European leaders are increasingly warning their populations to prepare for the possibility of war with Russia. Military expenditure is rising, civil defence planning is expanding, and political rhetoric is taking on a distinctly confrontational character. Yet Russia repeatedly denies any intention of attacking NATO countries. This contradiction raises an important question: are European governments simply preparing for a danger they genuinely believe exists, or does the confrontation also reflect older geopolitical ambitions, including the desire to weaken Russia permanently as an independent great power?
There is a provocative historical interpretation worth examining. Europe's confrontation with Russia might be understood, at least in part, as a final expression of the colonial mentality that dominated European international relations for centuries. In this interpretation, the ultimate objective would not necessarily be the conquest of Moscow by European armies, but the strategic dismemberment of Russia, leaving its territory, natural resources and political future vulnerable to external influence. This is a hypothesis about geopolitical motives, not an established account of European government policy. Nevertheless, the history of European imperialism makes it a legitimate subject for critical examination.
Recent developments illustrate the seriousness of the confrontation. In September 2026, European governments issued warnings about possible Russian attacks, including drone strikes, missile incidents and sabotage against critical infrastructure. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk cited intelligence suggesting that Moscow might attempt to test NATO's collective defence commitments. French President Emmanuel Macron described these concerns as well founded, while other European governments intensified preparations against potential Russian operations.
The Russian response has been categorical. President Vladimir Putin stated in September that Russia was not preparing for hostilities with Europe and had no reason to initiate such a confrontation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went further, suggesting that European preparations for war could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moscow's position is that NATO's military expansion and European rearmament are themselves contributing to the danger of conflict.
Of course, official Russian denials cannot simply be accepted as proof of peaceful intentions. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated that its government is prepared to employ large-scale military force against a neighbouring sovereign state. European governments therefore have substantial grounds for questioning Moscow's assurances. Equally, however, Russia's actions in Ukraine do not automatically establish an intention to invade NATO countries, much less an ability to conquer Western Europe.
Indeed, there are important differences between warnings of imminent invasion and assessments of more limited military or covert operations. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte stated on September 30 that there was no immediate threat to NATO territory, while emphasising that the alliance remained prepared to defend its members. Finnish and Baltic officials have similarly distinguished between the danger of Russian sabotage and the absence of evidence for an imminent conventional invasion.
The historical background to European attitudes towards Russia deserves attention. For centuries, European powers regarded territories beyond their borders as objects of strategic competition, economic exploitation and imperial expansion. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 and Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 represented radically different political projects, but both involved attempts by European powers to impose their will upon the vast territories to the east.
Hitler's ambitions were especially explicit. Nazi Germany's concept of Lebensraum envisaged territorial conquest, population displacement and the exploitation of Eastern Europe's agricultural and mineral resources. The Soviet Union was to be broken as a political and military power, with large areas brought under German domination. This was colonialism in an especially violent form, directed against European populations themselves.
It would be historically irresponsible to equate contemporary European governments with Nazi Germany. Their political systems, stated objectives and legal commitments are fundamentally different. Nevertheless, the history illustrates why Russian political culture remains intensely sensitive to threats from the West. The memory of invasion and immense wartime destruction continues to shape Russian strategic thinking, whether or not particular Russian security claims are justified.
There is also the question of Russia's extraordinary natural wealth. Russia possesses immense reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, timber, minerals and other strategically valuable resources. Its geographical position connects Europe with Asia, while its territory extends across eleven time zones. A Russia fragmented into smaller, politically dependent states would be a radically different geopolitical actor from the present Russian Federation.
Some commentators have advocated forms of Russian decolonisation or political fragmentation, arguing that the Russian Federation itself contains imperial structures and that ethnic minorities should enjoy greater opportunities for self-determination. Others have warned that the breakup of a nuclear-armed state could produce civil conflict, uncontrolled weapons proliferation and regional instability. The existence of such debates does not establish that NATO or European governments have adopted the breakup of Russia as an official objective.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between what governments publicly declare and what geopolitical outcomes particular interests might find advantageous. A weakened Russia, deprived of substantial military and economic influence, would unquestionably alter the European balance of power. Whether European policymakers actively seek territorial fragmentation, rather than merely the containment of Russian military aggression, requires evidence that cannot be supplied by speculation alone.
The economic dimension is particularly interesting. Before the Ukraine war, important sections of European industry depended upon relatively inexpensive Russian energy. The breakdown of that relationship contributed to substantial changes in European energy markets and industrial costs. A prolonged confrontation imposes considerable burdens upon European taxpayers, consumers and manufacturers. Rearmament also creates commercial opportunities for defence industries, but those opportunities should not be confused with proof that arms manufacturers control European foreign policy.
The colonial interpretation becomes more compelling as a question about political mentality than as a claim of an established secret plan. Colonialism was not merely the physical occupation of foreign territory. It also involved the assumption that powerful states possessed a superior entitlement to determine the political arrangements, economic relationships and strategic orientation of weaker societies. Where contemporary great powers seek to dictate the future of other nations, the resemblance to imperial thinking deserves examination.
This criticism must, however, be applied consistently. Russia's own attempts to dominate Ukraine, its annexation claims and its insistence upon privileged influence over neighbouring states also invite criticism in precisely these terms. A genuine rejection of imperialism cannot condemn Western interference while excusing Russian territorial expansion. The principle of national sovereignty must apply to Ukraine as well as to Russia.
There is a further danger in the present European approach: the security dilemma. One side increases its military preparations because it fears attack. The other interprets those preparations as evidence of hostile intentions and responds by strengthening its own forces. Each side then regards the other's response as confirmation of its original suspicions. A defensive measure from one perspective becomes a threatening act from another.
The confrontation surrounding Russia's Kaliningrad exclave illustrates the problem. Moscow has warned that attempts to blockade or isolate the territory could provoke an extreme military response, potentially involving nuclear weapons. NATO rejects Russian allegations that it is preparing such a blockade and maintains that its military posture is defensive. Yet the mutual suspicion surrounding the territory creates obvious dangers of miscalculation.
Europe's political leaders therefore face a difficult task. They have a responsibility to defend their populations against credible threats, including military aggression and sabotage. But they also have a responsibility to avoid transforming precautionary defence into a permanent political culture of confrontation. Military preparedness is not inherently evidence of aggressive intent; equally, preparations undertaken without adequate diplomatic engagement can contribute to the escalation they are intended to prevent.
This is where the broader question of European colonial history returns. The great European empires were repeatedly justified through claims of security, civilisation, economic necessity and strategic stability. Such claims often concealed, or at least accompanied, ambitions for territorial influence and economic advantage. Modern European governments operate under different institutional constraints, but they are not automatically immune from the temptations of great-power politics.
If influential circles in Europe genuinely regard the fragmentation of Russia as a desirable strategic outcome, they should be required to explain how such a development would serve the interests of ordinary Europeans, Russians or neighbouring peoples. The disintegration of a vast nuclear power would not necessarily produce liberal democracies and peaceful trading partners. It could instead unleash territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, refugee movements and struggles over nuclear weapons.
Nor would a prolonged conventional war between NATO and Russia offer any reasonable prospect of benefit proportionate to its human and economic costs. Even without nuclear escalation, the destruction could be immense. With nuclear weapons involved, the consequences could exceed anything experienced in European history.
The alternative is not naïve trust in Moscow. It is a foreign policy combining credible defence with serious diplomatic engagement, respect for national sovereignty, arms-control arrangements and a recognition that Russia will remain a major Eurasian power regardless of the preferences of European political elites.
The argument that contemporary European war preparations represent the last gasp of colonialism is therefore best understood as a warning about the possible reappearance of imperial habits under modern strategic language. It should not be presented as a proven conspiracy to partition Russia. The evidence establishes a substantial European military buildup, widespread concern about Russian aggression and continuing Russian denials of hostile intentions towards NATO. It does not establish an agreed European programme for carving up Russian territory.
But that distinction does not make the historical question irrelevant. A continent that once attempted repeatedly to dominate the territories to its east should be particularly careful about allowing defensive necessity to evolve into ambitions for permanent geopolitical subordination.
Europe has already experienced the catastrophic consequences of imperial rivalry and continental war. Its future security will depend not only upon military strength, but also upon avoiding the political assumptions that helped produce those catastrophes.
If the current confrontation is permitted to become a struggle over the permanent weakening or fragmentation of Russia, rather than the defence of sovereign states against aggression, then the old colonial mentality will indeed have found a new expression. And Europe, far from escaping its imperial past, may discover that it has once again allowed the ambitions of power politics to endanger the peace and prosperity of its own peoples.