In the landscape of modern democracies, populist movements have surged as a "third force" challenging the entrenched duopoly of traditional Left and Right parties. The United Kingdom's Reform UK, formerly the Brexit Party, exemplifies this trend. Founded in 2018 by Nigel Farage, it capitalised on anti-establishment sentiments, Euroscepticism, and immigration concerns to secure five parliamentary seats in the 2024 general election, while garnering around 14% of the national vote. This success echoes the rise of parties like France's National Rally or Italy's Brothers of Italy, which have disrupted the political status quo by blending economic nationalism, cultural conservatism, and direct appeals to disaffected voters.
Australia, often seen as a political cousin to the UK due to shared Westminster heritage, has amultiparty system. Yet, it lacks a comparable third force populist party that could rival the major players: the centre-right Liberals and the hard Left Australian Labor Party (ALP). Minor parties like the Greens (progressive environmentalists) and One Nation (Right-wing nationalist) have not achieved the broad, disruptive appeal of Reform UK. As of September 2025, no single populist entity dominates the "third force" space. Why?
Australia's federal politics is dominated by the two-party preferred system, where the Coalition (Liberals and Nationals) and Labor alternate in power. This duopoly has held firm since World War II, with minor parties playing supporting roles through preferences.
Populist undercurrents exist. The 1990s saw One Nation surge to 23% in Queensland's 1998 state election, driven by economic grievances and multiculturalism backlash. More recently, the United Australia Party (UAP), led by Clive Palmer, poured millions into the 2022 federal campaign, netting a mere 4.1% of the vote despite heavy advertising. The rise of independents in 2022, dubbed the "teal wave," saw progressive women unseat Liberal moderates in affluent seats, but this was anti-Conservative rather than broadly populist.
Unlike Reform UK's rapid ascent amid Brexit chaos, Australia's populism fragments. Right-wing sentiments splinter across One Nation, the UAP, and libertarian groups like the Liberal Democrats. Left-leaning populism is absorbed by the Greens or Labor's progressive wing. This diffusion prevents a unified third force from coalescing.
A key reason lies in Australia's electoral mechanics. The federal House of Representatives uses instant-runoff voting (preferential voting), where voters rank candidates. This favours major parties, as preferences from minors often flow to the top two, creating a de facto two-party outcome. In 2022, despite diverse votes, Labor and the Coalition claimed 76% of seats with under 55% first-preference support combined.
The Senate employs proportional representation, allowing smaller parties to gain traction, One Nation and the Greens hold sway here. But the House, where governments form, remains a high bar. Reform UK's first-past-the-post system in the UK amplifies vote share into seats for concentrated support, as seen in Clacton where Farage won with 46% in 2024. Australia's system dilutes this: even a 10-15% national vote might yield few House seats without regional strongholds.
Compulsory voting further mutes populist fire. With 90%+ turnout, extremists can't rely on mobilising apathetic bases; everyone votes, including moderates who preference away radicals. Voluntary voting in the UK (turnout ~60%) lets populists energize low-engagement demographics. Australia's state-level variations, like Queensland's optional preferential voting, have boosted minors (One Nation's 1998 win), but federally, the full preferential system reins them in.
Australia's history tempers populist explosions. Unlike the UK's Brexit referendum, a singular catalyst for Reform, Australia's 1999 republic referendum failed, diffusing monarchist-republican tensions without a lasting third party. Immigration debates, while heated (e.g., Tampa affair in 2001), were managed by Labor and Coalition tough-on-borders policies, co-opting populist appeals. John Howard's 1996-2007 Liberal government blended economic liberalism with cultural conservatism, neutralising Right-wing challengers.
Culturally, Australia's "fair go" ethos emphasises egalitarianism over the UK's class warfare or American identity politics. Populist rhetoric struggles against a strong welfare state and multicultural consensus (post-White Australia Policy). High immigration sustains economic growth, reducing scapegoating appeal. Polls in 2025 show immigration concerns at 20-25% of voter priorities, far below the UK's 40%+ post-Brexit. Economic stability, low unemployment (4.2% in mid-2025), booming resources, dampens the grievances fuelling Reform's anti-elite narrative.
Media plays a role too. Australia's concentrated outlets (News Corp dominance) amplify conservative views within the Coalition, unlike the UK's fragmented press that birthed Brexit media. Social media populism exists, e.g., anti-vax movements during COVID, but translates poorly to votes due to Australia's low digital polarisation compared to the US/UK.
As of 2025, pressures build. Cost-of-living crises from inflation (peaking at 7.8% in 2023) and housing unaffordability echo global populism. Yet, no unifying figure like Farage has emerged. Potential leaders, Hanson is too polarising, fail to bridge urban-rural or Left-Right divides.
Australia's absence of a third force populist party like Reform UK stems from a resilient two-party system, preferential voting that favours majors, historical co-optation of grievances, and a cultural aversion to extremes. These factors fragment populist energy, preventing a singular, disruptive force. However, in an era of global instability, rising inequality, geopolitical tensions, the "yet" in the title is key. A catalyst could yet ignite Australia's latent populism, birthing a homegrown equivalent. Australians have apparently not suffered enough, but as the march for Australia showed, cracks in the Lab-Lib hegemony are showing.