When even The Economist, one of the most influential defenders of liberal internationalism and the European political establishment, begins warning about the possible collapse of Europe's centrist political order, something significant is happening. Its editorial of 22 October 2026, entitled "The Agony of Liberal Europe," presents a remarkably bleak assessment of the continent's political future. France's recent riots, the fiscal crisis confronting its government, growing public disillusionment and the rise of parties outside the traditional political centre are no longer treated as temporary disturbances. They are symptoms of a deeper crisis of political legitimacy.
The editorial opens with an historical comparison to George Dangerfield's The Strange Death of Liberal England, published in 1935, which examined the breakdown of Britain's pre-First World War liberal political order. The implication is unmistakable. Political systems that appear permanent can deteriorate surprisingly quickly when economic grievances, ideological conflict and public disillusionment converge.
France is the immediate focus. The country has experienced exceptionally severe unrest, including arson, attacks on public buildings, looting and violent confrontations with police. According to The Economist, more than 500,000 people participated in demonstrations during the preceding weekend. Although most protesters were peaceful, the violence associated with the unrest was serious enough to raise questions about the state's ability to maintain public order.
Nor is the problem confined to France. The editorial points to protests in Belgium, Italy and Portugal, while warning that established centrist parties face serious electoral challenges across Europe. Germany's political establishment is under pressure, Spain faces a potentially significant political realignment, and France approaches another presidential election amid profound dissatisfaction with its existing leadership.
What makes the editorial particularly interesting is its attempt to separate the causes of the unrest from the explanations offered by conservative and nationalist critics.
The Economist strongly rejects the argument that mass immigration and failed integration are central explanations for the recent French violence. It emphasises that the overwhelming majority of demonstrators were not violent extremists, and that many were white French citizens protesting over living costs, inadequate public services and government policies. It attributes much of the organised violence to anarchists and revolutionary activists rather than immigrant communities.
A mass demonstration involving hundreds of thousands of people cannot reasonably be treated as though every participant shares responsibility for the conduct of violent minorities. Nor does the presence of immigrants or ethnic minorities among protesters establish that immigration caused the unrest. The immediate causes of particular acts of violence require evidence about those responsible.
Yet the editorial's dismissal of immigration as an explanation for the riots does not settle the broader question of immigration's contribution to European political and economic tensions. These are analytically separate issues. Immigration may not explain why a particular town hall was burned or why anarchists attacked police vehicles, but population growth, integration difficulties and competition for housing and public services can still influence public dissatisfaction. Their significance must be assessed through evidence rather than either automatic blame or categorical dismissal.
Indeed, The Economist acknowledges that many European voters want immigration and asylum levels reduced. It also reports that Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz has connected recent upheaval partly to migration and integration failures. These concerns cannot simply be dismissed as inventions of political extremists when they have become subjects of debate within the political mainstream itself.
Nevertheless, the editorial identifies another problem that may prove even more difficult for European governments to overcome: the exhaustion of their fiscal capacity.
France provides an especially troubling example. President Emmanuel Macron was able to respond to the Yellow Vest protests of 2018–19 by making expensive concessions. Today, according to The Economist, that option has become considerably more constrained. Economic growth has remained weak, public expenditure is high, and the budget deficit is expected to remain around 5 per cent of GDP even after proposed reductions.
The French government therefore faces a dilemma. Large numbers of citizens are demanding more spending on schools, public services and household support, yet the state is increasingly unable to finance additional commitments without worsening its fiscal position. Attempts to reduce expenditure risk provoking further unrest, while continued borrowing raises concerns about financial sustainability.
This is the central contradiction of the contemporary European welfare state. Governments have encouraged expectations of extensive public provision, but economic growth and available revenue may no longer be sufficient to satisfy those expectations. The resulting political pressures cannot be resolved simply by replacing one minister or rearranging a parliamentary coalition.
The editorial also highlights a crisis of political imagination. Centrist politicians, once presented as pragmatic reformers capable of transcending ideological divisions, increasingly appear unable to offer convincing solutions. The Economist acknowledges that it previously welcomed Macron as an ambitious representative of a revitalised political centre. It now portrays the same political establishment as defensive, exhausted and increasingly disconnected from public expectations. That is a significant admission from a publication that has long championed the European project.
The rise of nationalist and populist parties is often presented by establishment commentators as a threat to political stability. Yet there is another side to the problem. When established parties repeatedly fail to address concerns about living standards, housing, public services, immigration and national identity, voters may reasonably begin searching for alternatives. The existence of such dissatisfaction does not establish that every populist proposal is workable, but neither does it make the dissatisfaction illegitimate.
One of the most revealing features of The Economist editorial is its concern that electoral victories by parties outside the traditional centre could weaken the European Union itself. The publication warns that political disorder, fiscal instability and the collapse of established governing coalitions could undermine European cooperation at a time of intense international competition.
This reveals the scale of the perceived danger. The problem is no longer merely whether Macron or another unpopular leader survives the next election. It is whether the institutional and political assumptions underlying the contemporary European order retain sufficient public support to endure.
The comparison with Dangerfield's account of liberal England is therefore more than a literary flourish. It raises the possibility that political elites can become so accustomed to the permanence of their institutions that they underestimate the forces undermining them. Established parties may continue operating, parliaments may continue sitting, and elections may proceed normally, even while confidence in the governing system steadily erodes.
History does not establish that contemporary Europe is destined to experience the catastrophes that followed the political crises of the early twentieth century. Such analogies have obvious limitations. But they can serve as warnings against assuming that institutional continuity guarantees political stability.
There is also an important distinction between the decline of particular centrist parties and the collapse of liberal democracy itself. A democratic system may survive substantial changes in its governing parties and political priorities. Indeed, peaceful electoral change is one of the mechanisms through which democratic institutions renew their legitimacy. The more serious danger arises when political competition gives way to sustained violence, when governments cannot perform essential functions, or when significant sections of the population cease accepting lawful political outcomes.
France's recent unrest illustrates why these distinctions matter. Peaceful protest is a legitimate democratic activity, even when its demands are economically unrealistic or politically radical. Arson, looting and organised attacks on public institutions are not. Governments must be capable of protecting lawful dissent while preventing violent groups from exploiting it.
What is remarkable about the present situation is that even a publication as committed to the liberal European order as The Economist recognises the severity of the crisis. Its proposed diagnosis differs sharply from that of nationalist critics, particularly over immigration, but the underlying warning is unmistakable. Europe's established political leadership faces economic constraints, declining public confidence and growing challenges from movements that reject its prevailing assumptions.
The central question is whether those leaders can respond through meaningful reform or whether they will continue treating public dissatisfaction primarily as a problem of political messaging.
Europe's difficulties cannot be reduced to one cause. Weak economic growth, fiscal pressures, demographic change, immigration, political polarisation and declining institutional trust interact in complicated ways. Some of these problems are structural; others reflect policy choices that can be reconsidered.
But the first requirement for addressing a crisis is recognising that one exists.
When The Economist invokes the strange death of liberal England to describe the predicament of liberal Europe, it is acknowledging that the continent's established order is facing something more serious than an ordinary electoral setback. Whether that order adapts, transforms or continues to deteriorate remains uncertain.
What is increasingly difficult to maintain is the comforting assumption that European politics can simply return to business as usual.
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/10/22/the-agony-of-liberal-europe