Thomas Fazi has given an extended argument detailing why, despite his promised to end the Ukraine war in 24 hours, this is not likely to occur. While not mentioned due to publication dates, Russia has already rejected a leaked version of Trump's proposed peace program. One sticking point was about the Ukraine not joining NATO for some set number of years, to which Putin said, that this solves nothing but merely kicks the can down the road, to be dealt with at a later date. The problem is that Russia is winning the war, and has now recruited hundreds of thousands of extra troops by offering them a salary far greater than what they would get, say working in Siberia. So, Putin will come to any negotiation from a position of power, thanks to the Biden regime, who dragged this conflict out in a proxy war against Russia.
But the bigger problem is now Russia's distrust of the West: "The deeper challenge here lies in navigating the profound mistrust between Russia and the West. This demands a fundamental shift in the West's approach: abandoning its (failed) attempts to isolate and weaken Russia, and taking genuine steps to address Russia's security concerns. This is why Putin has emphasised that a comprehensive peace deal must include the removal of all sanctions against Russia.
Achieving such a geopolitical grand bargain, though, would require an all-out paradigm shift, in which the West relinquishes its pursuit of dominance and recognises the multipolar nature of global power dynamics. Yet, no Western leader — including Trump — seems prepared to make this leap. Despite potential shifts in priorities, such as focusing on Latin America and Iran, the strategic underpinnings of US policy are unlikely to change significantly under Trump's leadership. There is little to suggest a fundamental departure from the US's current strategy of aggressively countering the decline of American global dominance through diplomatic, economic and even military pressure."
https://unherd.com/2025/01/why-trump-wont-end-the-war-in-ukraine/
"The imminent return of Donald Trump to the White House has dramatically reframed the discussion about the Ukraine war. After years of insisting on a Ukrainian military victory at any cost, the Western political and media establishment appears to be begrudgingly acknowledging that this war can only end either through negotiations or Ukraine's collapse under the strain of depleted manpower and resources. Given that the likelihood of the latter scenario is becoming increasingly apparent — in spite of the final aid package announced by the outgoing Biden administration on Monday — it's not surprising that even the usually hawkish New York Times recently concluded that "it's time to plan for the postwar phase".
Putin has signalled his willingness to meet with Trump to discuss a peace deal, while the president-elect recently reiterated that "we have to end that war". After meeting Zelenskyy in Paris during the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral, Trump called for an "immediate ceasefire". In a remarkable shift, Zelenskyy himself recently acknowledged that Ukraine cannot reclaim the lost territories through military means and even suggested that he would be willing to cede territory in exchange for NATO protection.
The mere fact that negotiations are now on the table is a welcome development in a war that has already caused immense bloodshed and triggered massive economic and geopolitical tectonic shifts. However, despite making bold claims during his election campaign that he would end the war "in 24 hours", resolving the conflict is likely to prove very challenging — as Trump himself now admits.
The main hurdle is that the West's relentless push for an impossible Ukrainian victory against a much stronger opponent has strengthened Russia's hand. By rejecting earlier opportunities for negotiation — when Ukraine was in a stronger position — Western leaders have allowed Russia to consolidate its military gains, leaving little incentive for Putin to compromise.
In this sense, the belief that the West can achieve at the negotiating table what it failed to secure on the battlefield is, as political realist John Mearsheimer has argued, a dangerous illusion. "To win at the negotiating table, you have to win on the battlefield," he explained, "and it's the Russians who are winning on the battlefield." Putin's own words at his end-of-year conference underscore this: "The Russian army is advancing along the entire front line… We are moving towards resolving the main objectives that we set at the beginning of the military operation.
Ukraine — and the West — face a difficult decision: either accept Putin's terms, or endure the continuation of the war, which will further weaken Ukraine's position (while causing countless more lives to be lost for nothing). Putin's conditions for peace are unambiguous: legal recognition by Ukraine and the West of Russia's annexed territories — Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — as part of the Russian Federation; Ukraine's full withdrawal from contested territories; and Ukraine's renunciation of NATO membership aspirations and adoption of neutral, non-aligned status, coupled with demilitarisation, in exchange for Western security guarantees.
These demands render Zelenskyy's proposed compromise — ceding territory for NATO membership — untenable. Preventing Ukraine from joining NATO was, after all, the primary rationale for Russia's military operation. Trump appears to grasp this. Reports suggest his team is considering delaying Ukraine's NATO membership by at least 20 years, possibly in exchange for continued Western arms supplies. Statements by his running mate JD Vance indicate Trump might advocate for Ukraine to cede Russian-controlled regions, while agreeing to a demilitarised zone.
Certain factions will undoubtedly decry such terms as an unacceptable capitulation. However, the reality is that accepting a deal now is Ukraine's best option. All evidence suggests that the longer the war continues, the worse Ukraine's position will become. The West bears significant responsibility for squandering earlier opportunities to pursue peace, when Russia's demands were far less severe — and all to wage what even Boris Johnson candidly admitted in a recent interview to be a NATO proxy war against Russia.
"The main hurdle is that the West's relentless push for an impossible Ukrainian victory."
Yet, Zelenskyy's insistence on NATO membership essentially rules out any possibility of even starting negotiations. Trump could potentially sidestep this problem by excluding Ukraine from the first rounds of peace talks, as well as forcing Ukraine to face reality by cutting back military aid for Kyiv, but the real problem will be selling an agreement on Russia's terms inside the US, where he is likely to face massive pushback from the pro-war establishment, including the neocons in his own party. They will try to weaponise Trump's "America First" rhetoric against him by claiming — as they are already doing — that this would be a "humiliation" for the US.
Trump's vision of a "quick fix" in the form of a ceasefire or truce, pending a more comprehensive agreement, is also unlikely to succeed. Putin believes a prolonged ceasefire would merely allow Ukraine to rearm and prepare for a renewed offensive; his scepticism is rooted in his perception of the Minsk agreements as a Western ploy to buy Ukraine time to pursue a military solution. And Western commentary has done little to dispel such fears. One recent RUSI article proposed using a "frozen ceasefire" à la North and South Korea to heavily arm a diminished Ukraine, transforming it into a more effective bulwark against Russia in the future. Such proposals all but guarantee Moscow's resistance to any short-term, half-botched agreements.
The deeper challenge here lies in navigating the profound mistrust between Russia and the West. This demands a fundamental shift in the West's approach: abandoning its (failed) attempts to isolate and weaken Russia, and taking genuine steps to address Russia's security concerns. This is why Putin has emphasised that a comprehensive peace deal must include the removal of all sanctions against Russia.
Achieving such a geopolitical grand bargain, though, would require an all-out paradigm shift, in which the West relinquishes its pursuit of dominance and recognises the multipolar nature of global power dynamics. Yet, no Western leader — including Trump — seems prepared to make this leap. Despite potential shifts in priorities, such as focusing on Latin America and Iran, the strategic underpinnings of US policy are unlikely to change significantly under Trump's leadership. There is little to suggest a fundamental departure from the US's current strategy of aggressively countering the decline of American global dominance through diplomatic, economic and even military pressure.