China's Population Crisis: A Ticking Demographic Time Bomb, By Mrs. Vera West and James Reed
China's population problem is reshaping its schools, factories, and global influence. A primary school in Shanghai's Pudong New Area, Sanqiao Primary School, now has just 22 students and 23 teachers. This is a symptom of a nationwide plunge in birth rates emptying classrooms and threatening to hollow out the nation. Enrolments in Shanghai dropped 15% this year, and Guangzhou saw a 12% dip. Nationwide, kindergartens closed by the thousands in 2024, with 5 million fewer kids enrolled. If this trend continues, and it's likely to worsen, China could face economic stagnation, social upheaval, and a diminished role on the world stage. Is this the end of the "China century"?
China's demographic woes stem from the one-child policy, enforced from 1979 to 2015, which curbed population growth to prevent overpopulation. It worked too well. Births peaked at 13.57 per thousand in 2016 after the policy relaxed to allow two children, but by 2024, that rate halved to 6.77. Fertility rates in urban hubs like Beijing and Shanghai are among the world's lowest at 0.7. China's population dipped to 1.408 billion in 2024, down 1.39 million from the year before, marking the third straight year of decline, with deaths outpacing births for the first time since 1961 (outside of pandemics).
Projections estimate China's population could shrink to 633 million by 2100, a 55% drop from today's 1.416 billion. In a worst-case scenario with fertility at 0.72, it could plummet to 320 million, a 77% nosedive. The working-age population (15-64) is set to crater from around 900 million today to just 250 million in coming decades. Rising costs of living, gender imbalances from sex-selective abortions, and a cultural shift prioritising careers over kids are key drivers. Policies like cash incentives for babies have failed, as gender inequality and economic pressures persist.
A worsening decline could stall China's economy. A shrinking workforce means fewer factory workers, less innovation, and dwindling consumption. The old-age dependency ratio is skyrocketing; by 2025, projections showed 234 million elderly (16.4% of the population), but current trends suggest a faster impact. This will strain pensions and healthcare, with fewer workers supporting more retirees. Economic growth could slip below 4% in the 2030s and under 3% in the 2040s. The property market, a GDP pillar, is reeling from oversupply and shrinking demand as families dwindle.
If births drop another 20% this year, as some predict, ghost cities could emerge, not just empty schools. Businesses may flee to younger demographics in India or Vietnam. Output growth could halve from 2020 levels, turning China's demographic dividend into a deficit. Automation and AI might mitigate some losses, but they can't fully replace human ingenuity or consumer bases. Demography isn't destiny, but it's a heavy anchor.
The social effects are already stark. Kindergartens and primary schools are closing en masse, with widespread shutdowns reported. If the trend accelerates, school mergers, teacher layoffs, and rural depopulation will follow. Urban areas, with fertility as low as 0.5 in some cities, could lose 75% of their population in two generations. Gender imbalances mean millions of "leftover men" struggling to find partners, potentially spiking unrest or crime.
If it worsens, pension systems could collapse under 400 million retirees by mid-century. Healthcare may buckle, elder care could become a luxury, and inequality might widen as the rich import help while the poor struggle. Migration from rural to urban areas has strained resources; a full-blown crisis could spark internal migration conflicts or emigration waves, draining talent. China's social fabric, rooted in family duty, may fray as fewer children shoulder elder care.
A shrinking China loses geopolitical clout. A smaller population means fewer soldiers, weaker economic leverage, and diminished soft power. Aging demographics constrain military recruitment and innovation, potentially shifting Asia's balance. As China's global population share drops from 17% today to 5-7% by 2100, rivals like India surge ahead. The Belt and Road Initiative becomes harder to fund with a contracting tax base.
If the decline worsens, China might turn inward, prioritising survival over expansion. Ambitions like Taiwan reunification could fade amid domestic woes. Globally, this creates vacuums, opportunities for the U.S., but risks if desperation fuels aggression. Population decline imposes long-term constraints, forcing strategic retreats. No nation has escaped a demographic winter unscathed; China's could be catastrophic, potentially losing 700 million people.
If trends hold, the "China century" is at risk. China's dominance relies on people power, and without it, ambitions crumble. AI and tech could buy time, but immigration is unlikely in a xenophobic China. With fertility rates stagnant, the population could halve by 2100. Japan aged rich; China risks aging poor, trapped in middle-income status. The West, if it capitalises, could outpace a faltering giant.
This is a wake-up call. Demographic crises are global; China's just the canary in the coal mine. The West faces exactly the same problem.
"A primary school in Shanghai has attracted national attention after its student body shrank to just 22 this year, highlighting the dramatic impact China's plunging birth rate is having on the education system.
Sanqiao Primary School in the Pudong New Area now has more full-time staff than pupils – with 22 children and 23 teachers – despite being located in one of China's largest cities, according to enrolment data released on the local education authority's website.
The information was first published in April, but only began trending on Chinese social media platforms this week, sparking discussion on how the country's demographic decline is affecting schools.
Though Sanqiao is an extreme case, a nationwide decline in births has already caused a wave of preschool closures across China and is now increasingly being felt in the primary education sector.
In 2024, the number of kindergartens in China slumped by more than 20,000 compared with the previous year, with more than 5 million fewer children enrolled, according to official data.
A staff member from the Pudong district government's student enrolment and examination centre confirmed the data about the school was accurate.
Every school can only recruit students from their designated catchment areas, and for Sanqiao "the number of age-appropriate children in the actual catchment area is just this many", she said.
The decline in student numbers has been particularly dramatic in Sanqiao's case because several residential communities in the school's catchment area were recently demolished and relocated, she explained.
The total number of first-graders enrolled at primary schools in Shanghai stood at just over 171,000 as of April, down by 30,000 or roughly 15 per cent from the previous academic year, according to figures released by the Shanghai Education Commission.
Official data from another Chinese megacity, Guangzhou, showed a similar decline. Local primary schools enrolled a total of 240,100 children in 2024, a decline of 32,400 or nearly 12 per cent from 2023.
China's birth rate has plummeted since a peak in 2016, when the country changed its family planning laws to allow all couples to have two children. The number of births per thousand people halved from 13.57 that year to 6.77 in 2024, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
Despite the Sanqiao case, education expert Xiong Bingqi said the recent decline in birth numbers was currently mostly affecting kindergartens rather than primary schools.
"Based on newborn population numbers for corresponding years, the full effect of shrinking student numbers on primary schools won't hit until next year," said Xiong, director of the 21st Century Education Research Institute.
"Future enrolment will undoubtedly shrink, but the solution moving forward will be smaller class sizes to better address students' individual differences," he said.
Xiong said a class size of 20–25 students was reasonable, but according to his calculations, the national average class size currently stood at 38 students in primary schools and 46 in junior high."
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