In a provocative piece from The Spectator titled "The Peril of Playing with Viruses," (link below),the dangers of tinkering with deadly pathogens are laid bare. The article delves into experiments at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where scientists engineered chimeric viruses by swapping genes between bat coronaviruses, creating strains that infect human cells more efficiently and prove lethal in lab models. But beneath the veneer of scientific curiosity lies a darker truth: Much of this gain-of-function (GOF) research isn't about outsmarting nature — how could we presume to know its next move? — but about crafting bioweapons. And with labs worldwide pushing these boundaries, it's only a matter of time before a catastrophic lab leak unleashes a pandemic far deadlier than COVID-19. Drawing from the Spectator article and broader expert insights, this blog essay argues that GOF's primary driver is militaristic, not predictive, and that the world teeters on the brink of bio-disaster unless we halt this reckless pursuit.
Decoding Gain-of-Function: From Lab Curiosity to Potential Catastrophe
Gain-of-function research involves modifying viruses to enhance their transmissibility, virulence, or host range, essentially making them more dangerous to study how they might evolve naturally. Proponents claim it helps predict pandemics, allowing us to develop vaccines or countermeasures ahead of time. The Spectator highlights Wuhan experiments where spike genes from bat viruses were swapped to create "brand new viruses that could infect human cells better and kill humanised mice faster." Similar work on alpha coronaviruses linked to swine acute diarrhea syndrome (SADS) resulted in recombinant strains showing a 10,000-fold increase in viral growth in mouse brains.
On the surface, this sounds like proactive science. But dig deeper: These experiments often occur under inadequate biosafety levels, as noted in the article, where risky work on SADS viruses was done at BSL-2—akin to a standard lab, rather than the stringent BSL-4 required for such pathogens. The rationale? To "prove there is a risk" we already know exists. Yet, this "souping up and training" of viruses on human tissues doesn't truly forecast nature's whims; it accelerates them in ways that could backfire spectacularly.
The Bioweapon Motive: Beyond Civilian Applications
The article quotes Professor Richard Ebright bluntly: This research has "no civilian application whatsoever. The only potential products of this research are weapons of mass destruction." Virologist Simon Wain-Hobson echoes this, warning that publishing such details provides "intricate details of the recipe for how to construct novel infectious viruses" to any rogue state with a virology lab, for free. This isn't hyperbole; GOF has long been intertwined with biodefence programs. In the U.S., funding from agencies like DARPA and the NIH has supported similar work under the guise of "dual-use" research — beneficial for health but easily weaponised.
History backs this up. The Soviet Union's Biopreparat program in the 1970s-80s conducted GOF on anthrax and plague, creating super-strains for warfare. Today, nations like China and Russia invest heavily in virology, with Wuhan's lab tied to military collaborations. The Spectator points out that these experiments provide "where to order the ingredients" for novel viruses, arming potential terrorists or adversaries. If the goal were merely prediction, why publish blueprints that could enable bioweapons? The answer: Because the underlying intent often leans toward offensive capabilities, masked as defensive preparedness. Second-guessing nature is a flimsy pretext — evolution is unpredictable, driven by random mutations we can't fully anticipate. How could one "know" what virus will emerge next? GOF doesn't divine the future; it engineers threats that wouldn't exist otherwise.
The Futility of Predicting Nature: A Dangerous Illusion
Nature's viral evolution is chaotic and unknowable in specifics. Bats, as the article notes, harbour coronaviruses due to dense roosting in caves, but predicting which strain jumps to humans is like forecasting earthquakes — possible in broad terms, impossible in detail. GOF advocates argue it helps us stay ahead, but critics like Ebright contend it creates risks without commensurate benefits. The Wuhan work on SADS, which infects human lung organoids efficiently, demonstrates replication and damage — but at what cost? The article likens repeating such experiments post-COVID to "nuclear war exercises gone wrong," emphasising the insanity of risking global calamity again.
If prediction were viable, we'd have pre-empted COVID. Instead, evidence mounts that the pandemic stemmed from a lab leak at Wuhan, where these very experiments occurred. The article asserts the lab "almost certainly caused the pandemic" through inadequate safeguards. This isn't about hubris in second-guessing nature; it's about creating controllable horrors for strategic advantage. Bioweapons offer deniability, a "natural" outbreak that cripples enemies without fingerprints.
A History of Leaks: Warnings Ignored
Lab leaks aren't theoretical. The 1977 H1N1 flu reemerged from a Soviet lab, killing thousands. In 2004, SARS escaped a Beijing lab twice. Anthrax leaks at U.S. facilities in 2014-2015 exposed workers. The Spectator warns that with details published in journals like the Journal of Virology, the barrier to entry for bioweapons drops. COVID's origins, increasingly linked to Wuhan's GOF on bat viruses, underscore the peril. Authors like Shi Zhengli and Ben Hu, involved in pre-2020 work, paused publications during the pandemic due to sensitivity, only resuming in 2024.
These incidents reveal a pattern: Lax protocols, human error, and the inherent uncontrollability of enhanced pathogens. As the article states, "We are all put at risk if something goes wrong, no matter how far from the lab we live." With over 800 BSL-3/4 labs worldwide handling deadly agents, the odds of a leak escalate.
The Inevitable Deadly Leak: A Matter of When, Not If
Given the bioweapon incentives and prediction's futility, continued GOF is a countdown to disaster. The Spectator calls for public oversight: "The public has a right to a say in whether such experiments are done in our name and with our tax money." Yet, funding persists — U.S. grants to Wuhan pre-2020, and ongoing projects elsewhere. A leak of a super-engineered virus could dwarf COVID's toll, with fatality rates amplified through GOF. Rogue actors, armed with open-source recipes, could accelerate this. It's not paranoia; it's probability. Nature evolves slowly; labs fast-track Armageddon.
Gain-of-function research's true purpose isn't benevolent foresight, it's bioweapon development, cloaked in science. We can't second-guess nature's infinite variables, but we can create monsters that escape. The Spectator's exposé on Wuhan's perils is a wake-up call: Halt GOF, enforce transparency, and prioritize surveillance over synthesis. Otherwise, the next lab leak won't be a "what if" — it'll be a deadly certainty, reshaping humanity in ways we can't predict or survive. The world must act before the vial shatters, or the lab door is left open.