Australia's deepening engagement with India, recently highlighted by the Albanese government's diplomatic and economic overtures, is often presented as a strategic masterstroke. A vibrant democracy, a growing economy, a counterweight to China; the narrative writes itself. Yet beneath the optimism lies a harder truth: placing significant trust in India on defence, migration, or broader strategic alignment would be a serious error in judgment.
India is not a reliable partner in the way Australia's traditional allies have been. It is a civilisational state with its own deep interests, historical grievances, and strategic autonomy that consistently prioritises New Delhi's narrow advantage over collective security arrangements. This is not hostility, it is realism. And realism demands we see India clearly rather than through the rose-tinted lens of "Quad solidarity."
On defence, the record is cautionary. India maintains a long-standing relationship with Russia, including significant arms purchases and joint exercises even as Moscow has grown closer to Beijing. Its commitment to Western-style alliance discipline is minimal. While Indian forces participate in Quad naval drills, New Delhi has repeatedly shown reluctance to confront China directly in the Indian Ocean or along the broader Indo-Pacific. The 2020 Galwan clash demonstrated India's willingness to push back against Beijing, but also its preference for bilateral management rather than multilateral containment. Australia cannot assume Indian forces or bases would reliably support us in a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. Strategic autonomy cuts both ways.
Migration presents another set of risks. India is the largest source of skilled migrants to Australia, and many integrate successfully. However, rapid large-scale migration from any single country creates challenges of social cohesion, infrastructure strain, and potential dual loyalties. India's own internal dynamics, caste politics, religious tensions, and a strong diaspora influence apparatus, mean that large Indian communities can become vectors for New Delhi's preferences rather than fully Australian ones. Recent tensions around foreign interference, student visa integrity, and the behaviour of certain diaspora groups should give policymakers pause. Trusting India to manage migration outflows responsibly, or assuming seamless integration at scale, ignores patterns seen elsewhere.
On most other strategic issues, India's behaviour is predictably self-interested. It seeks technology transfers and market access from the West, while protecting its own industries and maintaining relationships with adversarial states. Its position on climate, trade, and global governance often aligns more with the Global South than with developed liberal democracies. This is understandable for a nation of 1.4 billion people with massive development needs. But it makes India a transactional partner at best, not a natural ally.
Australia's geopolitical position is precarious. We face a rising authoritarian power in China that views us with hostility. In this environment, diversification is wise. Deepening economic ties with India makes sense where mutual benefit is clear. Military-to-military exchanges and intelligence sharing have value. But building core defence strategy or large-scale demographic policy around trust in India would be foolish. Nations do not have permanent friends, only passing interests. India's interests are not Australia's.
The wiser course is pragmatic engagement without illusion. Trade where profitable. Cooperate on areas of genuine overlap, such as maritime security. But maintain strategic independence and avoid the temptation to see India as a substitute for robust alliances with the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Romanticising New Delhi as a fellow democracy blinds us to the civilisational and strategic realities that make deep trust premature.
Australia does not need more geopolitical ignorance. It needs cold-eyed assessment. India is an important player. It is not a saviour. Pretending otherwise risks repeating the pattern of wishful thinking that has already complicated our relationship with China. Realism, not rhetoric, should guide the India question.
https://www.spectator.com.au/2026/07/the-india-question-and-labors-geopolitical-ignorance/