Australia’s US Defence Entanglement and the Perils of a China Pivot, By Professor X
In the vast, red-dirt expanse of Western Australia's Northwest Cape, a network of dirt roads carves geometric patterns into the landscape, visible only from the sky. At its heart stands the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station, its towering radio masts silently broadcasting very-low-frequency signals to Australian and US submarines, including America's nuclear-armed "boomers." For most Australians, clustered along the continent's east and southwest coasts, this isolated facility is out of sight and out of mind. Yet, it is a linchpin in the intricate web of the Australia-US defence alliance, a partnership so deeply woven into the nation's security fabric that disentangling it would be a Herculean task. As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signals a desire for greater independence, hinting at closer ties with China in his July 2025 Curtin Oration, the risks of such a pivot loom large. Australia's strategic reliance on the US, embodied in joint facilities and force posture initiatives, makes any shift toward Beijing a dangerous gamble that could undermine national security, destabilise the Indo-Pacific, and leave Australia vulnerable in a world of escalating great power rivalry.
The Harold E. Holt station is just one node in a network of joint and collaborative facilities that tie Australia to the US defence apparatus. Nearly 1,700 kilometres southeast lies Pine Gap, a joint facility near Alice Springs that has long captured the national imagination, inspiring Midnight Oil's protest anthem Power and the Passion. Less known is its critical role: providing 20-30 minutes of advance warning for Russian or Chinese nuclear attacks, enabling the US to launch a devastating counterstrike. This capability underpins the US's doctrine of mutually assured destruction, extending a nuclear umbrella that protects allies like Australia. Leaked files from Edward Snowden revealed Pine Gap's codename, "RAINFALL," and its role in the US's ECHELON surveillance program, geolocating individuals for drone strikes and hoovering up signals intelligence from adversaries, and possibly allies. Other facilities, like the Joint Geological Research Station in Alice Springs, which detects nuclear tests, and the Learmonth Solar Observatory, which monitors solar disruptions, further cement Australia's role in US strategic operations.
The AUKUS partnership adds new layers to this integration. The Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC), under construction at Northwest Cape, will track space objects, including weapons systems, when it becomes operational in 2026. Near Geraldton, the Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station contributes to ECHELON, intercepting communications from adversary satellites. These facilities operate under Australia's "full knowledge and concurrence" (FK&C) policy, established by the Hawke government, which grants the US significant operational freedom while maintaining Australian oversight. Defence Minister Richard Marles, in a 2023 parliamentary statement, described this as a "fundamental contribution" to the alliance, underscoring Australia's strategic value to the US.
Beyond facilities, US force posture initiatives deepen the entanglement. Since 2011, 2,500 US Marines have rotated annually through Darwin, with expanded roles for US Army and Navy deployments. Nuclear-capable B-52s, B2 stealth bombers, and B1B Lancers operate from RAAF Tindal, upgraded with nearly $900 million in US funding. Under AUKUS, US and UK nuclear-powered submarines will begin operating from HMAS Stirling near Perth by 2027, supported by major infrastructure upgrades. These arrangements position Australia as what US Congressman Michael McCaul called the "central base of operations" for deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific. As US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2025, the US is "laser focused" on strengthening its forward posture in the region, with Australia as a key partner.
Against this backdrop, Albanese's July 2025 Curtin Oration, invoking wartime leader John Curtin to assert Australia's independence, has raised eyebrows. His planned visit to China and rhetoric emphasising a foreign policy not "outsourced" to the US have fuelled speculation, amplified on platforms like X, that Australia is contemplating a pivot toward Beijing. Posts on X reflect public unease, with some labelling AUKUS a threat to sovereignty and accusing Australia of becoming a US proxy. Former Home Affairs secretary Mike Pezzullo has called for an "honest public debate" about US force posture initiatives, questioning whether they align with Australia's interests in deterring China. This sentiment echoes a broader tension: while the US alliance provides unparalleled security, it limits Australia's strategic autonomy, particularly in navigating relations with China, its largest trading partner.
A pivot toward China would be fraught with peril. Strategically, it risks undermining US confidence in Australia as a reliable ally, potentially jeopardizing AUKUS, a $368 billion commitment, and other joint initiatives. Facilities like Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt, unprotected by missile defense systems delayed by the Albanese government, are known targets for Chinese ballistic missiles in a conflict. Beijing's high-resolution satellite imagery of these sites underscores their vulnerability. Economically, while China drives much of Australia's trade, closer alignment with Beijing could expose Australia to coercion, as seen in past trade disputes. A weakened US alliance would also reduce Australia's leverage in negotiations with China, leaving it economically exposed.
Regionally, a China pivot could destabilise alliances with Japan, the Philippines, and other Indo-Pacific partners who rely on a unified front against Chinese assertiveness. Multilateral exercises like Talisman Sabre, involving 19 nations, highlight Australia's role in collective security, a role that could erode if the US perceives Australia as wavering. Domestically, Albanese's policy risks political backlash. Coalition figures like Andrew Hastie have demanded transparency on US operations, while X posts reflect public scepticism about ceding sovereignty. The deep integration of US and Australian defence systems, facilities, intelligence sharing, and troop rotations, makes disentanglement a decades-long prospect, if not impossible. Without US backing, Australia's "boutique military" lacks the capacity to deter major powers independently, leaving it vulnerable in a volatile region. Perhaps that is what the Left plan is, to set Australia up for invasion?
To navigate this, Australia must tread carefully. Transparency is key: a public debate, as Pezzullo suggests, could clarify the role of US facilities and align them with national interests. Diplomatically, Australia should maintain strong US ties while engaging China to avoid a zero-sum choice. Investing in missile defences and domestic capabilities, like those delayed by the Albanese government, would reduce reliance on the US. Strengthening ties with Indo-Pacific partners through exercises like Talisman Sabre can diversify Australia's security network, enhancing resilience.
Australia's defence entanglement with the US, etched into its landscape from the Northwest Cape to Alice Springs, is both a strength and a constraint. It provides deterrence that Australia could never achieve alone, yet it limits the ability to pivot toward China without significant risk. Albanese's push for independence is a noble aspiration, but in a world where Beijing is preparing for conflict, as Hegseth warned, a misstep could leave Australia exposed, economically, strategically, and regionally. The red-dirt patterns of Harold E. Holt and the radar dishes of Pine Gap are more than infrastructure; they are symbols of a partnership that, for better or worse, defines Australia's place in the Indo-Pacific. To shift course now, without a clear strategy, risks unravelling the security that has kept the nation safe for decades.
"Etched into the ancient red sands of Western Australia's Northwest Cape is a network of dirt roads that, seen from above, carve a mysterious network of geometric shapes into the landscape.
For most Australians, clinging to the continent's east and southwest coasts, the Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station is out of sight and out of mind.
Towering radio masts rise from its central point and each corner of its two hexagonal ring roads, broadcasting very-low frequency signals to Australian and US submarines, including nuclear-armed American "boomers".
As Australians recoil from Donald Trump, Anthony Albanese has pointedly asserted Australia's independence in its relationship with the US, praising wartime leader John Curtin in a speech last Saturday for giving the nation the confidence "to think and act for ourselves".
But the reality is that Australia's security is so tightly wound up with the US's strategic posture that the two would be almost impossible to disentangle.
The isolated Harold E Holt station, pictured in a stunning aerial photograph taken last September, is just one example of the array of facilities on Australian soil that would play a critical role in a US war with China.
It's possible, though Australians will never know, the station's transmitters relayed messages to the Ohio-class submarine that launched 30 Tomahawk missiles on Iranian nuclear sites last month.
Nearly 1700km southeast as the crow flies is another more well-known national security installation, Pine Gap. It's been ingrained in the national consciousness, inspiring sporadic protests and one of Midnight Oil's most famous songs – Power and the Passion. ("Flat chat, Pine Gap, in every home a Big Mac. And no one goes outback, that's that.")
Few know, however, that this joint Australian-US facility 18km south of Alice Springs gives the US 20-30 minutes advance warning time of a Russian or Chinese nuclear attack.
That's long enough for whoever is in the White House to launch a devastating counterstrike. It's this guarantee of mutually assured destruction that, theoretically, keeps America's enemies from pressing the button, and gives credibility to the US's extended nuclear umbrella that protects its allies, including Australia.
Top secret files leaked by former NSA officer Edward Snowden confirmed Pine Gap, codenamed "RAINFALL", also "plays a significant role in supporting both intelligence activities and military operations", feeding in signals intelligence to the US's ECHELON surveillance program.
Its capabilities include the geolocation of individuals from their mobile phone signals, allowing them to be assassinated by drone strikes.
These sites and a handful of others are the physical manifestations of the Australia-US alliance. Together with new "force posture initiates" allowing the US military to operate from Australian soil, they are critical to America's war plans. They are what Defence Minister Richard Marles was talking about when he pointed to the contribution Australia's geography would make to any conflict between the US and China.
"Our continent is more relevant to great power contest now than it's ever been before," he told The Australian's Defending Australia summit in June.
"That is as much of a question in the here and now as is the building up of our defence capability."
Marles is right. But he is tiptoeing around just how strategically important Australia has become to its closest ally.
Republican congressman Michael McCaul said it more clearly in an August 2024 interview with The Australian, declaring Australia had become "the central base of operations" for America's military to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
Beijing knows this, of course, making these sites potential targets for Chinese ballistic missiles if war breaks out between the US and its superpower rival.
China has its own high-resolution satellite images of the facilities and knows they are unprotected by missile defence batteries, which the Albanese government has delayed acquiring.
Pine Gap, established under a 1966 treaty, has a US chief and an Australian deputy. It is one of three officially joint Australian-US defence facilities.
The other two are: the Joint Geological Research Station Alice Springs, which plays a critical role in detecting nuclear weapons tests; and the Learmonth Solar Observatory, which monitors solar weather that can disrupt communications networks.
The Harold E Holt facility is in a different category, providing privileged access to the US military under a longstanding collaborative arrangement.
The US has sole access to a number of the facility's VLF channels to communicate with its submarines, with Australian personnel having no knowledge of the content of those signals.
The new AUKUS Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability, currently under construction on the Northwest Cape, operates under the same collaborative model.
Pictured in another remarkable aerial photograph, obtained from the Nearmap imaging company, it appears as a stylised red-dirt map of Australia.
Known as DARC, it represents the first tangible evidence of the AUKUS partnership, forming part of a network of stations, with counterpart facilities in the US and the UK.
When it commences operations in 2026, its radar dishes will track, identify and monitor space objects for all three AUKUS partners, including space-based weapons systems that will increasingly threaten Western interests.
The US also relies heavily on another collaborative facility – the Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station, near Geraldton in Western Australia.
Like Pine Gap, the Australian Signals Directorate-run site contributes to the US's ECHELON network, hoovering up communications from adversary nations' satellites, and likely those of friendly countries too.
The joint and collaborative facilities are rarely spoken about by the government, except in irregular parliamentary statements by defence ministers to reassure the nation that they operate with Australia's "full knowledge and concurrence", or FK&C for short.
As Marles told the House of Representatives on February 9, 2023: "Australia's co-operation with the United States through joint and collaborative facilities is one of our most longstanding security arrangements.
"These joint and collaborative facilities support the effectiveness of the extended deterrence commitments the United States provides. This is a fundamental contribution Australia makes to the alliance and from which we derive great benefit."
Laying out the FK&C principle established by the Hawke government, he said "full knowledge" meant Australia had a detailed understanding of US capabilities and activities on Australian soil, while "concurrence" meant Australia agreed to those functions. But the arrangement is an arms-length one.
"Full knowledge and concurrence does not necessarily mean Australia approves each individual activity or task undertaken," Marles said. "Instead, it means we agree to the purpose of activities conducted in Australia, we are aware of the capabilities being used, and understand their expected outcomes."
The governing principle also applies to US "force posture initiatives" that began under the Gillard government in 2011 with the commencement of annual rotations of US Marine Corps personnel to Darwin.
About 2500 Marines now train in the Northern Territory for six months a year, while the arrangement has been expanded to include US Army personnel and rotational deployments of US Navy ships.
In the event of an Indo-Pacific conflict with China, US troops could deploy into the region from Darwin, taking positions on isolated islands to launch attacks on enemy ships, aircraft and ground forces.
Even more militarily significant are the US's rotational bomber deployments from Australia's Top End bases.
Under the obliquely named "enhanced air co-operation initiative", commencing in 2017, nuclear-capable B-52s, B2 stealth bombers, and B1B Lancers operate regularly from Top End bases including RAAF Tindal, which the US has spent nearly $900m upgrading in co-operation with Australia. Improvements include bulk fuel storage tanks, munitions storage, a longer and heavier-duty runway, and expanded aprons to cater for larger aircraft.
Under the AUKUS agreement, US and British nuclear-powered submarines will also begin operating from Western Australia's HMAS Stirling, near Perth, within two years.
The base will receive major upgrades to accommodate the boats, while improvements will be made at the Henderson naval precinct to undertake maintenance on the visiting boats.
While these are all "rotational" deployments, rather than US bases, their significance is clear – the US expects to be able to use Australia as a forward operating base if it finds itself in a conflict with China.
As US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate's Armed Services Committee last month, "Beijing is preparing for war in the Indo-Pacific", and the US "is laser focused on strengthening deterrence" across the region.
He said this involved "strengthening our forward posture in the region and working closely with our allies to enhance their own defence capabilities".
"In fact, we have already expanded the scope and scale of our co-operation with Australia, Japan and The Philippines to deter China, including with new understandings for enhanced posture in the future," Hegseth said.
Until now, Australia has been happy to accommodate such arrangements because – as with the alliance itself – they offer a level of deterrence Australia's boutique military could never provide on its own.
But the Prime Minister's declaration in his Curtin Oration that Australia will speak for itself and its foreign policy will not be "outsourced" suggests a mismatch between the US's expectations over its use of the continent and Australia's ability to shift the goalposts if it wants to sometime in the future.
It's a point that former Home Affairs secretary Michael Pezzullo – a strong supporter of the alliance – believes should be subject to an honest public debate.
"Do we accept his characterisation of the US force posture initiatives in Australia – as being aimed at deterring China?" Pezzullo told The Australian.
"Even if one takes the view that in the end the US won't go to war with China, and that Hegseth is not an influential figure in the administration, the mere fact that he says that China is preparing for war; that the United States is seeking to deter China, and that force posture initiatives that are undertaken with Australia and others are aimed at deterring China, should be discussed and debated in Australia."
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