On April 16, 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that its Member States had finalised a draft Pandemic Agreement, set for consideration at the 78th World Health Assembly in May 2025. Hailed as a historic step to bolster global defenses against future pandemics, the accord aims to enhance international cooperation, equitable access to medical countermeasures, and pandemic preparedness. Yet, beneath the rhetoric of solidarity lies a troubling reality: the WHO's track record during the Covid-19 plandemic and its perceived alignment with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cast a long shadow over the agreement's credibility. I argue that the Pandemic Agreement is a bad idea, rooted in the WHO's past failures, its lack of accountability, and its cozy relationship with the CCP, which undermines trust in its ability to deliver a fair and effective global health framework.
The Covid-19 plandemic exposed glaring weaknesses in the WHO's leadership and response mechanisms, raising doubts about its capacity to helm a binding global agreement. In December 2019, as the virus emerged in Wuhan, the WHO was slow to act. It echoed China's claims of no human-to-human transmission as late as January 14, 2020, despite evidence to the contrary, delaying global preparedness. The organization did not declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) until January 30, 2020, and only named Covid-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, when the virus had already spread to 114 countries. These delays, critics argue, cost lives and fuelled the pandemic's global toll, which claimed nearly 7 million lives by 2023.
The WHO's deference to China during this period was particularly damning. When Chinese authorities detained doctors like Li Wenliang for warning about the virus and censored early reports, the WHO failed to challenge Beijing's narrative. Instead, it praised China's "transparency" and "swift response," despite evidence of a cover-up that included delayed genomic data sharing and restricted access for WHO-led expert teams to investigate the virus's origins. A 2020 House Foreign Affairs Committee report detailed how the CCP's actions, aided by the WHO's reluctance to press for accountability, exacerbated the crisis. This pattern of prioritising diplomacy over truth undermines confidence in the WHO's ability to enforce a pandemic agreement that requires rapid, transparent data sharing and cooperation.
Moreover, the WHO's International Health Regulations (IHR), the existing framework for global health emergencies, proved toothless during Covid-19. Countries flouted IHR obligations, implementing trade and travel restrictions against WHO advice or failing to report outbreaks promptly.
Central to the scepticism surrounding the Pandemic Agreement is the WHO's perceived coziness with the CCP, which many argue compromises its impartiality. The WHO's handling of Covid-19 was marked by an apparent reluctance to criticise China, even as evidence mounted of Beijing's obfuscation. For instance, the WHO allowed China to veto American scientists from a 2021 investigation into Covid-19's origins and permitted the CCP to edit the final report, raising questions about the organisation's independence. U.S. Representative Nicole Malliotakis, during a 2023 House Oversight Committee hearing, accused the WHO of acting as a "co-conspirator" with the CCP by downplaying the virus's severity based on Chinese propaganda.
This relationship extends beyond Covid-19. China's growing influence within the WHO is tied to its financial contributions and strategic diplomacy. While the WHO's budget relies heavily on voluntary contributions from member states, China's pledges—such as $3 billion over three years for pandemic response in developing nations—pale compared to the U.S.'s $4.5 trillion Covid-19 response but grant Beijing disproportionate leverage. Critics, including the Heritage Foundation, argue that China's status as a "developing country" under WHO frameworks allows it to benefit from provisions meant for low-income nations, potentially skewing the agreement's resource allocation. This is particularly concerning given China's economic might as the world's second-largest economy, which contrasts with its self-identification as a developing nation to avoid stringent obligations.
The CCP's broader geopolitical strategy amplifies these concerns. Under Xi Jinping, China has pursued an assertive foreign policy, using international organisations to advance its interests. The WHO's failure to hold China accountable for early Covid-19 missteps—such as delaying the sharing of genomic data critical for vaccine development—suggests it may struggle to enforce compliance under the new agreement, especially if Beijing resists. Posts on social media reflect public distrust, with users accusing the WHO of "parroting China's lies" and botching the Covid-19 response, sentiments that underscore the challenge of securing global buy-in for an agreement led by an organisation seen as compromised.
The draft Pandemic Agreement, while promising equity and preparedness, fails to address the WHO's structural and operational shortcomings. First, the agreement's reliance on phrases like "Parties commit" without clear consequences for non-compliance mirrors the IHR's weaknesses. Critics argue this vagueness allows powerful states like China to sidestep obligations, as seen during Covid-19 when Beijing restricted WHO access to Wuhan.
Second, the agreement's focus on resource transfers and technology sharing raises concerns about intellectual property and fairness. The Heritage Foundation warns that the draft prioritises mandating technology transfers and weakening intellectual property rights, potentially discouraging innovation by pharmaceutical companies in developed nations. It also fails to define "developing country," risking benefits flowing to economically powerful nations like China rather than truly low-income states. This misalignment could exacerbate inequities rather than resolve them, contrary to the agreement's stated goals.
Third, the agreement does not adequately address the WHO's transparency issues. The negotiation process itself has been criticised for opacity, with limited public access to draft texts until recently. The Working Group on IHR amendments, a parallel process, has been similarly opaque, releasing only vague updates. Without transparency and accountability, the agreement risks perpetuating the WHO's tendency to prioritise political sensitivities—particularly with influential states like China—over global health imperatives.
The agreement threatens national sovereignty by granting the WHO authority over domestic policies like lockdowns or vaccine mandates. This concern reflects broader distrust in the WHO's intentions, fuelled by its Covid-19 missteps and perceived CCP alignment. The inclusion of provisions to "combat misinformation" in the draft has also raised free speech concerns, especially given the CCP's history of censoring Covid-19 information—a practice the WHO failed to condemn.
The WHO's past failures and its troubling relationship with the CCP make the Pandemic Agreement a risky proposition. The organisation's delayed and deferential response to Covid-19, coupled with its inability to enforce existing rules, suggests it is ill-equipped to oversee a binding global accord. Its alignment with China, evidenced by uncritical praise and restricted investigations, erodes trust in its ability to act impartially. The agreement itself, with its vague commitments and potential to favour powerful nations, fails to address these core issues.
Rather than rushing to adopt the agreement in May 2025, the WHO should prioritise internal reform. This includes ensuring transparency in negotiations, and addressing China's influence by clarifying definitions like "developing country." Member states should demand that financial obligations remain voluntary and that the agreement includes consequences for non-compliance, such as public reporting or benefit denials. Until the WHO proves it can act independently and effectively, the Pandemic Agreement risks being a hollow promise, built on a foundation of past failures and compromised trust.
https://jamesroguski.substack.com/p/the-text-of-the-who-pandemic-agreement
"The Text of the WHO "Pandemic Agreement" Has Been Agreed Upon By the Negotiators
This does NOT mean that it has been adopted. The World Health Assembly will consider the Pandemic Agreement when it meets May 17-26, 2025. Each nation can decide whether or not to sign the agreement.
EXCERPT FROM PAGE 6 OF THE PANDEMIC AGREEMENT:
(d) "pandemic-related health products" means those relevant health products (1) that may be needed for prevention, preparedness and response to pandemic emergencies;
(1) Pursuant to the amended IHR (2005). The Conference of the Parties shall consider any further amendments to the IHR modifying this term, with the aim to ensure consistency in the use of terms between the IHR and this Agreement.
EXCERPT FROM PAGE 5 OF THE IHR AMENDMENTS
"relevant health products" means those health products needed to respond to public health emergencies of international concern, including pandemic emergencies, which may include medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, medical devices, vector control products, personal protective equipment, decontamination products, assistive products, antidotes, cell- and gene-based therapies, and other health technologies;
https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA77/A77_ACONF14-en.pdf
MORE PCR "TESTS", MORE DRUGS, MORE VENTILATORS AND MORE GENE ALTERING BIOLOGICAL MURDER WEAPONS FOR EVERYONE AROUND THE WORLD!
Watch the final session of the 13th Resumed meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body here:
https://apps.who.int/gb/inb/e/e_inb-13-resumed-session.html
The Pandemic Agreement is NOT about mandates and lockdowns.
Your local tyrants are in charge of that.
EXCERPT FROM PAGE 27 OF THE "PANDEMIC AGREEMENT":
Article 24. Secretariat
2. Nothing in the WHO Pandemic Agreement shall be interpreted as providing the WHO Secretariat, including the WHO Director-General, any authority to direct, order, alter or otherwise prescribe the national and/or domestic laws, as appropriate, or policies of any Party, or to mandate or otherwise impose any requirements that Parties take specific actions, such as ban or accept travellers, impose vaccination mandates or therapeutic or diagnostic measures or implement lockdowns.