Big Australia is Not Afraid of Infrastructure Problem (But What about Transhumanism and Nuclear Annihilation?) By Paul Walker (Sydney)
Judith Sloan “Infrastructure a Big Problem for Big Australia,” gives a concise outline of the infrastructure problems that will need to be dealt with, if possible, for the dream of Big Australia of infinity migrants. The middle level elites make only token reference now to the need to move beyond a monoculture, since Anglo Australia has long died, and even the once useful multiculturalism has faded in usefulness. It is now all about short term profits, such as expanding real estate prices, as people live like sardines and being from countries where they are used to this, love it. Of course, before the entire framework collapses, from infrastructure overload. Think of it in engineering structural terms, as social infrastructure like a bridge which becomes subject to sheering forces beyond its capacity of resilience.
Still, there are storm clouds on the horizon for these local puny, petty elites. There is the bigger transhuman agenda, tying in with the Covid plandemic, which sees a replacement of humans by thinking machines, who will be the new slaves of the super-elite. Immigration fuelled capitalism is really a 19th century agenda, and is likely not to survive well into this century.
It is probable that Australia as we know it will not survive either. In the short term, with World War III just around the corner, how does our Big Australia lobby deal with a possible invasion by communist China, or the leveling of Australia by hypersonic missiles? They do not think about this, being only concerned with day-to-day profit maximisation. The CCP has already warned of this, saying Australia is now a nuclear target. A CCP hypersonic egg throw at Sydney would aid in spreading “die-versity.”
Anyway, more of the same old, tired normie debate about how many deck chairs to scram onto the Titanic.
“One of the points made by advocates of Big Australia is that if there are problems associated with large migrant intakes, it has nothing to do with bringing in people per se. Rather, it’s the failure of governments – and particularly state governments – to plan adequately and fund additional infrastructure and the required services.
The argument is that the complaints about congested roads, housing affordability, overcrowded schools and hospitals may be legitimate, but they have nothing to do with the fact that migrants have been contributing some two-thirds of population growth.
If governments were able to invest in a timely and appropriate fashion, then these problems could fade away. In this way, the benefits of large migrant intakes would be much more apparent and people would be more inclined to embrace high rates of population growth – so the argument goes. (Prior to the pandemic, Australia had one of the highest rates of population growth – between 1.2 and 1.5 per cent per year – of all developed economies.)
But are these claims right? Who pays for this additional infrastructure? Are we any good at building large-scale infrastructure projects given recent history?
Let’s be clear on one issue: it’s not just the recently arrived migrants who pay for the extra infrastructure that is required. It is all taxpayers and/or users of the facilities who bear the cost. Had that new bridge/tunnel/school/hospital not been needed, then we would all be better off, financially speaking.
Of course, the project developers and the financiers won’t be so happy with the relative lack of investment in infrastructure were migrant intakes lower, but their interests should never dominate public policy thinking in this area.
Big Australia advocates will often make the claim that there are economies of scale associated with big infrastructure spending and this should be taken into account when considering the link between migrant intake and infrastructure.
You build a road that can accommodate a certain number of cars per minute, say, but there are only half this number initially. Having borne the initial expense of the big build, there should be years when the additional costs of greater demand on infrastructure assets can be accommodated at very low marginal costs. (Economies of scale apply much less to service provision where the costs are closely related to the number of people accessing services.)
The trouble with this thinking is that it has been demonstrated on far too many occasions that state governments are hopeless at overseeing the construction of large infrastructure projects. Way over budget and massively delayed are typical features of many projects. (I’m not letting the federal government off the hook here, but it tends to provide funding rather than oversee projects directly.)
Consider the ongoing saga of the West Gate Tunnel project in Melbourne. Having decided to kill the contract for the East West Link project signed by the Napthine Coalition government – action that cost taxpayers over $1bn – the Andrews Labor government instead has embarked on a massive infrastructure spending spree, including the West Gate Tunnel.
This project was proposed by the toll road operator Transurban. This is, in itself, a bad early indication given the company’s self-interest in doing so. It’s not as if the Victorian government has any problem raising debt.
The project is made up of a 4km tunnel and some ancillary features. It was initially expected to cost $5.5bn, with the company stumping up two-thirds of the cost. In exchange for this contribution, the company sought an extension of the deal whereby the tolls it charges would rise by 4.25 per cent per year for an additional 10 years. This applies to road users who don’t use the West Gate Tunnel. In addition, the company’s exclusive road toll contract was extended to 2045. By any measure, this was an egregious deal, but its terms were rammed through the parliament.
The project has been a complete disaster. There were many months of delay dealing with the contentious issue of the disposal of the contaminated soil. The estimated costs have been jacked up several times and now stand at close to $12bn – more than twice the initial estimate. Workers on the site are paid at least $200,000 a year, and extremely generous contracts have been locked in.
The Victorian government has been forced to increase its contribution to the inflated cost and the final completion date is still up in the air. The project was originally expected to open in the second half of this year.
The Regional Rail project undertaken in Victoria was a similar fiasco. The light rail project in Sydney was over budget and over time. Upgrades to various highways have also been beset with problems.
It is also not just an Australian problem. The high-speed train project in California was finally terminated before completion in the face of substantial cost blowouts and unresolved impediments to project completion. The HS2 project in the UK – another high-speed train project – is riddled with rapidly escalating costs and delays. Some parts of the proposed routes have been scrapped.
All this begs the question of why there are so many problems associated with large infrastructure projects. One fundamental issue is project choice, wherein politics tends to prevail over independent assessments based on costs and benefits. In other words, the projects that get approved and funded are not necessarily the ones most needed but the ones most likely to garner votes.
There is also a crippling lack of competition among the contractors for these projects. A number of projects have been so badly specified in the first instance that it is not surprising that the costs have blown out significantly. A relative shortage of workers with the appropriate skills, particularly in relation to tunnelling, also drives up the ultimate costs.
Of course, when these projects are eventually completed, the users often welcome the added convenience although not the tolls. But it will be taxpayers in the future who are asked to pay off these excessively expensive projects that are funded through additional government debt.
The bottom line is that there are no solutions to these problems in the short term and the prudent action by governments is to limit the amount of infrastructure spending and the size of projects for the foreseeable future. And for this reason, it is also prudent to limit the migrant intake and the additional demands that are placed on infrastructure.”
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