The Middle East may be approaching another exceptionally dangerous phase of the war between the United States, Israel and Iran. Although the conflict has already caused extensive destruction, disrupted global energy supplies and destabilised neighbouring countries, there are increasingly credible indications that a new and potentially much more intensive military campaign is being contemplated for the period following the American midterm elections on 3 November 2026.
Michael Snyder, writing on 22 October, argues that both sides are preparing for a dramatic escalation. His warnings are characteristically apocalyptic, but the underlying military developments are not imaginary. Reporting from major international news organisations, together with assessments by security analysts, indicates that American and Israeli forces are preparing options for renewed large-scale strikes while Iran threatens retaliation extending well beyond the targets attacked in earlier phases of the conflict.
The danger is that each side believes it can impose costs severe enough to force its adversary to capitulate, while neither appears willing to accept the other's fundamental demands. That is precisely the kind of strategic confrontation in which an apparently limited operation can produce consequences far beyond those originally intended.
According to reporting by The New York Times, the American and Israeli militaries have developed plans for a short but intensive bombing campaign against Iran after the midterms. Potential targets include nuclear installations, missile and drone facilities, and elements of Iran's energy infrastructure. Military exercises have reportedly included flights over Iraq designed to rehearse possible strike operations.
The proposed strategy rests on the belief among some American officials that another concentrated round of attacks could inflict sufficient economic damage to compel Tehran to negotiate on terms more acceptable to Washington. Iran's economy has already suffered from sanctions, military strikes and the American naval blockade. The assumption is that another severe blow might finally break the deadlock.
Yet this reasoning contains an obvious weakness. Earlier military operations and economic pressure have not produced the concessions Washington desires. There is no guarantee that further destruction would change Iran's calculations. Indeed, Iranian leaders may interpret additional attacks as confirmation that American and Israeli objectives extend beyond limiting nuclear capabilities to the destruction of the Islamic Republic itself.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly argued that removing the Iranian regime is necessary to eliminate the nuclear threat. Such statements reinforce Tehran's conviction that the conflict is existential rather than a dispute that can be resolved through limited technical concessions.
If Iranian leaders believe their political survival is at stake, they may have little incentive to respond to renewed attacks with restraint.
The American military preparations are substantial. A third aircraft carrier strike group has been ordered towards the region, accompanied by additional forces that could provide Washington with a wider range of military options. Reports indicate that American planners expect important elements of this buildup to be in place by early November.
The timing is politically significant. President Donald Trump has said that the United States would not launch renewed attacks before the midterm elections. He has also repeatedly expressed confidence that the war can be brought to a conclusion, whether through negotiations or increased pressure.
Nevertheless, reports indicate that Trump has previously rejected or postponed proposed military operations against Iran, including an Israeli attack contemplated earlier in October. This is an important qualification. Military planning does not necessarily mean that the President has authorised an attack. The preparations may also serve as coercive diplomacy, intended to convince Tehran that refusing concessions will carry unacceptable consequences. But preparations undertaken for bargaining purposes can become preparations for war if negotiations fail.
Iran, meanwhile, is making its own threats increasingly explicit. Senior Iranian officials have warned that another American or Israeli offensive would produce retaliation broader than previous exchanges. General Mohsen Rezaei has indicated that potential targets could include American-linked data centres, artificial intelligence facilities and undersea communications cables in the Gulf region.
Such threats suggest an effort to widen the conflict from conventional military and energy targets to the infrastructure supporting the modern digital economy.
Iran has also threatened American military bases if United States forces continue escorting commercial vessels through contested routes in the Strait of Hormuz. Snyder draws attention to reports of further attacks on tankers and vessels encountering naval mines. These incidents illustrate how quickly the struggle over maritime access could trigger direct confrontation between American and Iranian forces.
The Strait of Hormuz remains central to the entire conflict. Before the war, roughly one-fifth of internationally traded oil passed through this narrow waterway. Disruption to shipping has therefore consequences extending far beyond the Middle East.
For Washington, restoring reliable maritime commerce is both an economic and strategic objective. For Tehran, the ability to threaten that commerce provides one of its remaining instruments of leverage against a militarily superior opponent.
This creates an especially dangerous confrontation. American efforts to guarantee passage can be interpreted by Iran as attempts to destroy its bargaining power. Iranian attacks on shipping, in turn, increase pressure on Washington to respond militarily. Neither side can easily retreat without appearing to surrender a central strategic objective.
The possible expansion of Iranian retaliation into neighbouring Gulf states adds another dimension. Saudi oil facilities, ports, communications systems and other critical infrastructure could become targets if Tehran concludes that regional states are supporting American military operations. The continuing conflict involving the Houthis in Yemen has already increased pressure on Saudi Arabia and threatened alternative shipping routes.
The United States has ordered nonessential diplomatic personnel and family members to leave Saudi Arabia amid growing security concerns. Such precautionary measures do not establish that an attack is imminent, but they demonstrate that American authorities regard the threat environment as serious.
A wider regional conflict would also place enormous pressure on American missile-defence systems. Intercepting large numbers of missiles and drones requires expensive defensive munitions, and earlier fighting has already raised concerns about the rate at which these weapons are being consumed.
Iran does not need to defeat American or Israeli forces in conventional battle to impose substantial costs. Sustained attacks on infrastructure, shipping and regional military installations could prolong the conflict and increase its economic consequences.
This brings us to the danger emphasised by Snyder: the possibility that another major escalation would intensify the existing global energy and food crises.
Oil prices have already responded sharply to reports of renewed military planning. Snyder notes that Brent crude briefly approached $113 a barrel on 22 October. Another sustained disruption of Gulf exports could place further pressure on transport costs, industrial production and household energy bills.
The consequences would extend into agriculture. Modern food production depends heavily on fuel, fertilisers, transport networks and international trade. Higher energy costs can increase the expense of operating machinery, manufacturing agricultural inputs, transporting crops and distributing food to consumers.
Countries already suffering drought, conflict or severe food insecurity would be especially vulnerable. Sudan and Afghanistan, for example, face grave humanitarian difficulties independently of the Iranian conflict. A further increase in food and energy prices could aggravate those conditions.
Snyder predicts a worsening global food crisis. The mechanism he identifies is plausible, although the scale of any additional deterioration will depend on how extensively shipping and energy production are disrupted, how long the conflict continues and whether alternative supply routes can compensate.
It would be premature to conclude that a worldwide food catastrophe is inevitable. It would be equally mistaken to assume that the economic effects of another major Middle Eastern war could be contained within the region.
There is also a serious political contradiction in the American position. Trump has repeatedly presented himself as capable of securing favourable outcomes through overwhelming pressure and negotiation. Yet a renewed bombing campaign could deepen the very economic problems that have made the Iran war unpopular with sections of the American electorate.
A brief offensive might be intended to compel concessions and end the conflict. But Iran could respond by widening attacks on energy infrastructure, prolonging maritime disruption and raising the costs of war for American consumers and regional allies.
In that situation, an operation designed to end the war quickly might instead create pressure for additional military intervention.
The possibility of a ground operation, even one limited to particular nuclear or missile installations, would introduce further risks. American troops operating inside Iranian territory could face casualties, capture or prolonged engagement. Any such operation would also strengthen the Iranian leadership's argument that the country's sovereignty and political survival were under direct attack.
There is no certainty that Washington will pursue such a course. Trump has generally shown reluctance to commit ground forces to Iran, and the military buildup provides options rather than proof of a final decision.
Nevertheless, the accumulation of forces, increasingly explicit threats and apparent diplomatic deadlock makes the coming weeks exceptionally dangerous.
The approaching elections create a further complication. Israel votes on 27 October, while the American midterms follow on 3 November. Political leaders on both sides must consider how military action might affect domestic opinion, electoral outcomes and their own authority.
It would be speculative to assert that an escalation has been scheduled purely for electoral convenience. Yet the timing of the reported plans demonstrates that domestic politics and military strategy are interacting. Decisions postponed before an election may be reconsidered afterwards, particularly if leaders believe the political constraints have changed.
Iranian leaders will be watching these developments closely. They may calculate that American domestic divisions and economic pressures limit Washington's willingness to sustain another costly campaign. American and Israeli planners, conversely, may believe Iran's weakened economy and damaged military capabilities make it vulnerable to a final decisive offensive.
Both calculations could prove dangerously mistaken.
The central problem is that the participants appear to have fundamentally incompatible understandings of what constitutes an acceptable end to the conflict. Washington demands substantial restrictions on Iran's nuclear programme and an end to threats against maritime commerce. Tehran demands relief from economic and military pressure while resisting concessions it regards as surrendering its sovereignty and security.
Israel's leadership sees the continued existence of the Islamic Republic as a fundamental security problem. Iran's leadership regards Israeli and American military pressure as a threat to its survival. Under these circumstances, escalation can appear rational to each side individually even when it increases the danger for everyone.
The world is therefore approaching a period in which a renewed American-Israeli offensive, an Iranian pre-emptive action, a maritime confrontation or an attack by an allied regional force could trigger a much wider conflict.
Michael Snyder's prediction of a coming intensification should not be treated as established fact. The President has not publicly authorised the reported offensive, negotiations continue, and previous plans for major strikes have been abandoned or postponed.
But the warning cannot simply be dismissed as alarmism. The military deployments are real, the planning has been widely reported, Iranian threats are explicit, and the economic vulnerabilities are substantial.
What makes the situation so alarming is not merely the destructive power available to the combatants. It is the apparent confidence that another escalation can be controlled, that a few days of overwhelming force might settle a conflict whose political causes remain unresolved. History offers little assurance that wars develop according to the schedules and limits imagined by those who initiate them.
After the American midterms, the Middle East may face another round of destruction more intensive than anything witnessed in recent months. Whether diplomacy can avert that outcome remains uncertain.
The danger is that both sides are preparing for an onslaught they believe they can manage, while the rest of the world may be left paying the price in higher energy costs, disrupted trade, worsening food insecurity and the possibility of a far wider war.
https://michaeltsnyder.substack.com/p/both-sides-are-preparing-to-greatly