Immigration Does Not Solve Population Decline, By James Reed

The article from Aporia Magazine titled "Immigration Does Not Solve Population Decline" by Noah Carl, published on February 27, 2025,

https://www.aporiamagazine.com/p/immigration-does-not-solve-population

challenges the widely held assumption that immigration is a viable long-term solution to demographic issues such as population decline and aging societies.

The article argues that immigration only provides a short-term boost to population numbers and does not address the underlying causes of population decline, such as low birth rates. It emphasizes that immigrants, once settled, tend to adopt the fertility patterns of the host country, typically within one or two generations. This means that the initial population increase from immigration eventually fades as immigrant birth rates converge with those of the native population, which are often below replacement level (2.1 children per woman).

A significant point raised is the global nature of fertility decline. Even countries that traditionally supply immigrants, such as those in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, are experiencing falling birth rates. For instance, Mexico's fertility rate has dropped from over 6 children per woman in the 1960s to around 1.9 today, and similar trends are observed worldwide. This suggests that relying on immigration becomes less sustainable as fewer young people are available to migrate from sending countries over time.

The article critiques the notion that immigration can permanently offset an aging population. While young immigrants initially lower the median age of a population, they too age over time. Without continuous and ever-increasing inflows of new immigrants, the demographic structure reverts to an older profile. This creates a dependency on perpetual immigration, which is impractical given global demographic trends and political realities.

Carl questions the economic argument often made in favour of immigration—that it sustains a workforce to support an aging population. He notes that immigrants also eventually retire and require support, adding to the dependency ratio in the long run unless immigration accelerates indefinitely. Furthermore, the article hints at social cohesion issues, suggesting that large-scale immigration might strain cultural and institutional stability, though it does not delve deeply into this aspect.

The piece uses Japan as an example, noting its low immigration and declining population, yet it remains a functional, prosperous society. This challenges the idea that population decline is inherently catastrophic. Carl also poses a thought experiment: if immigration were a true solution, countries could theoretically maintain stable populations indefinitely through constant inflows—but this ignores the finite pool of potential migrants and the logistical limits of such a policy.

The author advocates for addressing root causes—like encouraging higher native birth rates through family-friendly policies—rather than relying on immigration as a "band-aid." He argues that immigration is often framed as a solution by policymakers because it avoids the harder task of reversing cultural and economic trends driving low fertility.

Studies consistently show that immigrant fertility rates converge with those of the host population over time. For example, in the United States, second-generation immigrants from high-fertility countries like Mexico have birth rates much closer to the national average (around 1.8) than to their parents' home country rates. This convergence undermines the idea that immigration can sustain population growth indefinitely, as the article notes.

The global fertility decline highlighted in the article is a critical limitation. The United Nations projects that by 2050, over half the world's population growth will come from sub-Saharan Africa, while other regions stagnate or shrink. However, even Africa's fertility is declining (e.g., Nigeria's rate fell from 6.35 in 1990 to 5.3 in 2020). As fewer young people are born globally, the pool of potential immigrants shrinks, making it impossible to rely on immigration as a perpetual solution.

Immigration's impact on the dependency ratio (the ratio of non-working-age to working-age people) is temporary. Young immigrants who arrive today become tomorrow's retirees. Economists have modelled this in countries like Germany, where even significant immigration post-2015 has not prevented an eventual rise in the dependency ratio due to low native births and aging migrants. This creates a treadmill effect, requiring ever-larger waves of immigration, which is neither politically feasible nor sustainable.

Beyond the article's scope, critics of immigration as a demographic fix often point to integration challenges. Large-scale immigration can lead to wage suppression in certain sectors, housing shortages, and cultural friction, as seen in debates across Europe and the U.S. These costs may outweigh the temporary demographic benefits, especially if native populations perceive immigration as a threat rather than a solution, fuelling political backlash.

The article's call to boost native birth rates aligns with policies in countries like Hungary, which offers tax breaks and subsidies for families, or Sweden, which provides generous parental leave. These approaches address the root cause—low fertility—rather than masking it with immigration. Historical examples, like the post-WWII baby boom in Western nations, show that cultural and economic incentives can reverse demographic trends without relying on external populations.

Proponents of immigration as a demographic solution, such as the IMF's Giovanni Peri (2022), argue that it ensures economic growth and population stability in aging societies. They cite immediate benefits: immigrants fill labour shortages, pay taxes, and support pension systems. However, this view assumes constant inflows and ignores long-term assimilation and global fertility trends, as Carl points out. Peri's argument also sidesteps the political limits to immigration—public resistance grows when inflows exceed integration capacity, as seen in Brexit or U.S. border debates.

The Aporia article, combined with broader analysis, builds a compelling case that immigration does not solve demographic concerns like population decline or aging. It is a stopgap that delays, rather than resolves the issue, given the convergence of immigrant fertility, the finite global supply of migrants, and the temporary nature of its economic benefits. A sustainable approach requires tackling low birth rates directly through cultural and policy shifts, rather than leaning on an increasingly untenable immigration fix. Japan's example suggests societies can adapt to decline without collapse, challenging the panic that drives immigration-centric solutions. Ultimately, the data and logic suggest that immigration is less a cure and more a distraction from the deeper demographic challenge.