The End of Liberal Democracy By James Reed
Back in 1992, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed that history was over with the victory of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism, in his book, The End of History and the Last Man:
He did not anticipate the radical jihadist challenge, mass migration and white genocide, or the populist revolt against these things:
Nor, for that matter did he see the advance of computers and the loss of entire sectors of jobs, and the rapid shrinking of society’s pie:
However, Fukuyama is now worried about populism, as seen in Europe and in Donald Trump, as the restless natives will upset “liberal democracy,” whatever that now is:
“There is growing consensus that populism constitutes a grave threat to liberal democracy, and to the liberal international order on which peace and prosperity have rested for the past two generations. Democracies rely on power-sharing arrangements, courts, legislatures and a free and independent media to check executive power. Since these institutions obstruct the free reign of populists, they are often subjected to blistering attack.
This is especially the case with the right-wing variety of populism that is spreading across the U.S. and Western and Eastern Europe. The liberal international order depends, in turn, on institutions such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Trade Organization, the G20, the European Union, the North American free-trade agreement and others in order to facilitate the movement of goods and investment across borders. All of them, together with the underlying principles and values giving rise to them, have been in the crosshairs of populist politicians in recent years.
Several factors are enabling the spread of this virulent strain of populism. First there are economic factors associated with the decline of the Western middle class and hyper-concentration of wealth in the hands of the elite. Next are the intrinsic political weaknesses of democracies themselves, dependent as they are on fractious coalitions and divided electorates. These shortcomings are routinely exploited by charismatic strongmen. Just as important are cultural factors related to the resentment of newcomers and the feeling by some that the country has been claimed by foreigners.
These factors explain why immigration, at least in the West, acts as a lightning rod for populism. The surge of migrants and asylum claimants over the past decade – partly a result of failed military interventions in the Middle East and flawed immigration and border controls – has exacerbated anxieties about rapid cultural change in areas of the U.S. and Europe. It is no surprise, then, that identity politics – whether over ethnicity, language, religion or sexuality – is fast displacing class as the defining characteristic of contemporary politics.”
This is a good article because it clearly identifies the “global liberal order,” with what we view as the globalist forces set to destroy community and security. “Liberal democracy” is nothing more than a sugar-coated deceptive phrase for globalism, with its mass migration and open borders. At no point does Fukuyama attempt to address the real concerns that have led to populism, such as people rightly fearing that their job security and homelands will be vapourised by globalist forces. Thus, hopefully, Fukuyama’s liberal democracy will die, for it is a force of evil that must be opposed, and defeated for nations to survive.