The war with Iran has settled into a temporary lull, but almost no one on either side treats it as more than a holding pattern. Michael Snyder's recent Substack lays out the Iranian reading of the situation clearly: fighting has been put on pause until after the 3 November US midterms, after which the Trump administration and Israel are expected to resume large-scale strikes. Trump himself has said more than once that a decision on Iran is coming "very soon," and he has explicitly ruled out new attacks before Election Day. Aides, according to reporting, want the conflict kept relatively quiet so it does not dominate the news while Republicans defend thin majorities. Once the votes are counted, that political constraint loosens.
Iran is not waiting passively. Officials are fortifying nuclear and security sites, satellite imagery shows new dirt mounds around Pickaxe Mountain and Natanz, while ground forces train, missile production continues, and public rallies are staged. Airports, ports and power plants have been told to prepare for wartime conditions with shelters and backup supplies. Tehran has warned, both publicly and in private channels with regional governments, that any new American strikes will be met with a wider and harsher response across the Middle East. One option under discussion is ground incursions into neighbouring countries, aimed at creating leverage the US would find hard to ignore.
Shipping attacks already show Iranian willingness to raise costs. On 11 October six commercial vessels were reported struck in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Replacing a modern tanker takes years and tens of millions of dollars; repeated hits erode global capacity and keep energy prices elevated. At the same time, Saudi strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen have drawn explicit threats of retaliation against Saudi energy facilities, airports and other strategic sites. The Houthis have also warned that US involvement would bring a "swift and painful" response against American interests in the region.
Several paths are plausible once the midterms are past.
The most straightforward is a renewed US-Israeli air and missile campaign focused on remaining nuclear infrastructure, missile production sites, command nodes and energy assets. Israel's election calendar (27 October) and the US midterms both create short-term incentives for restraint; after both votes, joint operations become easier to justify. Limited strikes before the elections remain possible if Iranian attacks on shipping or US forces continue to escalate, but a larger campaign is the one Iranian planners appear to expect.
A second scenario centres on Iranian ground action. With the largest standing army in the region and substantial reserves, Tehran could attempt limited incursions into southern Iraq aimed at Kuwaiti territory or infrastructure. Even a force of a couple of hundred thousand would be difficult for Iraqi or Kuwaiti forces, or the relatively small US Marine presence in the theatre, to stop quickly. The political shock of Iranian troops on Kuwaiti soil, or of sustained disruption to Gulf oil infrastructure, would raise the costs of any American campaign and potentially force negotiations on terms more favourable to Tehran.
A third path is a wider proxy and maritime escalation that runs in parallel with any direct strikes. Intensified Houthi attacks on Saudi energy and aviation targets, further shipping strikes in the Strait and Gulf of Oman, and pressure on US facilities via Iraqi militias would stretch American and Gulf defences. Iran has also floated the idea of targeting regional data centres and communications infrastructure. None of these moves require crossing the nuclear threshold, yet each compounds the economic damage already visible in elevated oil prices and tanker losses.
The most dangerous variant is a rapid climb toward what Iranian officials have called a "doomsday war." If strikes are judged to threaten regime survival or the core of the nuclear programme, Tehran could abandon previous restraint on missile barrages, attempt to close the Strait more completely, or escalate through non-conventional means. US and Israeli planners have contingency options for ground raids or larger ground deployments, but any such move would itself trigger Iranian retaliation on a scale that has so far been avoided. Both sides have incentives to keep the conflict below that threshold, yet the combination of Iranian preparations, US post-election freedom of action, and ongoing attacks on shipping makes miscalculation more likely.
For now the calendar still imposes a pause. After 3 November that constraint disappears, and the preparations already underway on the Iranian side suggest they expect the next phase to be larger and more dangerous than the last. The global energy market, already absorbing tanker losses and infrastructure threats, will register the result quickly.
https://michaeltsnyder.substack.com/p/iran-believes-that-more-war-is-coming