The Israeli Gaza ground assault has begun. It is not going to be an easy battle, even with Israel’s vastly superior weaponry. The Ukraine War is dragging out into sustained battles, but it is spread over a vastly greater area. Gaza is an urban environment, where behind every building there could be a sniper, and booby trap in front of every step. Hamas has a vast tunnel network, far more extensive that used by the Vietcong in the Vietnam War. While the media had reported on poison gas being used in the tunnels, apart from the rules of war, it is probable that some sort of ventilation systems would be in place to deal with this; Hamas certainly had plenty of time to prepare for scenarios like this.
In any case as detailed below, the long-term for Israel to deal with the Gaza problem are challenging. Military occupation will be hugely expensive. Merely eliminating the present Hamas leaders then leaving will kick the can onto the next generation. A fulltime occupying UN peace keeping force, given the failures of such ventures elsewhere, is unlikely too. Thus, the options are all limited, but must be addressed once the present fighting ends, however long that takes. Probably some temporary sub-optimal “solution” will be adopted.
“Why a ground invasion is so risky
The difficulties of a Gaza ground assault are clear enough. Fighting street to street in a confined, highly urbanised environment will be hideously difficult for Israel’s forces. Hamas also has the advantage of an extensive tunnel network estimated at up to 500 kilometres in length, enabling its militants to attack and then disappear.
Israel can counter these challenges to some extent with the use of robots and drones. But night vision technology will be ineffective in the total darkness of tunnels, as these devices require faint ambient light to work.
Israel has also warned the roughly 1.1 million civilians in the northern half of Gaza to move to the southern half. Altogether, the United Nations says some 1.4 million people in Gaza have been displaced so far in the conflict, with nearly 580,000 sheltering in UN shelters.
It’s unclear how many people are still in the north. Israel has warned that those who remain could be classed as sympathisers with “a terrorist organisation”.
Inevitably, there will be appalling civilian casualties. Not all will necessarily be the IDF’s fault, but the default position of the region and those in the global community opposed to Israel’s action will be to blame Israel.
Another challenge is the estimated 200 hostages taken by Hamas during its raid into Israel. Hamas says it has spread them around Gaza. Almost certainly, some will be in the northern war zone. Hamas claims 22 have already been killed by Israeli bombs. Some relatives of the hostages are criticising the Netanyahu government for not giving sufficient priority to freeing their loved ones.
When the fighting stops: no good options
What Israel intends to do if and when it has secured the northern half of Gaza is not clear. The coastal strip is already facing a “catastrophic” humanitarian situation, according to the UN. And in terms of administering the territory, there are few good options.
1) A military reoccupation of Gaza, as Israel did from 1967 to 2005.
This would constitute a huge military burden and expose IDF personnel to violence and kidnapping. US President Joe Biden has warned reoccupation would be a big mistake.
2) Eliminate Hamas’ senior leadership, declare victory, then leave.
Such a victory would almost certainly be short-term. Other low-level members of Hamas would take pride in coming forward to reconstitute the group. Or another group, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, might fill the vacuum. Israel would not be able to control who or what that entity might be.
3) Call on the secular Fatah party that now controls the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to take control in Gaza.
That is scarcely viable. Fatah lost a civil war to Hamas in 2007 and there’s no indication the Palestinian Authority’s return would be acceptable to Palestinians there. Moreover, the authority’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected to a four-year term in 2005 – and is still in charge. As such, he lacks legitimacy, even in the West Bank.
4) Administration of Gaza by non-aligned local leaders.
This is a pipe dream. Even if such figures could be found, Gazans would almost certainly see them as collaborators with the Israelis, given their role would be to keep the strip’s hardliners under control.
5) Administration of Gaza by a non-Palestinian Arab force.
Again, this is not feasible. The leaders of potential Arab contributors to such a force, such as Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would not want to be seen as policing Palestinians on behalf of Israel.
6) Administration of Gaza by a non-Arab or United Nations force.
Given the enormous risks, it’s very hard to see any non-Arab countries embracing this idea. A UN peacekeeping force would require not only Israeli approval, but a UN Security Council resolution at a time when Russia and China rarely agree with the three Western permanent members.
Israel also contends Hezbollah has impeded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon from carrying out its mandate, preventing it from stopping militant attacks. After the Hamas attacks, Israel would be unlikely to entrust its security to peacekeepers with little incentive to put their lives on the line for its sake.”