By John Wayne on Monday, 16 November 2026
Category: Race, Culture, Nation

The Left’s Problem with Human Nature: When Socialist Ideology Turns Against Its Creators

 The Left's Problem with Human Nature: When Socialist ideology Turns Against Its Creators

Celina101, in an October 2026 Substack essay entitled "The Left's Problem with Human Nature", raises an issue that goes considerably deeper than the familiar political disputes about intelligence, sex differences and human heredity. The question is whether contemporary progressive ideology can accommodate the possibility that human beings possess biological characteristics and dispositions that cannot simply be abolished through education, political activism or institutional reconstruction. If human nature imposes constraints upon the achievement of political ideals, then reality itself becomes an obstacle to utopian aspirations.

There is, however, another philosophical difficulty that deserves attention. What happens when the anti-essentialist and social-constructivist arguments frequently deployed against traditional conceptions of human nature, are applied to the Left itself? If identities, values, categories and supposedly objective truths are historically contingent constructions, why should progressive political identities and moral commitments enjoy immunity from the same analysis?

The result is a potentially devastating exercise in philosophical self-reference. The intellectual solvent used to dissolve traditional beliefs can also dissolve the socialist foundations upon which its advocates stand.

The biological background is important. Behavioural genetics has produced substantial evidence that individual differences in cognitive abilities and many psychological characteristics are influenced by genetic variation. A major longitudinal twin study reported that the estimated heritability of general cognitive ability increased from approximately 41 per cent at age nine to 66 per cent at age seventeen. Large-scale genomic studies have also identified numerous genetic variants associated with cognitive performance, although the predictive power of individual variants is generally small and the interpretation of polygenic scores requires considerable care.

These findings do not establish genetic determinism. Heritability is a population-level statistical measure, not a statement about the percentage of an individual's intelligence that is genetically fixed. Nor does high heritability establish that environmental interventions are ineffective. Nevertheless, the evidence makes an uncompromising blank-slate conception of humanity scientifically difficult to defend.

Similar considerations arise in debates about sex differences, personality and vocational interests. The existence, magnitude and causes of particular differences remain legitimate subjects of investigation. Biological influences do not eliminate cultural influences, and substantial overlap between distributions is common. Yet the general proposition that human beings possess evolved biological dispositions should hardly be regarded as intellectually scandalous.

The philosophical problem begins when empirical questions are transformed into ideological tests. A political movement committed to equality of moral worth may understandably resist arguments suggesting that some social inequalities are inevitable. But equality of moral worth does not logically entail equality of talents, preferences, interests or outcomes. Confusing these propositions creates an incentive to reject inconvenient empirical findings rather than examine their implications.

This is where social constructivism enters the picture.

In its moderate form, social constructivism makes an entirely reasonable observation: many human categories, institutions and practices are shaped by history, language, social interaction and political power. Concepts such as citizenship, professional status and educational merit possess significant conventional dimensions. Their present forms are not necessarily inevitable or permanent.

Radical constructivism makes a much stronger claim. On some versions, supposedly objective categories and truths are understood primarily as products of discourse, institutional power and historically contingent practices. What appears natural or inevitable may be an ideological construction serving particular interests.

This approach has frequently been employed to interrogate traditional institutions, established hierarchies and inherited moral beliefs. But there is no obvious philosophical reason why its critical machinery should stop operating when it encounters progressive ideology.

Consider the category of the Left itself. If political identities are socially constructed, then the Left is not the embodiment of some timeless historical principle called progress. It is a shifting collection of movements, institutions, intellectual fashions, economic interests and competing aspirations. What counted as progressive in one generation may be condemned as reactionary in another.

The historical movement from traditional class politics towards contemporary identity-based politics illustrates the point. These changes can be analysed in terms of institutional incentives, professional interests, educational structures and struggles for cultural authority. There is no need to assume that each transformation represents an advance towards some objectively privileged destination.

Indeed, the very concept of progress becomes problematic under radical anti-foundationalism. Progress towards what? If moral standards are themselves historically constructed, then describing one social arrangement as more progressive than another requires a standard of evaluation. If that standard is also merely contingent, the claim to objective moral superiority becomes difficult to sustain.

The same problem arises with social justice. A radical constructivist may explain traditional moral beliefs as products of power, class interest and historical circumstance. But the preferred conception of social justice is equally susceptible to such an explanation. It too emerges from particular institutions, intellectual networks, political struggles and social incentives.

Why should one construction possess authority over another?

One possible answer is that progressive values promote human flourishing, reduce suffering or respect individual autonomy. But this answer introduces substantive moral commitments that require justification. It cannot simply be assumed that these commitments escape the genealogical criticism directed against rival traditions.

A more sophisticated constructivist might argue that moral principles can be justified through democratic deliberation, coherence or their practical consequences without appealing to eternal essences. That is a serious philosophical response. Yet it also concedes the central point: political commitments require argument and justification. They cannot establish their authority merely by exposing the historical contingency of their opponents.

There is a related difficulty concerning science. Certain radical interpretations of scientific knowledge emphasise the role of social practices, funding structures, institutional authority and prevailing paradigms in determining what counts as accepted knowledge. Such considerations can illuminate the sociology of scientific research. They do not, by themselves, demonstrate that scientific findings are merely arbitrary products of political power.

But suppose the stronger relativist position is accepted. Scientific authority then becomes another historically situated construction. The claim that particular findings about human variation are illegitimate because they conflict with egalitarian assumptions cannot automatically claim a privileged scientific status. It must itself be examined as a product of institutional and political circumstances.

The same scrutiny would apply to university departments, professional associations, academic publishing networks and bureaucracies that enforce prevailing ideological expectations. Their preferred categories and standards are not magically exempt from the social analysis applied to traditional institutions.

This creates an uncomfortable symmetry. If a conservative conception of human nature can be explained as an ideological construction serving particular interests, a progressive conception of human malleability can be subjected to precisely the same explanation. If traditional morality is understood as an expression of institutional power, contemporary progressive morality may be understood in the same terms.

The radical constructivist cannot consistently exempt the constructivist.

The difficulty becomes particularly acute when the language of social construction is combined with apparently unconditional moral demands. One cannot easily maintain that all moral standards are contingent products of discourse while simultaneously insisting that one's preferred standards possess universal and unquestionable authority. There may be ways of reconciling these positions, but the reconciliation requires philosophical work rather than political denunciation.

Nor does the existence of biological constraints automatically justify any particular social hierarchy. The descriptive claim that people differ in abilities or dispositions does not establish the normative claim that they should possess unequal rights or moral standing. The familiar distinction between facts and values remains essential.

Nevertheless, acknowledging that distinction cuts both ways. Biological differences do not establish political inequality, but political commitments to equality do not establish the biological interchangeability of human beings. The moral desirability of an outcome cannot determine whether a scientific hypothesis is true.

There is an additional irony here. A political philosophy that emphasises the social construction of identities may nevertheless treat its own favoured categories as remarkably stable and authoritative. The language of oppression, privilege, marginalisation and progress can acquire an almost essentialist character. Individuals and institutions are classified according to categories that are supposedly contingent, yet those classifications may be treated as morally decisive.

The result is not necessarily the abolition of essentialism but its selective relocation. Traditional essences are rejected, while politically preferred identities and moral categories acquire a functional rigidity of their own.

This suggests a more general philosophical principle: a critical theory that claims universal applicability must permit its own assumptions, institutions and advocates to become objects of the same criticism. Otherwise, what presents itself as a method of intellectual liberation risks becoming an instrument of ideological privilege.

The point is not that every thinker on the Left subscribes to radical relativism. Many progressive philosophers defend moral realism, scientific objectivity and biologically informed accounts of human behaviour. Nor does the self-referential objection prove that all forms of social constructivism are incoherent. Moderate constructivism is compatible with objective facts, biological constraints and reasoned moral disagreement.

The target is the stronger and more selective position: the tendency to describe inconvenient beliefs as constructions of power while treating one's own political commitments as though they possess a uniquely objective authority.

Celina101's discussion of human nature thus opens the door to a broader critique. The controversy is not merely about whether human beings possess genetically influenced characteristics, but whether political ideals can be allowed to dictate what counts as an acceptable account of reality.

A coherent intellectual position must distinguish between the world as it is and the world as we might wish it to be. It must also recognise that criticism is a reciprocal activity. The intellectual weapons employed against one's opponents remain available for use against oneself.

If radical social constructivism is correct, then the Left itself is a historically contingent construction, its moral vocabulary a product of particular circumstances, and its institutional authority an expression of social relations open to criticism and transformation. If, on the other hand, objective truths and defensible moral principles are possible, then biological facts cannot be dismissed simply because they offend political preferences.

Either way, the attempt to reserve critical scepticism for one's opponents while protecting one's own ideological foundations is intellectually indefensible.

The solvent cannot be permitted to dissolve everything except the hand that holds the bottle.

https://celina101.substack.com/p/the-lefts-problem-with-human-nature