One of the most disturbing developments in the continuing American and Israeli confrontation with Iran is that the possible use of nuclear weapons has entered serious strategic discussion. This does not mean that President Donald Trump has decided to employ such weapons, or that an attack is imminent. There is no verified evidence establishing either proposition. Nevertheless, when an experienced Washington defence analyst considers the possibility sufficiently important to discuss, the implications deserve careful examination.

Byron Callan, the veteran defence analyst at Capital Alpha Partners, has examined the prospect of renewed large-scale American and Israeli attacks on Iran in a research note discussed by ZeroHedge on November 13, 2026. Callan is uncertain whether major military operations will resume during November or December. His principal concern is not predicting the next airstrike but examining the strategic costs, military limitations and possible consequences of another round of fighting.

The most alarming issue concerns Iran's deeply buried nuclear-related facility at Pickaxe Mountain, near Natanz. Callan strongly doubts that Washington would use a nuclear weapon against the site, but acknowledges that the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. His observation is not a prediction of nuclear war. It is a warning that the logic of military escalation can produce choices that would previously have appeared almost unthinkable.

The difficulty begins with the limits of conventional military power. The United States and Israel possess formidable air forces, sophisticated intelligence systems and advanced precision weapons. They can destroy military installations, damage infrastructure, disrupt communications and impose substantial economic costs upon Iran. But the ability to inflict destruction should not be confused with the ability to achieve a coherent political victory.

Callan questions whether strategic bombing alone could overthrow the Iranian government. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and much of Iran's military establishment could survive another air campaign, even if the country's economy and infrastructure suffered further damage. The Iranian state might emerge weaker, poorer and more hostile, but still capable of maintaining domestic control and conducting regional military operations.

This distinction has haunted American strategic thinking for decades. Air power offers political leaders the possibility of dramatic action without committing large ground forces. It creates the appearance of decisive military strength while avoiding some of the immediate costs of occupation. Yet destroying targets is not the same as creating a stable political settlement.

The available American ground forces in the region are insufficient for a full-scale occupation of Iran, a large and geographically difficult country with a population exceeding ninety million. Even a substantially larger invasion force would face enormous political, logistical and military challenges. The notion that a few weeks of bombing could reliably produce a cooperative successor government is therefore highly questionable.

There is also the problem of what happens after the bombing stops. A government that survives extensive attacks may use the destruction to strengthen nationalist sentiment, suppress domestic opponents and justify further militarisation. Citizens who dislike their rulers may nevertheless resent foreign attacks upon their country. Military pressure can weaken a regime without necessarily creating the conditions for its removal.

The nuclear question arises partly because underground facilities are designed to withstand conventional attack. Iran has invested heavily in hardened installations intended to preserve sensitive capabilities against superior foreign air forces. The deeper and more protected these facilities become, the more difficult it is for an attacker to establish that they have been destroyed.

A nuclear weapon might appear, in a narrowly technical calculation, to offer a means of overcoming some of these difficulties. But this reasoning risks ignoring the immense strategic and moral consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold.

No nuclear weapon has been used in warfare since the American attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. For more than eighty years, a powerful international norm has developed against the battlefield use of nuclear arms. That norm has survived the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, numerous Middle Eastern conflicts and repeated confrontations between nuclear-armed powers.

Breaking it would be an event of extraordinary historical significance. Even a single nuclear strike against an underground military installation would transform international perceptions of nuclear weapons. It could make future use appear less exceptional and encourage other governments to reconsider their own strategic calculations.

Russia would certainly study the precedent in relation to Ukraine and its confrontation with NATO. China would consider the implications for its own military planning. North Korea could interpret the event as further justification for retaining and expanding its nuclear arsenal. Other states might conclude that possession of nuclear weapons is the only reliable means of deterring attacks by more powerful adversaries.

This is the central paradox of a nuclear strike intended to prevent proliferation. An attack designed to stop one country from developing nuclear weapons could strengthen the incentives for other countries to acquire them.

There is also the question of effectiveness. A nuclear detonation near a deeply buried installation would not automatically establish that every relevant tunnel, piece of equipment or quantity of nuclear material had been destroyed. Without reliable post-strike verification, the attacking government might be unable to demonstrate that its principal objective had been achieved.

The result could be the worst combination imaginable: an unprecedented act of military escalation, severe international condemnation, possible radioactive contamination and continuing uncertainty about the survival of the very capabilities the attack was intended to eliminate.

The humanitarian consequences would also require serious consideration. The effects of a nuclear explosion depend upon the weapon, its detonation conditions, geology and surrounding population. A nuclear earth-penetrating attack cannot simply be assumed to confine radioactive material safely underground. Fallout, contamination and civilian exposure could become major concerns, potentially extending beyond the immediate target area.

Such consequences would not disappear because the weapon was described as tactical or directed against a military objective. The distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons may have operational significance, but it does not eliminate the moral and political gravity of nuclear use.

There is a further difficulty for Washington: the possibility of Iranian retaliation. Iran's missile and drone capabilities have been reduced by previous military operations, but they have not been eliminated. Tehran retains the capacity to impose costs upon regional adversaries and threaten important infrastructure.

American and allied air-defence systems can intercept many incoming threats, but they rely upon expensive and finite inventories of missiles and other defensive equipment. Callan emphasises that repeated attacks consume interceptors at a rate that creates problems for military planning and industrial replenishment.

This is an often overlooked aspect of modern warfare. The cost of defending against relatively inexpensive missiles or drones can greatly exceed the cost of the weapons being intercepted. A military force may successfully defend a target while consuming scarce equipment that cannot be replaced quickly.

The implications extend beyond the Middle East. Every interceptor or precision weapon committed to the Iranian conflict is potentially unavailable for another contingency. American military planners must also consider commitments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, including the possibility of confrontation involving Russia, China or North Korea.

A prolonged Middle Eastern war could therefore weaken American flexibility elsewhere, even if the United States retained overwhelming military superiority over Iran. Strategic power depends not merely upon possessing advanced weapons but upon maintaining sufficient inventories, industrial capacity and political freedom of action to meet multiple threats.

For Australia, this is particularly important. Australian defence planning increasingly assumes close cooperation with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. If American weapons inventories are substantially depleted in the Middle East, questions arise about the resources available for deterrence and allied support in Asia.

The Australian government should not assume that American military power is unlimited or that commitments in one region have no consequences for another. A major escalation against Iran could create strategic effects extending far beyond the Persian Gulf.

Energy security provides another reason for concern. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most important maritime routes for petroleum shipments. Continued attacks, shipping disruption, higher insurance costs and uncertainty about safe passage can influence global energy prices even without a complete closure of the waterway.

Further strikes against Iranian or regional energy infrastructure could produce additional volatility. The consequences would be felt by importing countries, industrial businesses and ordinary consumers. Australia would not be insulated from these effects merely because it possesses substantial domestic energy resources.

A prolonged disruption could increase transport costs, complicate supply chains and contribute to inflationary pressures. Governments already struggling with public debt and living costs would face additional economic difficulties. The consequences of military escalation could therefore spread through the global economy long before any decisive political result was achieved.

This raises a fundamental question about the objectives of the American campaign. Is the purpose to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, weaken its military capacity, compel diplomatic concessions or overthrow its government? These objectives are not identical, and different objectives require different strategies.

A limited operation intended to degrade particular capabilities may succeed militarily without producing regime change. A campaign designed to overthrow the government would require a far more ambitious political and military undertaking. A strategy that shifts between these objectives risks becoming an open-ended conflict in which each round of destruction creates demands for further action.

The temptation to declare victory after a spectacular strike may be politically attractive, particularly for leaders facing domestic pressure. But the strategic consequences of war do not necessarily end when a government announces that its objectives have been achieved.

Iran may retain surviving capabilities, rebuild damaged facilities, pursue alternative programmes or respond through regional proxies and other instruments of pressure. A military campaign that fails to establish a durable political settlement can become a recurring cycle of attacks and retaliation.

There is also the danger of miscalculation. When adversaries repeatedly threaten escalation, they may begin to assume that the other side is bluffing. Military deployments intended as deterrence can be interpreted as preparations for attack. Negotiations may break down because one side believes that time is running out. An incident at sea or a strike against regional infrastructure can produce pressure for retaliation before political leaders have fully assessed the consequences.

This is why the continuing uncertainty surrounding American intentions is itself dangerous. Diplomatic ambiguity can sometimes create leverage, but it can also encourage adversaries to prepare for worst-case scenarios. In a region already experiencing prolonged conflict, the margin for error may be narrow.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's continuing concerns about access to Iranian nuclear facilities complicate matters further. Inspectors require reliable information about nuclear material and activities to assess compliance and proliferation risks. Military attacks can damage facilities, disrupt monitoring arrangements and make subsequent verification more difficult.

A durable solution to the Iranian nuclear problem ultimately requires more than the physical destruction of buildings. It requires credible arrangements for monitoring nuclear activities, addressing security concerns and reducing incentives for further escalation. Military force may influence negotiations, but it cannot automatically substitute for them.

None of this requires sympathy for the Iranian regime. Its domestic repression, regional military activities and nuclear ambitions deserve serious scrutiny. Nor does criticism of American military strategy imply that Iran should be permitted to threaten its neighbours or pursue nuclear weapons without consequence.

The question is whether particular military actions are likely to improve the security situation or produce dangers greater than those they are intended to prevent. That is a question of strategic judgment, not ideological loyalty.

Callan's analysis is valuable because it focuses upon costs, limitations and uncertainties rather than treating military action as an uncomplicated demonstration of strength. The United States can inflict enormous damage upon Iran, but its capacity to impose a preferred political outcome is much less certain.

The nuclear possibility, however remote, exposes the ultimate danger of a strategy that becomes frustrated by its own limitations. If conventional attacks fail to achieve the desired result, political leaders may face pressure to escalate. Each successive step can be presented as necessary to complete the previous one.

This is how limited military operations can acquire a momentum that their original architects never intended. The argument shifts from whether war is wise to whether previous sacrifices will be wasted unless further action is taken.

The nuclear threshold must not become merely another option on a list of military capabilities. Its significance extends beyond the immediate conflict and beyond the administration that might authorise its use. The consequences would affect the international security system for generations.

The possibility of an American nuclear attack on Iran remains remote, and Callan does not suggest otherwise. But the fact that it has entered serious strategic discussion should encourage restraint rather than sensationalism.

https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/nuke-question-wall-streets-top-defense-analyst-says-us-nuclear-use-iran-cannot-be-100