically, bolster defences, and unite against CCP aggression. Failing to see China as an existential threat isn't just intellectual error, it's a path to strategic defeat. The time for deflation is over; reality demands vigilance.
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