"A Chinese spy ship spotted off the coast of South Australia has been accused of mapping Australia's submarine cables for "future operations."
Sky News broke the news on Monday that a Chinese government research vessel circumnavigating the coast of Australia was off the SA coast and within Australia's exclusive economic zone." But all of this was just water off a communist duck's back for the prime minister. So, let us cut to the chase and consider what happens if the Chinese military cut Australia's internet cables in the coming China war.
If the Chinese military were to cut Australia's submarine internet cables, the consequences would be immediate and devastating, with effects rippling across every aspect of society. These undersea cables, responsible for carrying over 95% of global internet traffic, are the backbone of modern communications and economic transactions. Severing them would not just be an inconvenience; it would trigger a national crisis, plunging Australia into chaos within hours.
The economic ramifications would be felt almost instantly. The Australian Stock Exchange would likely be forced to halt trading, as financial transactions, reliant on global connectivity, could no longer be processed. Online banking, ATMs, and electronic payments would grind to a halt, creating financial panic. Businesses that depend on international data transfers, from corporate headquarters to logistics firms, would be thrown into disarray. Supermarkets, fuel distributors, and pharmacies, all of which rely on digital inventory management systems, would struggle to function. The resulting supply chain disruptions could lead to food shortages and fuel crises, triggering widespread panic buying and hoarding reminiscent of the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic but on a much larger and more chaotic scale.
Beyond the economy, the collapse of digital communications would create a dangerous information vacuum. Australians would suddenly find themselves cut off from international news, social media, and even essential government updates. The inability to verify facts could lead to mass hysteria, fuelled by rumours and misinformation. With emergency services relying on digital networks for coordination, response times for police, fire, and medical assistance could be significantly impacted, further heightening public anxiety. The loss of reliable communication channels would weaken law enforcement's ability to maintain order, increasing the likelihood of civil unrest. Riots and looting could break out as people scramble for resources, and the government might be forced to impose emergency measures, including curfews and restrictions on movement, to prevent societal breakdown.
The military and national security implications would be just as severe. Australia's ability to coordinate with allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan would be compromised, leaving the country vulnerable to further threats. Intelligence-sharing networks, crucial for detecting and responding to geopolitical threats, would be crippled. The Australian Defence Force would struggle to issue commands and maintain operational efficiency, particularly if the cable disruption was accompanied by cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure. With key naval and air defence communications compromised, Australia's ability to respond to an escalating military threat in the Indo-Pacific would be severely weakened.
Internationally, the fallout would be profound. Australia's closest allies might interpret the deliberate sabotage of undersea cables as an act of war, prompting discussions of military retaliation. The economic impact would not be confined to Australian borders; as a major exporter of resources such as iron ore, coal, and natural gas, disruptions to Australia's trade could send shockwaves through global markets, particularly in China, Japan, and South Korea. The incident could set a dangerous precedent, normalising the targeting of undersea infrastructure in conflicts to come, reshaping the nature of modern warfare.
Preventing such a scenario requires urgent action. Australia must invest in strengthening naval patrols and surveillance around critical undersea cables while developing alternative routing options, including satellite communications and secure land-based links with allied nations. Greater cybersecurity measures must also be put in place to ensure that if physical infrastructure is attacked, digital resilience can compensate. The risk of submarine cable sabotage is no longer theoretical; it is a looming strategic threat that demands immediate attention.
In an era where information and connectivity are as vital as energy and water, ensuring their security is not just a matter of convenience but of national survival.
"A Chinese spy ship spotted off the coast of South Australia has been accused of mapping Australia's submarine cables for "future operations".
Sky News broke the news on Monday that a Chinese government research vessel circumnavigating the coast of Australia was off the SA coast and within Australia's exclusive economic zone.
The vessel is considered a "spy ship" and is understood to have a dual purpose: legitimate scientific research while collecting intelligence.
Senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Malcolm Davis noted it was particularly concerning how the ship had been following the route of a submarine cable that is "really important to Australia's economy and infrastructure".
A Chinese spy ship spotted off the coast of South Australia has been accused of mapping Australia's submarine cables for "future operations". Picture: Xu Qin/Xinhua via Getty Images
Mr Davis said submarine cables, which he said are used more than satellites "at this point in time", were crucial.
He said if they were cut, the likes of banking systems and stock markets could go down.
"Submarine cables are what the internet goes through. When you access the internet, you're either accessing it via a submarine cable or you're accessing it by satellite. Submarine cables give you the greatest bandwidth," he explained to Sky News' Peter Stefanovic on Tuesday.
"If you cut those submarine cables, you lose access to the internet. Now, that's not just simply a case of, oh, well, you lose social media for a bit.
"It is about infrastructure and logistical systems that go down. So those submarine cables are really critical infrastructure for Australia and this ship is precisely following that submarine cable."
He ultimately predicted the scientific research vessel known as Tan Suo Yi Hao, had been "mapping the submarine cable for future operations".
When asked why the ship would want to map the cables, Mr Davis said it was a process of China "gathering intelligence on operational environments" that it may want to operate in during a time of war.
"For example, one of the key sea lanes of communication during wartime would be through the Southern Ocean and through Bass Strait up into the Pacific, because that would then divert commercial maritime merchant traffic away from conflict areas," he said.
"The Chinese would want to cut that sea-laner communication if they could, particularly to starve Japan of access to maritime trade. So it makes sense for them to then send an intelligence gathering vessel and an oceanographic vessel that can then gather useful information on the oceanographic and bathymetric environment in that area and potentially do some more traditional spying at the same time."
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese admitted on Monday he ultimately "would prefer that it wasn't there" after being grilled on the ship's close proximity to Australia.
"We live in circumstances where just as Australia has vessels in the South China Sea, and vessels in the Taiwan Strait and a range of areas, this vessel is there," he said.
"What our task is to do is to make sure we represent Australia's national interest and we do that each and every day and I have every confidence, every confidence in our defence force and our security agencies to do just that."
Mr Albanese also claimed the Australian Defence Force had been monitoring the incident, but it was reported by The Australian that it is actually a responsibility of the Australian Border Force."