There is a bitter irony at the heart of Western climate policy. For decades, Western governments have imposed increasingly expensive regulations on their own industries in the name of saving the planet, while Communist China has positioned itself to become one of the greatest commercial beneficiaries of the entire exercise. Western politicians congratulate themselves on their environmental virtue, Western manufacturers struggle with rising costs, and Beijing watches its industrial competitors become increasingly dependent upon Chinese technology, manufacturing and supply chains. If the Chinese Communist Party had been invited to design an industrial policy to weaken Western manufacturing while strengthening China's position, it might have struggled to devise something more advantageous than the climate policies Western governments have voluntarily embraced.

A detailed article by Robert Malone and Jill Glasspool Malone, "How the West's Climate Policies Became the CCP's Cash Machine," published on November 3, 2026, examines this extraordinary situation. Their analysis deserves attention because it exposes the economic consequences of environmental policies that are too often discussed exclusively in moralistic terms. The issue is not simply whether carbon dioxide contributes to atmospheric warming. It is whether the regulatory response to climate change has created an industrial and geopolitical arrangement that systematically disadvantages Western economies while rewarding their principal strategic competitor.

The climate sceptic position begins by questioning the extraordinary confidence with which governments translate complex climate projections into sweeping economic mandates. Climate models necessarily involve assumptions about future emissions, economic development, technological change and the behaviour of the climate system. Their projections are not infallible forecasts. Yet governments have frequently treated selected projections as sufficient justification for imposing costly changes upon energy production, transport, agriculture and manufacturing. The economic consequences are immediate and measurable, while many of the projected environmental benefits extend decades into the future.

Scientific uncertainty, economic cost and geopolitical consequences deserve far more scrutiny than they have generally received. Even accepting the conventional scientific assessment of anthropogenic warming, it does not follow that every subsidy, emissions target or technological mandate represents sensible public policy.

One of the most remarkable examples comes from Australia's motor vehicle industry. Under the New Vehicle Efficiency Standard, which commenced in January 2025, manufacturers can earn emissions credits for qualifying vehicles. These credits have commercial value because manufacturers whose fleets exceed prescribed emissions targets may need to acquire credits or face financial penalties.

Malone describes the extraordinary spectacle of more than 1,600 Chinese-made BYD vehicles being stored at Jamberoo Action Park in New South Wales during 2025. According to the reporting discussed in his article, a BYD Sealion 7 could potentially generate approximately $7,050 in regulatory credits. The mere presence of the stored vehicles does not prove that they were imported to obtain credits, but the underlying incentive deserves examination. Government regulation has created a financial asset associated with importing particular vehicles, independently of whether Australian consumers actually purchase them.

Consider the implications. Australian motorists may prefer conventional petrol or diesel vehicles because of their price, reliability, range or suitability for rural conditions. Yet government policy creates financial incentives favouring electric vehicles, many manufactured in China. The result is not simply a marketplace in which competing technologies succeed or fail according to consumer demand. It is a politically engineered market in which governments influence the competitive outcome.

The European situation is equally revealing. European governments have imposed increasingly demanding vehicle emissions requirements while encouraging the transition to electric cars. Established manufacturers face substantial compliance costs, while electric-vehicle producers can benefit from credit arrangements and regulatory advantages. Some conventional manufacturers have entered emissions-pooling agreements with electric-vehicle companies, including Tesla and China's BYD.

In effect, manufacturers of conventional vehicles can find themselves financially supporting competitors whose products receive preferential regulatory treatment. This is a peculiar conception of industrial policy, particularly when European governments simultaneously express alarm about the competitive threat posed by heavily subsidised Chinese electric vehicles. Europe encourages a market transition that Chinese manufacturers are exceptionally well positioned to exploit, then attempts to protect its own industries from the consequences through tariffs.

China, meanwhile, has not relied upon the invisible hand of the market. Beijing has pursued an enormous programme of industrial investment, subsidies, infrastructure development and strategic control over supply chains. Research cited by Malone estimates that Chinese government support for electric vehicles amounted to at least US$230.9 billion between 2009 and 2023. This helped create formidable manufacturing capacity in electric vehicles, batteries and associated technologies.

The Chinese advantage is not entirely artificial. Chinese manufacturers have developed genuine expertise in battery chemistry, production efficiency and vertically integrated manufacturing. But those capabilities have developed within a political economy in which the state identifies strategic industries and directs substantial resources towards their expansion. Western governments have often behaved as though their principal responsibility is to regulate domestic industry, while Beijing has concentrated on ensuring that Chinese industry can supply the technologies those regulations require.

The same strategic problem extends beyond motor vehicles. Solar panels, battery storage systems, electric vehicle components and the processing of critical minerals have become central elements of the energy transition. China occupies an exceptionally powerful position in several of these supply chains. A Western country can announce ambitious renewable-energy targets, but if achieving those targets requires purchasing large quantities of Chinese-manufactured equipment, the economic and strategic benefits may flow overseas.

There is a further contradiction. Western governments frequently demand rapid reductions in domestic fossil-fuel use while China continues to rely heavily upon coal for electricity generation and industrial production. China has also expanded renewable energy at enormous scale, so it would be inaccurate to portray its energy policy as exclusively coal-based. Nevertheless, its willingness to retain substantial conventional generating capacity while developing renewable technologies contrasts sharply with Western policies that seek to accelerate the retirement of established energy infrastructure.

This raises an elementary question of national interest. What is achieved if Western manufacturing becomes more expensive, domestic industrial capacity declines, and production shifts towards countries with different energy systems and environmental standards? Global emissions are not necessarily reduced merely because they disappear from one nation's domestic accounting. The full consequences depend upon how goods are produced, transported and consumed.

The history of international carbon trading supplies additional reasons for scepticism. Under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, projects in developing countries could generate carbon credits purchased by industrialised nations. One particularly notorious example involved HFC-23, an industrial waste gas with a powerful greenhouse effect. Destroying this gas could generate highly valuable credits, creating concerns that some producers had incentives to generate additional waste gas simply to receive payment for destroying it.

China hosted a substantial proportion of the relevant projects. Here was an environmental mechanism capable of rewarding precisely the industrial behaviour it was supposedly designed to discourage. It is an excellent illustration of what happens when governments create elaborate artificial markets without adequately anticipating how businesses will respond to financial incentives.

The broader lesson is that regulatory systems are not immune from manipulation merely because their stated objectives are virtuous. Carbon credits, subsidies, renewable-energy mandates and emissions restrictions create commercial opportunities. Those opportunities attract corporations, investors and governments seeking financial advantage. Once substantial economic interests depend upon particular regulations, powerful constituencies emerge to defend those regulations regardless of whether they remain the most effective means of achieving their original objectives.

This phenomenon is sometimes described through the economic theory of "bootleggers and Baptists." Moral campaigners advocate restrictions because they believe them socially desirable, while commercial interests support the same restrictions because they stand to profit. In the climate debate, environmental activists may sincerely believe that stringent regulation is essential to prevent dangerous warming, while manufacturers, financial institutions and foreign industrial powers recognise the opportunities created by government intervention.

Their motivations need not be identical. Indeed, they may have little in common beyond supporting the same policies. But the practical consequences can be remarkably convenient for those possessing the capital, manufacturing capacity and political influence to exploit the new regulatory environment.

The geopolitical dimension becomes especially troubling when Western governments cooperate directly with Chinese institutions in developing environmental regulations and technological standards. Malone documents cooperation between California and Chinese institutions involving electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and climate policy. Such cooperation does not establish that Beijing secretly dictated American regulations. It does, however, raise legitimate questions about strategic judgement.

Why should Western governments develop policies that increase dependence upon technologies and supply chains dominated by a geopolitical competitor without first establishing how domestic industrial capacity and national security will be protected? Why should environmental targets be considered in isolation from energy reliability, manufacturing employment, affordability and strategic independence?

Australia has particular reasons to ask these questions. It possesses enormous mineral and energy resources, including coal, natural gas, uranium and materials essential to modern battery technologies. Yet its political establishment has repeatedly embraced policies intended to transform domestic energy production while much of the associated manufacturing capacity remains overseas. There is a danger of becoming a supplier of raw materials and a purchaser of finished technologies, rather than developing the industrial capabilities needed for genuine economic independence.

A more rational approach would begin with affordable and reliable energy, technological competition, domestic manufacturing capacity and a sober assessment of national security. Environmental protection should not become an excuse for transferring industrial advantage abroad or imposing unnecessary economic hardship upon households and businesses.

None of this requires believing that the Chinese Communist Party invented Western climate policy or secretly controls every environmental organisation. Such claims would go beyond the available evidence and are unnecessary to the argument. Beijing did not need to create the Western regulatory system. It needed only to recognise its economic implications, invest accordingly and exploit the opportunities that Western governments themselves provided.

That is perhaps the most damning conclusion of all. The West has not necessarily been defeated through some elaborate foreign conspiracy. Its political leaders have voluntarily adopted policies that create significant advantages for a strategic competitor, often without adequately considering the consequences.

The Chinese Communist Party must regard much of this as an extraordinary stroke of good fortune. Western governments lecture their citizens about environmental responsibility, burden domestic industries with increasingly complex regulations, and then discover that the technologies required to comply are disproportionately supplied by China.

It is difficult to imagine a more convenient arrangement for Beijing. The West writes the regulations, Western consumers pay the costs, and Chinese industry is positioned to collect a substantial share of the rewards.

The arrangement was not literally made in heaven for the Chinese Communist Party. But from Beijing's perspective, it must sometimes look remarkably close.

https://www.malone.news/p/how-the-wests-climate-policies-became