It is fashionable in modern politics to denounce "elites" as if the very existence of them were the problem. That instinct is understandable — people see arrogance, detachment, and at times outright corruption — but it is also historically naïve. Every functioning society has elites. The real question is not whether elites exist, but what kind of elites they are.
Classical sociology was blunt about this. Thinkers like Vilfredo Pareto argued that power is always concentrated in a relatively small group — the "elite" — whether in politics, business, or culture. Elite theory makes the same point more generally: even in democratic systems, decision-making tends to cluster in networks of influence rather than being evenly distributed. There are massive differences across society in IQ and abilities; Leftist equalitarianism is false.
So, the claim that elites are essential to development is, in a basic sense, correct. Complex societies require coordination, expertise, and long-term planning. Infrastructure does not build itself; institutions do not maintain themselves; knowledge does not organise itself spontaneously. These things require leadership, and leadership inevitably creates elites, because not everyone is a leader.
But history draws a crucial distinction that modern debate often misses: not all elites are alike.
Older elite traditions — whether aristocratic, civic, or early industrial— tended (at least in theory) to see themselves as custodians. Their legitimacy rested on a reciprocal understanding: privilege came with obligation. Landed elites were expected to govern and protect; professional elites to serve public needs; political elites to maintain order and continuity. Even when imperfectly realised, the ideal was outward-facing, toward society.
Modern elites, by contrast, often operate within a different framework. They are highly mobile, networked across borders, and embedded in institutional systems — corporate, bureaucratic, or globalist technocratic — that are less directly accountable to local communities. Development literature even notes how contemporary "expert elites" are produced through global education and professional networks, shaping policy and knowledge systems across countries.
This shift has consequences. When elites become detached from the communities they influence, a phenomenon sometimes described as elite capture can emerge — where resources and decision-making disproportionately serve those already in positions of power, of the globalists.
The result is not the absence of elites, but a transformation in their orientation:
from stewardship → self-advancement
from duty → entitlement
from local responsibility → global abstraction
That is where the unease many people feel today originates. It is not simply resentment of success or competence. It is the perception that those at the top no longer see themselves as bound to the societies that sustain them.
The contrast — between older "protector" elites and what I call a more "Epstein-like" model — gestures at something real: the fear that elite status has become decoupled from moral responsibility. When power, wealth, and influence operate without a corresponding sense of obligation, legitimacy erodes.
Importantly, this does not mean the answer is to abolish elites, if it could be done. History suggests that when one elite is discredited, another replaces it, what Pareto called the "circulation of elites." The vacuum never lasts. The only real question is whether the next elite cycle is better or worse.
So, the more serious argument is this:
Societies need elites to function and develop
But they need elites with a governing ethos, not merely a winning strategy
That ethos is not easily legislated. It is cultural as much as institutional. It depends on norms about responsibility, restraint, and accountability, qualities that cannot be reduced to technical expertise or credentialism.
In that sense, the problem facing modern societies is not the existence of elites, but the weakening of the idea that elites are answerable to something beyond themselves. Without that, development may continue in a material sense, more technology, more wealth, more complexity, but it risks losing coherence, trust, and ultimately stability.
And history suggests that when that balance breaks down, the "circulation of elites" does not occur gently.
https://counter-currents.com/2026/04/elites-are-essential-to-development/
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/whos-afraid-of-losing-midterms/