The Biolabs in Ukraine: From Conspiracy Smear to Official Review
In early 2022, as Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, Tulsi Gabbard, then a private citizen and former congresswoman, posted a video raising a straightforward concern: There are dozens of U.S.-funded biological research facilities in Ukraine handling dangerous pathogens. She argued they should be secured or shut down to prevent accidental releases amid the chaos of war.
Mainstream voices and politicians, including Sen. Mitt Romney, blasted her. Romney called it "parroting false Russian propaganda" and labelled her claims "treasonous lies" that "may well cost lives." Others, like Rep. Adam Kinzinger, echoed the "traitor" line. The message was clear: Questioning these labs made you a Kremlin asset.
Fast forward to 2026. Tulsi Gabbard is now Director of National Intelligence in the Trump administration. She's leading a review of more than 120 U.S.-funded biolabs abroad, including over 40 in Ukraine. The goal: map their locations, catalogue pathogens, and scrutinise the research, especially risky "gain-of-function" work that could make pathogens more dangerous. Gabbard ties it directly to lessons from COVID-19.
The facilities were real and publicly acknowledged. Since 2005, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) poured roughly $200 million into Ukraine's biological infrastructure through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (often called the Nunn-Lugar program). This supported around 46 Ukrainian-owned and operated laboratories, health facilities, and diagnostic sites.
Official purpose: Secure and consolidate dangerous pathogens left over from the Soviet-era bioweapons program, improve biosafety, strengthen disease surveillance for human and animal health, and prevent outbreaks or proliferation to bad actors. Think monitoring things like anthrax, plague, or avian flu in a region with a troubled history of biological work.
In March 2022, Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland confirmed to Congress that Ukraine had "biological research facilities" and expressed worry that Russian forces might seize "research materials." Pentagon fact sheets openly discussed the funding and collaboration. Avril Haines, then DNI, noted the labs could pose misuse risks even if not intended for weapons.
The U.S. and Ukraine have long denied any bioweapons development, consistent with the Biological Weapons Convention. Mainstream outlets, fact-checkers, and international bodies called Russian claims of active U.S.-run "bioweapons labs" disinformation, a narrative amplified to justify the invasion.
Labs working with live pathogens, even for defensive or public-health reasons, carry real risks. Accidents happen. The world saw that with debates over Wuhan lab leak theories and gain-of-function research. Placing or funding such facilities in a country bordering a nuclear power, with a history of corruption and now at war, invites legitimate questions:
Biosafety in a war zone: What happens if a shell hits a facility storing dangerous samples? Did all pathogens get properly destroyed or moved when Russia advanced?
Transparency: Why the aggressive gaslighting when officials had already admitted the labs existed? Calling basic questions "treasonous" eroded trust.
Broader pattern: The U.S. has funded similar threat-reduction programs across former Soviet states. Oversight matters when taxpayer dollars and global health are involved. COVID reminded everyone how interconnected (and fragile) this is.
Gabbard's 2022 point wasn't wild conspiracy; it was risk mitigation. Her current review as DNI seems like an overdue accountability move under a Trump executive order banning federal gain-of-function funding.
This isn't about proving secret super-villain labs (evidence for active bioweapons programs remains absent or unconvincing to most independent observers). It's simpler and more sobering:
Governments fund dual-use biological research worldwide. "Dual-use" means the same work that fights diseases can, in theory, enable weapons. Post-Soviet cleanup was a worthy goal, but execution, secrecy, and risk assessment deserve scrutiny, especially when war breaks out nearby.
The partisan flip-flops are telling. What was "Russian propaganda" in 2022 is now a formal U.S. intelligence review in 2026. That doesn't make Gabbard a prophet or her critics villains, it shows how fog-of-war narratives and political tribalism clouded a legitimate biosecurity issue.
Better paths forward include:
Full transparency on past and current projects.
Stronger international oversight for high-containment labs.
Ending reflexive smears against people asking questions about risky research.
Prioritising real biosafety over narrative control.
Pandemics don't care about politics. Pathogens don't respect borders or talking points. Whether these Ukrainian facilities were purely benign public health tools or carried hidden risks, the episode reveals how quickly "trust the experts" can become "don't ask questions," and why independent scrutiny remains essential.
