Donald Trump may believe that his continuing naval blockade of Iran offers a relatively inexpensive means of maintaining pressure upon Tehran without resuming a major military campaign. But this strategy could prove to be one of the most dangerous gambles of his presidency. Economic warfare is still warfare, and a blockade that progressively damages Iran's economy while offering its leadership no acceptable means of escape may eventually produce precisely the military escalation Washington claims to want to avoid. The danger is that the United States could stumble into another major Middle Eastern war, not through a deliberate decision to launch one, but through the accumulated consequences of a coercive strategy that its architects mistakenly regard as manageable.
Andrew Day, writing in The American Conservative on 11 November 2026, raises precisely this concern. Although Trump has publicly suggested that further major attacks upon Iran are unlikely and that the war is effectively over in military terms, the blockade remains in place. Washington has also expanded its economic pressure campaign, including measures directed at Iranian overland trade and shipping routes through the Caspian region. The result is a continuing confrontation in which the United States is attempting to weaken Iran economically while maintaining the military capacity to strike again.
The central problem is that the blockade is not a neutral diplomatic instrument. A coercive naval blockade is traditionally understood as a belligerent measure, and its legality depends upon the circumstances and applicable international law. Whatever terminology Washington employs, Tehran is unlikely to regard the deliberate obstruction of its maritime commerce as a peaceful act. From the Iranian perspective, the United States is continuing the conflict by economic means while reserving the right to resume large-scale military attacks whenever it considers them advantageous.
The assumption behind the strategy appears to be that sufficiently intense economic pressure will eventually force Iran to accept American demands. But what happens if the Iranian leadership concludes that capitulation would threaten its political survival more seriously than continued resistance? Economic coercion then ceases to be a route towards settlement and becomes a mechanism for prolonging confrontation.
This is the dilemma identified by several experts cited in Day's article, including Rosemary Kelanic of Defense Priorities and Iranian affairs analyst Sina Toossi. Their argument is that Washington has repeatedly overestimated its ability to convert economic pressure into political concessions. Iran's leadership has endured sanctions and diplomatic isolation for decades. It has developed methods of circumventing restrictions, strengthening alternative trading relationships and imposing costs upon its adversaries. Additional pressure may cause substantial economic suffering without producing the strategic surrender Washington seeks.
There is also a serious misunderstanding of how populations respond to foreign attack. American policymakers sometimes assume that economic hardship will turn citizens against their rulers, thereby creating pressure for political change. But external military threats can produce the opposite result. Nationalism, fear of foreign domination and anger at civilian suffering may strengthen support for resistance, even among people who otherwise dislike their government.
Iran is hardly a politically united society. Its leadership has faced significant domestic opposition, and many Iranians have legitimate grievances against the Islamic Republic. Yet opposition to the regime does not automatically translate into support for American military intervention or economic strangulation. A population can oppose its own rulers while simultaneously resenting foreign powers that bomb its cities or obstruct its commerce.
The blockade may therefore strengthen precisely the political forces it is intended to weaken. Hardliners can portray economic hardship as the consequence of foreign aggression, marginalise advocates of compromise and insist that national survival requires continued resistance. A policy designed to force moderation may instead encourage greater militancy.
The military consequences are potentially more serious. Iran cannot match the United States in conventional naval or air power, but it does not need to achieve conventional superiority to impose substantial costs. Its strategic position near the Strait of Hormuz gives it opportunities to disrupt maritime commerce and threaten the economic interests of countries far beyond the immediate conflict.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most important energy chokepoints. Large quantities of oil and liquefied natural gas normally pass through its narrow waters. Even limited disruption can affect shipping insurance, freight costs, energy markets and investor confidence. Iran possesses a variety of military capabilities relevant to maritime disruption, including missiles, drones and naval forces. The precise condition of those capabilities after earlier fighting is uncertain, but the continued attacks upon shipping described in contemporary reporting indicate that Tehran has not been rendered incapable of imposing costs.
According to Day's account, October witnessed particularly intense Iranian attacks against vessels operating in the strait. If this pattern continues, Washington may face an increasingly difficult choice. It can tolerate continuing disruption, thereby undermining the credibility of its blockade and regional security commitments, or it can escalate militarily in an attempt to suppress Iran's remaining capabilities.
The second option may appear attractive to American military planners, particularly if they believe that a concentrated campaign could substantially weaken Iran's ability to threaten shipping. Yet military escalation rarely proceeds according to the expectations of those who initiate it. Attacks upon Iranian military facilities could provoke retaliation against American bases, regional infrastructure or shipping. Further American strikes could follow, producing a cycle of escalation that neither side originally intended.
This is how a supposedly limited economic campaign can become the opening stage of a much larger war. The blockade creates the confrontation, Iranian resistance supplies the justification for additional military action, and each subsequent exchange generates pressure for still greater force.
The presence of substantial American naval forces adds another dimension. Day notes the movement of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, raising the possibility of a temporary concentration of three American carrier strike groups in the region. Such deployments may be intended to deter Iran and reassure American allies. But they also increase the military options available to Washington and place additional valuable assets within a dangerous theatre of operations.
Deterrence is not a mechanical process. One side's defensive precaution can appear to the other as preparation for attack. Iran may interpret additional American forces as evidence that Washington is preparing to resume major strikes, prompting Tehran to adopt a more aggressive posture. The Americans may then interpret Iranian preparations as confirmation of hostile intentions. Both sides can become trapped in a security dilemma in which actions intended to reduce vulnerability actually increase the probability of conflict.
The domestic American political situation further complicates matters. Following the November midterm elections, Democrats are preparing to assume control of Congress in January 2027. The administration also faces a government-funding deadline in December. Day suggests that these developments could create a political window in which advocates of a harder military line press for action before congressional circumstances become less favourable.
Such speculation should not be mistaken for evidence that a new offensive has already been decided upon. Nevertheless, domestic political considerations have frequently influenced the timing and presentation of foreign-policy decisions. A president facing criticism over an inconclusive confrontation may be tempted to demonstrate resolve, particularly if advisers argue that further military action could produce a decisive result.
Israel's security concerns add another source of pressure. Israeli leaders regard Iran's military capabilities and regional influence as major strategic threats. Some influential American commentators and policy organisations likewise favour a more confrontational approach towards Tehran. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, for example, has long advocated strong pressure upon the Islamic Republic.
The underlying danger is that Washington may be pursuing incompatible objectives. It wants Iran economically weakened, militarily constrained and politically compliant, but it also wants to avoid the costs and uncertainties of a major new war. Those objectives might be reconciled through a negotiated settlement offering meaningful reciprocal concessions. They are much harder to reconcile through a blockade that inflicts continuing damage while leaving Iran with little incentive to accept the American position.
A blockade is not automatically an effective bargaining instrument merely because it imposes economic pain. Coercion works only when the target believes that compliance offers a better outcome than resistance. If Tehran concludes that American demands amount to strategic humiliation, permanent vulnerability or eventual regime destruction, then further economic pressure may simply reinforce its determination to resist.
This is where the prospect of a catastrophic miscalculation arises. Iran may decide that it has little to lose by escalating disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Washington may respond with major strikes intended to restore deterrence. Iran may retaliate against regional targets, drawing additional states into the confrontation. Energy markets could react sharply, shipping could be disrupted and the economic consequences could spread internationally.
Australia also has reason to be concerned. As an energy-importing economy closely connected to Asian trade, Australia would not be insulated from a major disruption of Middle Eastern energy supplies. Higher international oil prices can flow through to transport, agriculture, manufacturing and household expenses. A prolonged regional conflict could therefore aggravate Australia's existing cost-of-living pressures even without direct Australian military involvement.
The blockade intended to force Iran to its knees may instead provoke a confrontation that damages the entire region, destabilises global energy markets and draws America into another war from which it will struggle to escape. The strategy could backfire catastrophically, and the greatest danger is that Washington may discover this only after events have passed beyond its control.
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dont-relax-yet-trumps-iran-blockade-makes-more-war-likely/