Ineptocracy: The Failure of Ukraine Policy, By Brian Simpson
The article by Michael Rainsborough, Professor of Strategic Theory at King's College London
opens with a sharp critique from Ben Wallace, former UK Defence Secretary, who, in a Telegraph piece, branded U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance "clueless" regarding their approach to the Ukraine war. This sentiment, Rainsborough notes, resonates across British and European commentary, especially after a heated Oval Office confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky over ending the conflict. Western media largely sided with Zelensky, portraying him as a heroic figure resisting Russian aggression, while casting Trump and Vance as appeasers—a narrative Rainsborough suggests oversimplifies the situation.
Trump and Vance have openly sought to disentangle the U.S. from Ukraine's war, a stance Rainsborough acknowledges as controversial but questions whether they should heed advice from figures like Wallace. He points to Wallace's October 2023 Telegraph claim that Ukraine's counteroffensive was succeeding—a prediction that proved wildly optimistic. The counteroffensive faltered, notably in Zaporizhzhia, and the Kursk incursion failed to shift the battlefield dynamics. With Ukraine losing 20 percent of its territory and facing resource shortages, Rainsborough argues the war has stagnated, exposing the hollowness of Western optimism.
European leaders, despite their bold rhetoric about deploying troops or enforcing no-fly zones, lack the military capacity to act without U.S. support, rendering such proposals impractical. Rainsborough frames this as part of a broader pattern of Western strategic missteps—comparing Ukraine to debacles like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—where well-intentioned interventions spiral into costly failures. He questions why Western policymakers repeatedly stumble into these traps, ignoring the "elephant in the room": a chronic inability to learn from past mistakes.
The piece then dissects this pattern, defining "good strategy" as achieving clear goals efficiently, with proportionality and prudence as its cornerstones. Rainsborough contrasts this with "bad strategy"—impulsive, disproportionate actions clung to despite mounting evidence of failure. He cites historical examples of prudent strategy (e.g., Britain's imperial management) against modern blunders, arguing that the West has lost its knack for restraint since the Cold War.
Rainsborough attributes this to a "total war mentality" lingering from World War II and the Cold War, where existential threats justified all-out mobilisation. This mindset, he argues, has been misapplied to non-existential conflicts like Ukraine, leading to overreach. He critiques the influence of think tanks and policy elites—like the signatories of the 1998 Project for a New American Century letter urging Saddam Hussein's ouster—who prioritise grandiose objectives over practical outcomes. This "anti-strategy," he suggests, reflects a deeper ideological rigidity, exemplified by the post-9/11 "war on terror" and even the "war on Covid," where totalising responses trumped proportionality.
The article concludes by questioning why this persists. Rainsborough posits that a post-Cold War shift toward a "liberal imperialist" mission—to enforce a global democratic order—has disconnected policy from public consent. Elites, cloistered in an "ineptocracy" of technocrats, dismiss popular scepticism, producing strategies that sound noble but falter in execution. He ends with a provocative self-reflection: might the very study of strategy, bloated with academic excess, be complicit in these failures?
Wallace's "clueless" jab at Trump and Vance reflects a transatlantic rift. Trump's push to exit Ukraine aligns with his "America First" ethos, seen in his February 2025 Oval Office clash with Zelensky, where he halted intelligence sharing (for a time) and berated Zelensky for resisting peace talks. Vance echoed this, suggesting economic stakes (e.g., mineral deals) over military aid.
The article underscores Ukraine as the latest in a string of Western flops. By March 2025, Ukraine's losses—20 percent of its land, manpower shortages (average soldier age 43, per whitehouse.gov, February 28, 2025)—and Russia's resilience, expose the limits of Western support. European troop proposals, floated by leaders like Keir Starmer, are correctly dismissed as hollow without U.S. backing.
Rainsborough's "total war brainrot" thesis ties modern missteps to a WWII hangover, where absolute victory justified absolute effort. Applied to Ukraine, this manifests in moralistic framing (Zelensky as Churchill, Putin as Hitler) rather than pragmatic goals, a critique echoed in Wallace's own warnings of "Nazi appeasement" parallels.
The "paradox of expertise" highlights a disconnect: despite abundant strategic scholarship, outcomes worsen. Rainsborough cites the Iraq invasion—pushed by Kagan and Kristol—as a precursor to Ukraine, where ideological zeal outpaced reality.
The shift to an "ineptocracy" reflects a post-democratic trend where elites ignore public fatigue with endless wars. A 52 percent Ukrainian willingness to cede territory for peace (whitehouse.gov, February 28, 2025), contrasts with Western insistence on fighting on, mirroring domestic U.S. scepticism of prolonged aid.
Rainsborough's account is a biting autopsy of Western strategic decay, using Wallace's critique as a springboard to expose broader flaws. His scepticism of Trump and Vance is tempered by equal disdain for their critics' track record, suggesting neither side grasps proportionality. The call for prudence resonates as Russia holds firm and Western resolve wavers. The article's strength lies in its unflinching question: why do we keep failing? Because of Europe falling into what he calls "ineptocracy."
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