For more than 15 years, the world has heard the same refrain: Iran is "on the verge" of building a nuclear bomb. Israeli intelligence, US officials, and think-tank reports have repeatedly warned that Tehran was just months — or at best a year — from crossing the threshold. Yet the bomb never materialised. Sanctions, diplomacy, sabotage, and an unwritten fatwa from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei against nuclear weapons kept the program at the "threshold" stage: enough enriched uranium for a weapon if the political decision was ever made, but no actual weaponisation.

Now, in late March 2026, that script has changed. A Reuters report reveals that Iranian hardliners are no longer whispering about the bomb in private — they are openly demanding it on state television and in regime-affiliated media. The calls come as the US-Israeli campaign (Operation Epic Fury) enters its fifth week, with strikes that have already killed Khamenei and several senior figures. This is not another round of familiar brinkmanship. Something fundamental has shifted.

The New Hardliner Offensive

According to two senior Iranian sources cited by Reuters, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) now dominate decision-making after Khamenei's death on the first day of the war. Hardline voices that were previously contained are ascendant. Key public statements include:

Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of the assassinated Ali Larijani) telling state media the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should be suspended while Iran keeps its civilian program.

Conservative commentator Nasser Torabi declaring on state television: "We need to act in order to build a nuclear weapon. Either we build it or we acquire it."

The IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency publishing explicit calls for immediate NPT withdrawal.

These are not vague threats. They are direct, public challenges to the long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity" — having the capability without crossing into actual weaponisation. One source told Reuters the debate is "louder, more public and more insistent" because the regime now feels its survival is genuinely at risk.

Why This Time Feels Different

The "on the verge" warnings were real in technical terms — Iran has been enriching uranium to near-weapons grade and mastering the necessary science for years. But the political decision to build was never taken. Khamenei's fatwa provided ideological cover for restraint, and the regime calculated that a formal bomb would bring overwhelming international isolation, sanctions, and possible pre-emptive strikes.

That calculus has collapsed in the current war. With the Supreme Leader gone, the IRGC in the driver's seat, and conventional military capabilities being systematically degraded (missile production facilities hit, air defences crippled), hardliners argue there is "little to gain by forswearing a bomb or staying in the NPT." The regime's survival now trumps everything else. In their view, only nuclear deterrence can prevent future attacks or force the US and Israel to back off.

This is not mere propaganda for domestic consumption. It is a genuine internal policy debate that the war has accelerated. Previous threats to quit the NPT were usually negotiating tactics. Today, with facilities already bombed and key moderates removed, the hawks are harder to silence.

Making Sense of the Shift

Three clear conclusions emerge:

1.The war has removed the last brakes. Khamenei's death and the decapitation of more moderate voices have tilted the regime toward the IRGC's long-held preference for a nuclear deterrent. What was once a "red line" is now an option on the table.

2.This is desperation dressed as defiance. The regime is weaker militarily than at any time since the 1980s. Openly calling for the bomb is partly an attempt to rally hardline support at home and send a message abroad: keep pushing us and we will cross the threshold. Whether they can actually build and deploy a usable weapon quickly under sustained bombardment is another question — but the intent is no longer hidden.

3.The "threshold state" strategy is probably over. For years Iran wanted to be able to sprint to a bomb if needed without formally declaring itself a nuclear power (avoiding full pariah status). The current crisis suggests that approach has failed. Hardliners now appear willing to accept the costs of going all the way.

What Happens Next?

If hardliners win the internal argument, Iran could attempt to weaponise existing fissile material, accelerate covert work, or even seek external help (though Russia and China have their own reasons to be cautious). The US and Israel will treat this as confirmation that strikes must continue until the program is physically destroyed — not just delayed.

For the rest of the world, especially energy-dependent nations like Australia, a nuclear-armed (or sprinting) Iran amid an ongoing conventional war raises the stakes dramatically: higher oil prices, disrupted shipping, and the very real risk of escalation if Israel or the US decides the only way to stop a bomb is to widen the campaign.

The old pattern — "Iran is months away… again" — has finally broken. This time the regime is saying the quiet part out loud. Whether it is bluff, genuine policy shift, or both, the conflict has entered a far more dangerous phase. The question is no longer whether Iran could build a bomb. It is whether the war will force them to try — and how far the US and Israel are willing to go to stop them.

https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/iran-hardliners-ramp-up-calls-nuclear-bomb-sources-say-2026-03-26/