On June 29, 2025, Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, a prominent Shia cleric in Qom, Iran, issued a fatwa declaring U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as "mohareb" (enemies of God) for threatening Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior clerics. The fatwa calls on Muslims worldwide to make these "enemies regret their words and actions," framing any cooperation with them as "haram" (forbidden) and promising martyrdom rewards for those who act against them. This follows U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, which killed key military figures and escalated tensions.
The fatwa's designation of Trump and Netanyahu as "mohareb" carries grave implications under Iran's interpretation of Islamic law, where the term often justifies execution. This explicit call to action could inspire lone actors or organised groups, particularly those aligned with Iran's ideology, to target these leaders or their interests. The precedent of the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie, which led to years of threats and a 2022 stabbing, underscores the potential for long-term, decentralised violence.
The fatwa explicitly targets high-profile figures, increasing the risk of assassination attempts. Iran's history of plotting against U.S. officials, such as the 2020 Justice Department charges against Iranian operatives targeting Trump's former National Security Adviser John Bolton, suggests capability and intent. The U.S. intelligence community has long assessed that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seeks to retaliate for the 2020 killing of Qassem Soleimani, with Trump as a primary target. The fatwa could amplify these efforts, potentially mobilising Iran's global network of proxies, including Hezbollah, which has a history of attacks like the 1983 Beirut bombings.
Recent reports highlight concerns about Iranian sleeper cells in the U.S., with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning of a "heightened threat environment" following the airstrikes. On June 22, 2025, DHS arrested 11 Iranian nationals, including an alleged sniper, raising alarms about potential terrorist plots. Blog articles, such as one from The Economic Collapse, speculate that these arrests, including an Iranian army sniper found with an IRGC identification card, could indicate preparations for significant attacks. Iran's prior warning to Trump about activating sleeper cells if attacked, communicated during the G7 summit in June 2025, adds credibility to these fears.
Experts warn that Iran may resort to asymmetrical warfare, including terrorism, cyberattacks, or sabotage, due to its weakened conventional military capabilities post-airstrikes. Steve Quayle, cited in a blog article, emphasises the risk of attacks on "soft targets" like refineries or public gatherings, especially around events like July 4th. The fatwa could serve as a religious justification for such tactics, encouraging proxies or radicalised individuals to target U.S. infrastructure or civilians.Iran has a history of using proxies like Hezbollah to conduct attacks abroad.
The fatwa and related tensions have prompted heightened security in the U.S. Blog reports note the erection of large barricades around the White House and U.S. Treasury, suggesting anticipation of domestic threats. DHS and FBI have intensified monitoring of potential Iran-backed cells, with increased police patrols at sensitive sites like government buildings and Jewish community centres. Major states like California and New York are on high alert, reflecting a broader national security response to the fatwa's potential to incite violence.
The fatwa's call for global Muslim action could inspire lone-wolf attacks or small-scale plots by radicalised individuals, particularly in Western countries with significant Shia populations or Iranian diaspora communities. The broad language urging Muslims to "make enemies regret their actions" leaves room for interpretation, potentially encouraging unpredictable acts of violence. The Rushdie case demonstrates how such fatwas can sustain threats over years, with attackers acting independently. X posts highlight fears of radicals interpreting the fatwa as a direct order, though no specific plots are confirmed.
Iran's proxies, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, could be galvanised by the fatwa to target U.S. or Israeli interests. Iran's long-standing support for these groups, designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S., increases the risk of coordinated attacks in the Middle East or beyond. A European diplomat noted Iran's capability to strike American and European nationals outside the U.S., potentially through these proxies. However, Iran's weakened military and proxy networks post-airstrikes may limit their operational capacity.
The DHS bulletin warns of potential 'low-level cyberattacks" against U.S. networks, a tactic Iran has employed previously. The fatwa's religious framing could embolden non-state actors to launch cyber operations or sabotage, aligning with Iran's asymmetrical warfare strategy. Blog articles suggest concerns about attacks on critical infrastructure, such as refineries, which could disrupt U.S. economic stability.
The arrest of 1,200–1,500 Iranian nationals who entered the U.S. during the Biden administration has fuelled speculation about sleeper cells. Experts like Michael Balboni argue that lax border security may have allowed foreign operatives to infiltrate, increasing the risk of domestic terrorism. The fatwa could act as a catalyst for these individuals to act, though no direct evidence links these arrests to active plots.
The fatwa's international scope, calling on "all Muslims" to act, raises the possibility of attacks in allied nations or regions with U.S. military presence, such as Qatar or Iraq. Iran's threat to target U.S. bases in the Middle East, as stated by Ali Akbar Velayati, aligns with the fatwa's rhetoric and could escalate regional tensions. However, Iran's limited response post-airstrikes, as noted by experts, suggests a cautious approach to avoid all-out war with the U.S.
While the fatwa poses a significant rhetorical and ideological threat, its practical impact on new terrorist threats remains uncertain. Iran's military setbacks and damaged air defences may constrain its ability to orchestrate large-scale attacks, pushing it toward asymmetrical tactics, such as urban terrorism and cyberattacks, which will bring the war onto American streets.