Iran has issued one of its more ominous warnings since the present war began. According to a senior Iranian official, Tehran is preparing to abandon what it describes as its defensive posture and move to a "fully offensive" strategy unless Washington changes course within a matter of weeks.
The obvious question is what "offensive" actually means. Iran could simply be engaging in coercive diplomacy, attempting to frighten Washington into concessions while its own economy is being strangled. Alternatively, Tehran may be signalling something much more serious: renewed missile and drone attacks, attacks upon Gulf energy infrastructure, disruption of international shipping, activation of its regional proxies and perhaps covert operations much farther from Iran itself.
The first possibility should not be dismissed. Bluff is part of international politics, particularly when a state is negotiating from weakness. The American naval blockade is inflicting serious economic damage on Iran. Oil exports provide crucial foreign currency, while Iran has already suffered damage to military and energy infrastructure. Threatening an offensive may therefore be an attempt to manufacture bargaining power that Tehran no longer possesses through conventional economic means.
There is an obvious logic to such a strategy. If your opponent believes that squeezing you harder will eventually produce a regional explosion, the cost-benefit calculation of continuing the squeeze changes. Iran does not necessarily have to defeat the United States militarily. It merely has to convince Washington that victory will cost more than compromise.
That is particularly important because of the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, around one-fifth of global crude oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passed through this narrow waterway. Traffic has subsequently collapsed. Iran therefore possesses something resembling an economic weapon of mass disruption (WMD). It does not need to sink the American fleet to hurt the United States. It needs only to make the Gulf sufficiently dangerous that shipping costs, insurance premiums and ultimately oil prices surge.
That may explain what Tehran means by going on the offensive. Missile and drone attacks on tankers, ports, refineries, pipelines or Gulf installations could transform Iranian weakness into global economic pain. The target would ultimately be political rather than purely military: American motorists, European industry, Asian energy importers and governments frightened by another inflationary shock.
There is also the proxy option. Iran spent decades constructing networks precisely because they allowed Tehran to impose costs on enemies without every confrontation becoming a direct Iran-versus-America war. Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias and other aligned organisations have provided varying degrees of strategic depth. The Houthis have already demonstrated how relatively inexpensive missiles and drones can interfere with one of the world's great maritime trade routes.
But there is another possibility that deserves attention: the battlefield may extend beyond the Middle East. Earlier in the war, American authorities were reportedly warned that Iran might be attempting to activate sleeper cells abroad. This does not mean that thousands of Iranian agents are sitting in suburban houses waiting for Tehran to telephone them. The reality of Iranian covert operations is potentially messier and more difficult to detect. Tehran has previously been accused of employing proxies, sympathisers, criminal organisations and recruited individuals to conduct surveillance, intimidation, kidnapping and assassination operations outside Iran.
That makes the phrase "all Iranian entities" particularly interesting. It could simply be rhetorical flourish referring to Iran's military and security apparatus. But if Tehran genuinely decides that it is fighting an existential struggle, the distinction between conventional warfare, proxy warfare, terrorism, sabotage and cyber operations may become increasingly blurred.
Potential targets would not necessarily be spectacular. Embassies, Jewish institutions, Iranian dissidents, energy infrastructure, shipping facilities and prominent political figures could all carry symbolic or strategic value. Cyber operations offer an especially attractive avenue because attribution can initially be uncertain and physical risk to Iranian personnel is low.
None of this establishes that sleeper cells are presently being activated. Intelligence warnings need to be treated as warnings, not facts. Recent Israeli intelligence concerning alleged Iranian assassination plans against President Trump illustrates the problem. American intelligence reportedly could not independently verify some of those claims. In wartime, governments have incentives to interpret ambiguous information pessimistically, while intelligence services necessarily act upon possibilities long before they become certainties.
There is nevertheless a major difference between saying that a particular plot has not been proven and saying that Iran lacks the capability or inclination to conduct operations abroad. Its history makes the latter conclusion difficult to sustain. Consequently, Western security agencies have to prepare for attacks even when the probability of any individual scenario remains uncertain.
The most likely interpretation of Tehran's announcement may therefore be neither "it is all bluff" nor "the sleeper cells are awakening." It may be deliberate strategic ambiguity. Iran wants Washington, Israel and the Gulf states to contemplate every possibility simultaneously. Perhaps a tanker will be struck. Perhaps missiles will hit an oil installation. Perhaps an Iranian-aligned militia will attack an American facility. Perhaps cyber-attacks will disrupt infrastructure. Perhaps something will happen in Europe or America. Even Australia. Perhaps nothing will happen at all. Uncertainty itself becomes a weapon.
There is also a dangerous paradox in the American strategy. Economic pressure is intended to reduce Iran's ability to wage war. But if Tehran concludes that the blockade threatens the survival of the regime, increasing pressure can also increase its incentive to gamble. A regime facing slow strangulation may eventually prefer a dangerous roll of the dice to accepting inevitable decline.
That does not mean Washington should surrender to threats. Doing so would establish the disastrous precedent that disrupting international shipping and threatening regional war are effective methods of obtaining concessions. It does mean that American and Israeli planners must understand that Iran's decision-making may become less cautious as its options narrow.
Iran cannot defeat the United States in a conventional war. Tehran knows this. Its remaining strength therefore lies in making the conflict unconventional, geographically dispersed and economically expensive.
That is why the words "fully offensive" should be taken seriously without being taken literally. They may be bluff. They may be preparation for another missile exchange. They may mean attacks on tankers and Gulf oil installations. They may include covert operations far beyond the Middle East. Most likely, Tehran wants its enemies to worry about all of them.And that may itself be the opening move of the offensive.
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