Iran Will See a Nuclear Imperative: Lessons from History, By Charles Taylor (Florida)
As James Dwyer argues in The Conversation, the US strikes on the Iranian nuclear sites may have backfired, pushing Iran to conclude that acquiring nuclear weapons at any cost is now essential for regime survival. Drawing lessons from North Korea's defiance, Ukraine's disarmament, and the fates of Iraq and Libya, Iran may see nuclear armament as its only shield against Western military intervention. This blogpost explores why Iran might pursue this path and the global implications of such a decision.
Dwyer's analysis suggests that Operation Midnight Hammer, while tactically impressive, has inadvertently strengthened Iran's resolve to acquire nuclear weapons. The U.S. used Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs designed to destroy deeply buried targets like Fordow, which is embedded in a mountain. Despite claims of "spectacular military success," Iranian officials assert that their facilities were evacuated and sustained minimal damage, a claim echoed by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on X. This resilience, combined with historical precedents, provides a compelling rationale for Iran to emulate North Korea's nuclear strategy.
North Korea's nuclear program offers Iran a blueprint for survival. By developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, Pyongyang has deterred Western military intervention despite decades of sanctions and isolation. Dwyer notes that North Korea "no longer faces a Western military threat" because its nuclear arsenal ensures mutually assured destruction. Posts on X similarly highlight North Korea's success in leveraging nuclear weapons to secure regime stability, with some speculating that Iran may seek direct assistance from Pyongyang, given their history of missile technology cooperation.
For Iran, North Korea's model demonstrates that nuclear weapons can neutralise the U.S.'s overwhelming conventional advantage, exemplified by bunker-busting bombs. Acquiring warheads would allow Iran to deter future strikes and project power regionally, particularly against Israel, which has faced Iranian missile barrages since the U.S. attack.
Iran's calculus is also shaped by the fates of states that abandoned or lacked nuclear weapons. Dwyer points to Ukraine, which surrendered its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal in the 1990s under the Budapest Memorandum, receiving security guarantees from Russia and the West. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion in 2022 exposed the fragility of those assurances, suggesting to Iran that disarmament invites aggression. Ukraine's denuclearisation left it vulnerable to Russian expansionism.
Similarly, Iraq and Libya serve as warnings. Saddam Hussein's Iraq, lacking nuclear weapons, faced U.S.-led invasions in 1991 and 2003, leading to regime collapse. Muammar Gaddafi's Libya relinquished its nascent nuclear program in 2003, only to be toppled by NATO-backed forces in 2011. These examples reinforce Iran's belief that nuclear weapons are a prerequisite for deterring Western intervention.
Operation Midnight Hammer may have also galvanized Iran's domestic support for nuclearisation. Medvedev claimed on X that the strikes rallied Iranians around their spiritual leadership, including those previously indifferent or opposed. This unity could embolden the regime to pursue nuclear weapons as a symbol of national resilience. Regionally, Iran's proxies, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias, could intensify attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets, creating a distraction while Iran accelerates its nuclear efforts, potentially with foreign assistance.
If Iran concludes that nuclear weapons are essential, it faces two primary paths: domestic development or foreign acquisition. Both carry significant risks and implications.
1. Domestic Development
Iran's nuclear program, despite setbacks from U.S. and Israeli strikes, retains significant expertise and infrastructure. Fordow's deep fortifications suggest that some capabilities may have survived the recent attack. Iran could redouble efforts to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels (90% U-235) and develop warheads, though this would require overcoming technical challenges and evading further strikes. Dwyer notes that bunker-busting bombs may not have fully destroyed Iran's facilities, giving it a window to rebuild.
2. Foreign Acquisition
Medvedev's assertion that "a number of countries" are ready to supply Iran with nuclear warheads points to a faster, albeit riskier, option. As discussed in prior blog posts today, Russia and North Korea are the most likely candidates due to their nuclear arsenals and strategic ties with Iran. Russia, facing Western sanctions, might see nuclear transfers as a way to counter U.S. influence, while North Korea could seek financial or technological gains. China and Pakistan are less probable but not impossible, given their own geopolitical calculations. Some have speculated on these possibilities, with some suggesting a Russia-Iran-North Korea axis could emerge to challenge the West.
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, whether through development or acquisition, would reshape global security dynamics.
A nuclear-armed Iran would likely trigger a Middle Eastern arms race. Saudi Arabia, which condemned the U.S. strikes, has signalled interest in nuclear capabilities if Iran achieves them. Turkey and Egypt might follow, destabilising the region. Israel, already under Iranian missile attacks, could escalate its pre-emptive strikes, risking a broader war.
Iran's nuclearisation would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), especially if facilitated by Russia or North Korea. As Dwyer's analysis implies, the failure of bunker-busting bombs to stop Iran could embolden other states to pursue nuclear weapons, perceiving conventional defences as insufficient. This nuclear anarchy could unravel decades of non-proliferation efforts.
The U.S. faces a strategic bind. Operation Midnight Hammer aimed to prevent Iran's nuclearisation but may have accelerated it. Further military action risks entangling the U.S. in a ground war, as Medvedev warned, while diplomacy is complicated by Iran's hardened stance. The U.S.'s use of bunker-busting bombs, unique to its arsenal as Dwyer notes, underscores its unmatched power but also its limits against a determined adversary.
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons could deepen its ties with Russia, China, and North Korea, forming a formidable anti-Western bloc. This alignment would challenge U.S. hegemony, particularly in the Middle East, where Gulf states like Qatar and the UAE have criticised the strikes. A nuclear-armed Iran could also empower its proxies, intensifying attacks on U.S. bases and allies.
While Dwyer's argument that Iran sees nuclear weapons as its only path to survival is compelling, it assumes the regime prioritises survival over all else. Economic collapse, intensified sanctions, or internal dissent could force Iran to negotiate rather than escalate. Moreover, foreign suppliers like Russia or North Korea face significant risks, including U.S. retaliation or global isolation, which might deter them. Iran's claim of minimal damage to its facilities requires verification, as does Medvedev's assertion of foreign support, which may be rhetorical posturing.
Nevertheless, the historical lessons of North Korea, Ukraine, Iraq, and Libya provide a strong incentive for Iran to pursue nuclearisation. The failure of bunker-busting bombs to decisively halt Iran's program may convince the regime that only nuclear deterrence can prevent regime change.
Operation Midnight Hammer, intended to cripple Iran's nuclear ambitions, may have instead convinced the regime that nuclear weapons are its only means of survival. Drawing on North Korea's success and the failures of Ukraine, Iraq, and Libya, Iran may seek to acquire nuclear warheads, either through domestic efforts or foreign assistance from Russia or North Korea. The consequences, regional instability, non-proliferation collapse, and heightened U.S.-Iran tensions, could reshape the global order, for the worse.
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