In an era of great-power competition, the battlefield has expanded beyond land, sea, air, space, and cyber. A sixth domain has emerged: the cognitive domain — the realm of human perception, reasoning, decision-making, and behavior. Militarised cognitive warfare represents the deliberate, state-directed effort to weaponise this domain, turning the human brain into both target and terrain. No longer confined to traditional propaganda or psychological operations (PSYOPS), this form of conflict integrates advanced technologies — AI, big data, neuroscience, algorithms, and social media — to alter how individuals and societies think, feel, decide, and act, often without kinetic violence.
The concept gained prominence through NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Innovation Hub, which in the early 2020s described cognitive warfare as "the art of using technological tools to alter the cognition of human targets, who are often unaware." By 2025–2026, NATO's Chief Scientist reports framed it as a fight for cognitive superiority: synchronised military and non-military activities across the competition continuum to gain, maintain, or protect advantage in how people perceive reality and form intent. The brain is both weapon and objective; rationality itself becomes a vulnerability to exploit.
Key Players and Doctrinal Approaches
China has been the most explicit in militarising the cognitive domain. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) recognizes it alongside land, sea, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. PLA writings since the early 2010s discuss achieving "cognitive dominance," "biological dominance," and "intelligence dominance" to subdue enemies without fighting — echoing Sun Tzu. Modern PLA strategies fuse traditional "three warfares" (public opinion, psychological, legal) with AI-driven "algorithmic cognitive warfare." This involves building granular dossiers on individuals (via stolen data from breaches like OPM), using social media recommendation algorithms for precise influence, and creating alternative realities to erode liberal democratic beliefs. The goal: shape foreign perceptions, fracture alliances, and achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of war, as seen in influence operations targeting Taiwan or Western societies.
Russia employs a refined, aggressive variant rooted in Soviet-era "active measures." It deploys disinformation at scale — fake accounts, bots, deepfakes, and narrative synchronisation — to sow doubt, polarise societies, and undermine will to act. In the Ukraine conflict (ongoing into 2026), Russia has timed emotionally charged narratives (e.g., nuclear threats, "dirty bomb" accusations) with geopolitical events like NATO summits or aid announcements to influence Western decision-makers and publics. Budgets for such operations are estimated in billions, with networks generating hundreds of thousands of posts daily.
The United States and NATO allies are catching up, but face challenges. NATO views cognitive warfare as broader than traditional info ops, PSYOPS, or cyber — targeting cognition itself via multi-domain effects (bottom-up biological, middle-out psychological, top-down social). Recent reports urge doctrine integration, resilience building, and narrative intelligence. Critics argue Western approaches remain fragmented, defensive, and slow, often treating symptoms (disinformation) rather than the core contest over sensemaking and trust.
Tools and Tactics of Militarised Cognitive Warfare
Modern cognitive warfare leverages convergence in neuro-bio-info-cognitive (NBIC) sciences:
AI and Algorithms: Generative AI scales deepfakes, personalised disinformation, and microtargeting. Platforms amplify divisive content via recommendation engines.
Data Exploitation: Stolen personal data enables hyper-tailored operations — e.g., exploiting biases or fears of specific demographics.
Narrative Synchronisation: Timing manipulative stories (fear, identity, epistemic chaos) with real events to degrade decision quality.
Emerging Edges: Neuroscience for "intelligent psychological monitoring" (e.g., China's sensor tech tracking soldier emotions) or potential neurotech disruptions (though speculative and ethically fraught).
Examples abound: Russia's 2024–2025 interference in Romanian and Moldovan elections via AI-driven bots and TikTok amplification; China's long-term influence campaigns eroding Western cohesion; synchronized disinformation in Ukraine to fracture support.
Militarised cognitive warfare blurs war/peace, civilian/military lines, and poses existential risks to open societies. It exploits democratic vulnerabilities — free speech, pluralism, trust in institutions — while autocracies control narratives domestically. The stakes: eroded alliances, delayed responses to aggression, internal polarisation that weakens resolve.
Defenses require more than fact-checking or tech moderation. NATO and allies advocate whole-of-society resilience: cognitive security education, fortified institutions, integrated doctrine tying cognitive effects to planning (alongside cyber/electronic/space ops), and proactive narrative shaping. Building "cognitive superiority" means enhancing collective sensemaking, protecting rationality, and denying adversaries advantage in the human domain.
Yet debates persist: Is this truly novel, or repackaged political/influence warfare? Some argue the "buzzword" distracts from historical lessons. Regardless, the convergence of tech and intent makes it more potent than ever.
In 2026, as geopolitical tensions simmer — from Ukraine to Taiwan — the mind is the ultimate high ground. Victory may hinge less on missiles than on whose reality prevails. The fight for gray matter is here!
https://anamihalceamdphd.substack.com/p/militarized-cognitive-warfare-human