Late November 2025, Spain – the European Union's top pork producer and the world's third-largest exporter – faced a nightmare it hadn't seen in over 30 years: the return of African Swine Fever (ASF). The highly lethal virus, which can kill up to 100% of infected domestic pigs and European wild boars through massive internal bleeding and organ failure, was confirmed in wild boars near Barcelona. Robert Malone's February 10, 2026, Substack piece dives deep into this crisis, framing it not just as an agricultural disaster but as a potential biosafety failure with eerie parallels to debates over COVID-19 origins.
ASF poses zero risk to humans or food safety (cooked pork is fine), but its economic punch is brutal. Spain exports roughly 3 million tons of pork annually, worth around €8.8 billion (~$10.2 billion), with nearly half heading to China. Within days of detection, major markets like China, the UK, Mexico, and Canada slapped bans or restrictions on Spanish pork, triggering immediate losses in the billions and supply-chain chaos (e.g., Mallorca halted 1,000 weekly pig exports during peak Christmas season). No commercial farms have been hit yet – all cases remain in wild boars – but a spillover would mean mass culling of entire herds, as standard protocol demands.
First detections: Two dead wild boars in late November 2025 near Cerdanyola del Vallès (Barcelona area), followed by more in the Collserola hills. By early 2026, cases climbed steadily:
Late December 2025: Around 26–47 confirmed positives.
Mid-January 2026: 60+ positives across 15–17 outbreaks (mostly secondary).
Late January/early February 2026: Over 100 positives (e.g., 103 by late January from 980 tested; some reports cite 142 by early February).
Authorities acted fast: A 20-km infected zone (with a tight 6-km high-risk core), restricted access, traps, thermal drones, military support, and intensive surveillance. No domestic pig infections reported, suggesting effective containment in wildlife so far. Catalonia even plans aggressive wild boar population reduction (halving from ~125,000 to 60,000) to curb spread and overpopulation risks.
The Lab Leak Angle: Proximity, Genetics, and Suspicion
Malone's essay spotlights the elephant in the room: The outbreak epicentre sits just 150 metres from IRTA-CReSA (Centre for Research in Animal Health), a BSL-3 high-containment lab designated as a WOAH/OIE reference centre for swine diseases. IRTA-CReSA has long collaborated with the USDA's Plum Island Animal Disease Centre (via a 2017–2022 agreement) on ASF research, including pathogenesis, diagnostics, vaccines, and – crucially – genetic manipulation of the virus genome to create attenuated (weakened) strains via homologous recombination.
Key red flags Malone highlights:
Genetic match: Sequencing by Spain's CISA-INIA (EU reference lab) showed the strain closely resembles the Georgia-2007 reference virus – the exact one commonly used in labs for experiments and vaccine development – not the genotypes circulating in current European outbreaks.
Timing and activity: The lab was conducting ASF experiments in October–November 2025, overlapping with the first detections.
Construction disruptions: Ongoing work adjacent to the facility (new building) raised biosecurity questions, including a reported gas supply interruption.
This sparked official probes: Spanish Ministry of Agriculture couldn't rule out a "biological containment facility" origin. Police (Mossos d'Esquadra and Guardia Civil) raided IRTA-CReSA in December 2025 on court order, investigating possible environmental crimes amid sealed proceedings. Five nearby labs handling ASF were audited.
Malone draws direct parallels to Wuhan: A dangerous pathogen emerges near a lab actively working on it, with genetic ties to research strains, fuelling speculation about accidental release during routine (or manipulated) work. He notes no confirmed gain-of-function (GOF) enhancement here – focus is on
Investigations have leaned away from a lab origin:
Multiple genetic analyses (including by Barcelona's Institute for Research in Biomedicine) found no match between the outbreak strain and 17–19 viruses used at IRTA-CReSA or other labs. Differences include dozens of mutations and large genomic deletions absent in lab stocks.
Independent reports (e.g., from CISA-INIA and EU reference labs) concluded a lab escape is "highly unlikely" or outright ruled out.
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture and regional officials affirmed no genetic link, describing the strain as potentially "moderately virulent" and not lab-derived.
Early theories pointed to contaminated food (e.g., a wild boar eating a discarded sandwich from an infected region), though the unique genetics complicate that.
Broader Implications: Biosafety Wake-Up Call?
Even if the lab theory fizzles, the episode underscores vulnerabilities in high-containment research – especially international collaborations on high-consequence pathogens. A confirmed leak would trigger reviews (USDA OIG, HHS/NIH, etc.) and push for stricter EU/global biosafety rules. For now, it's contained wildlife-only, but the economic scars linger, and trust in pathogen research takes another hit.
Malone concludes this could be "this decade's defining case study in laboratory safety" – a reminder that the Wuhan debate isn't isolated. Whether natural spillover, human error, or something else, Spain's ASF crisis shows how fragile food security can be when a killer virus resurfaces after decades.