In a provocative article titled "Do you want multiculturalism or democracy?" published on Macrobusiness, David Llewellyn-Smith argues that Australia faces a stark choice between maintaining its democratic integrity and embracing unchecked multiculturalism, particularly in the context of recent Chinese immigration. He contends that the political influence of certain ethnic Chinese voters, especially those with ties to mainland China, poses a direct risk to Australia's democratic processes by skewing foreign policy toward Beijing's interests. This claim, rooted in concerns about electoral dynamics and foreign influence, demands a thorough examination. This critical response expands and defends Llewellyn-Smith's position, arguing that specific patterns of immigration and political behaviour, particularly when influenced by an authoritarian regime like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), can undermine democratic sovereignty. It proposes measures to safeguard Australia's democracy while critically addressing the problem of multiculturalism.
Llewellyn-Smith's central thesis is that the growing political influence of a specific segment of Australia's Chinese diaspora, recent immigrants with relatives in China or sympathies toward Beijing,threatens democratic objectivity. He points to seven federal electorates (Bennelong, Reid, Parramatta, Chisholm, Menzies, Aston, and Banks) where the ethnic Chinese vote is significant, suggesting that their electoral power could sway Australia's foreign policy toward accommodating the CCP, an expansionist authoritarian regime. This, he argues, is distinct from other diaspora groups, such as Muslim or Jewish communities, which he views as less tied to a single foreign power's agenda. The concern is not multiculturalism itself but the potential for a foreign government to exploit diaspora loyalties, compromising Australia's strategic autonomy.
This argument rests on three pillars:
1.Electoral Influence: The concentration of ethnic Chinese voters in key electorates creates a political incentive for parties to prioritise their interests, even if those align with Beijing's goals over Australia's national interest.
2.Foreign Interference: The CCP's global influence operations, including through platforms like WeChat, can shape diaspora attitudes, pressuring voters to support policies favourable to China.
3.Democratic Erosion: If political parties pander to these pressures, they risk undermining Australia's sovereignty, aligning policy with a foreign power rather than democratic principles.
Australia's democratic system, built on free elections and representative governance, assumes that voters prize the national interest. However, Llewellyn-Smith highlights a unique challenge: recent Chinese immigrants, particularly those with family in China, may face coercion or ideological alignment with the CCP due to its transnational influence. The CCP's tactics, such as surveillance, propaganda, and pressure on diaspora communities, are well-documented. For instance, reports from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) have warned of foreign interference, including attempts to influence diaspora communities through media and cultural organisations. WeChat, a Chinese-owned platform, has been flagged for censoring content critical of Beijing, potentially shaping political views among Chinese-Australian users.
The electoral dynamics exacerbate this risk. In the seven electorates mentioned, ethnic Chinese voters form a significant bloc, with some estimates suggesting they comprise 10–20% of voters in areas like Bennelong and Chisholm. Both Labor and Liberal parties have courted this demographic, as seen in Sussan Ley's response to backlash over Senator Jane Hume's remarks about Chinese spies during an election campaign. Llewellyn-Smith argues that this pandering reflects a broader failure to address the diaspora's potential to act as a conduit for Beijing's influence, especially when voters choose pro-China policies over Australia's democratic values.
This is not to suggest that Chinese-Australians are inherently disloyal. Many are fully integrated and committed to Australia's democracy. The issue lies with a subset of recent immigrants who, due to cultural ties, family pressures, or CCP propaganda, may opt for Beijing's interests. This dynamic is distinct from other multicultural groups. For example, Muslim-Australians come from diverse nations (e.g., Lebanon, Pakistan, Indonesia), diluting any single foreign influence, while Jewish-Australians are described as aligned with democratic values and lacking regional geopolitical baggage. The CCP's unique ability to project power globally makes the Chinese diaspora a specific concern.
The tension between multiculturalism and democracy is not unique to Australia. In Canada, similar concerns have arisen about Chinese influence in elections, with reports of CCP-linked interference in ridings with significant Chinese populations. Canadian analyst Ben Rabidoux,has questioned whether Canada should cap permanent residency from specific countries, noting India's dominance in recent intakes but implying broader concerns about concentrated diaspora influence. In Australia, the Department of Home Affairs reported 2,541,651 temporary visas (excluding tourists) in Q1 2025, with significant numbers from China, raising questions about integration and political influence over time.
Historically, Australia has balanced multiculturalism with national cohesion. Post-World War II immigration from Europe, followed by waves from Asia, built a diverse society under a democratic framework. However, the CCP's modern influence operations, through media, education, and economic coercion, present a new challenge. Unlike earlier immigrant groups, whose source countries lacked the global reach of modern China, today's Chinese diaspora operates in a context where Beijing actively seeks to shape overseas communities. This aligns with Llewellyn-Smith's warning of a "pivot to China," as seen in Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's consideration of expanding the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement to include AI and digital sectors, a move opposed by Sussan Ley but reflective of political pressures.
Llewellyn-Smith suggests two immediate steps: banning the CCP ambassador from Australian media and prohibiting WeChat. These are bold but defensible measures, though they require nuance to avoid alienating Chinese-Australians or stifling free expression. Below, I expand on these and propose additional strategies:
1.Restricting CCP Media Access: Banning the CCP ambassador and diplomats from Australian media platforms would curb Beijing's ability to shape public narratives directly. This does not mean silencing Chinese-Australian voices but targeting official CCP channels known for propaganda. For example, the ambassador's opinion piece in the Financial Review pushing for AI cooperation under the free trade agreement is a subtle form of influence, framing China as a benign partner despite its authoritarian record. A media ban could be implemented through sanctions or visa restrictions, signalling that foreign officials cannot exploit Australia's open media environment to undermine its interests.
2.Banning WeChat: WeChat's role as a tool for CCP censorship and surveillance is well-documented. In 2020, Australia's government flagged concerns about its data privacy risks, and similar bans have been considered in the US and India. Prohibiting WeChat would disrupt Beijing's ability to monitor and influence Chinese-Australians, though it risks backlash from users who rely on it for communication. A compromise could involve strict regulations requiring WeChat to operate transparently in Australia, with data stored locally and content moderation subject to Australian laws, reducing its use as a propaganda tool.
3.Voter Education and Integration: Llewellyn-Smith calls for better educating Chinese-Australian voters to value democratic values over Beijing's influence. This could involve community outreach programs emphasising Australia's democratic principles, free speech, and sovereignty. Government-funded initiatives, in partnership with Chinese-Australian organisations, could promote civic engagement while countering CCP narratives. This approach avoids stigmatising the diaspora while fostering loyalty to Australia's democratic system.
4.Strengthening Foreign Interference Laws: Australia's 2018 foreign interference laws already criminalise covert influence operations. Strengthening these with specific measures targeting diaspora manipulation, such as penalties for foreign-linked organisations pressuring voters, would deter CCP interference. Regular ASIO briefings to political parties could ensure they resist pandering to foreign-influenced voting blocs.
5.Electoral Transparency: To address the electoral influence of specific diasporas, Australia could require political parties to disclose outreach strategies targeting ethnic communities. This transparency would expose pandering to foreign interests, allowing voters to hold parties accountable. Additionally, caps on political donations from non-citizens or foreign-linked entities could reduce external influence in key electorates.
Critics may argue that Llewellyn-Smith's position risks xenophobia or unfairly targets Chinese-Australians. Multiculturalism, they contend, is a cornerstone of Australia's identity, and singling out one group undermines social cohesion. This critique has merit, stigmatizing an entire diaspora is both unjust and counterproductive. However, the argument is not about Chinese-Australians as a whole but about a specific subset vulnerable to CCP influence. The distinction is critical: the target is Beijing's interference, not the diaspora's cultural identity.
Another counterargument is that banning WeChat or CCP media access infringes on free speech. Yet, these measures target foreign state actors, not individual expression. The CCP's use of WeChat for censorship and surveillance is not a defence of free speech but a subversion of it. Australia has a right to protect its democratic processes from authoritarian interference, just as it regulates other foreign threats.
Finally, some may argue that multiculturalism and democracy are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Australia's history shows they can coexist. However, Llewellyn-Smith's point is that multiculturalism becomes a liability when it enables foreign powers to exploit democratic systems. The focus is on safeguarding democracy, not rejecting diversity.
The issue extends beyond Australia. As global powers like China expand their influence, democracies worldwide face similar challenges. The UK's recent moves to tighten immigration rules, cited as a model for Australia, reflect a growing recognition that unchecked migration without integration can strain democratic cohesion. In the US, concerns about foreign influence in elections have led to calls for stricter oversight of diaspora communities. Australia's response could set a precedent for balancing multiculturalism with democratic integrity in an era of geopolitical rivalry.
Moreover, the article's framing of a "pivot to China" under Albanese raises questions about Australia's strategic alignment. With the US-Australia alliance under strain, as noted in related commentary, policies that cozy up to Beijing risk weakening Australia's position in the Indo-Pacific. A democracy influenced by an authoritarian regime is no democracy at all, it becomes, as Llewellyn-Smith warns, a step toward a "Chinese satrap" state.
David Llewellyn-Smith's argument that multiculturalism, when exploited by foreign powers like the CCP, threatens Australian democracy is a provocative but necessary wake-up call. The influence of certain Chinese-Australian voters, swayed by Beijing's propaganda or coercion, risks skewing Australia's foreign policy and eroding its sovereignty. By restricting CCP media access, regulating platforms like WeChat, educating voters, strengthening interference laws, and ensuring electoral transparency, Australia can protect its democracy. These measures target foreign interference, not the Chinese-Australian community, preserving the balance between diversity and democratic integrity. As global authoritarianism tests democratic resilience, Australia must act decisively to ensure that its democracy, not foreign agendas, prevails. The question is not just about multiculturalism or democracy; it's about whether Australia can remain a free nation in an age of covert influence.
https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2025/07/do-you-want-multiculturalism-or-democracy/
"Do you want multiculturalism or democracy?
Because, increasingly, you will have neither.
Ahead of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's upcoming trip to China, Sussan Ley said Australia should be wary of the expansion of an existing free trade agreement to include artificial intelligence and the digital economy.
In an opinion piece in the Financial Review, China's ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, urged Albanese to embrace AI as one area ripe for co-operation under an updated China-Australia free trade agreement, which entered into force in 2015.
…Asked whether she had apologised to community leaders over Senator Jane Hume's remarks about Chinese spies, which sparked backlash from Chinese Australians during the election campaign, Ley said she would not go into the details of private discussions.
"I freely admitted that we did not get it right, that our tone wasn't right and the messaging wasn't right, and that we needed to change course, course correct for the future. And I think that message was well received, but I also know that the Chinese Australian community expects ongoing dialogue from this point forward."
Neither party got the Chinese diaspora right because neither attacked it enough.
If ethnic Chinese voters of a certain vintage are going to vote based upon pro- or negative- Beijing policies, which fundamentally undermine democracy for everybody else, including all other migrants, then they need to be better educated.
This is one of the key sources of the Labour pivot to China. When it wins over this segment, which occupies roughly seven federal seats to varying degrees, the ethnic Chinese vote becomes very influential via Bennelong, Reid, Parramatta, Chisholm, Menzies, Aston, and Banks.
This is not the same as the Muslim vote, which is multinational and diversified as a national interest bloc. Nor is it the same as the Jewish vote, which is democratic and has no regional implications.
Recent vintage Chinese immigrants, especially those with relatives in China under threat, are a direct risk to the objectivity of Canberra's foreign and strategic policy around China, and therefore to your democracy, as federal parties mull over snuggling up to the expansionist tyranny for personal gain.
A few obvious steps present themselves. Banning the CCP ambassador and his underlings from the media would be a good start. Banning WeChat is another.
I don't have the answer, but we must ask the question."