The ideological campaign against traditional ideas of personal responsibility has now extended into the gymnasium. Ava Purkiss, a historian at the University of Michigan, recently appeared on NPR's Code Switch to discuss what she described as America's oppressive historical relationship with physical fitness. Her argument was not simply that exercise is fascist, as some critics have suggested, but that physical fitness has historically been used to distinguish the supposedly industrious and disciplined from the lazy and dependent. She suggested that fitness can become a form of "soft fascism" when employed as a means of making moral judgements about individuals and their contribution to society. This is a more sophisticated argument than the sensational headlines suggest, but it is also one that leads to some extraordinary conclusions when examined carefully.

Purkiss argues that physical fitness has been used to determine who is hardworking and who is lazy, who possesses self-restraint and who is greedy, and who contributes to national progress rather than becoming dependent upon government support. Her concern is that physical condition can become a substitute for moral judgement, allowing society to categorise individuals according to their bodies. There is a legitimate point here. Physical appearance is not an infallible guide to character. People may suffer from illness, disability, genetic conditions or circumstances that make exercise difficult. An overweight person may possess admirable qualities of courage, generosity and perseverance, while an exceptionally fit individual may be morally reprehensible.

But acknowledging these elementary truths does not justify treating physical fitness as a politically suspect ideal. There is an enormous difference between recognising that physical condition does not determine human worth and suggesting that the social admiration of strength, discipline and bodily health represents an oppressive ideological practice. The former is a reasonable moral qualification. The latter risks undermining virtues that have been recognised across civilisations and political traditions.

The central difficulty with Purkiss's argument concerns the relationship between physical fitness and personal responsibility. Fitness is not a perfect measure of self-discipline, since genetics, age, illness, disability and socioeconomic circumstances all influence physical capacity. Nevertheless, regular exercise generally requires persistence, the willingness to tolerate discomfort and the ability to pursue long-term objectives rather than immediate gratification. These are valuable habits, regardless of whether the individual possesses exceptional athletic ability.

If the social recognition of such habits is regarded as oppressive because it distinguishes between different levels of achievement, then the criticism threatens to extend far beyond physical exercise. Educational accomplishment, professional competence, artistic excellence and intellectual achievement also involve differences in effort, ability and outcome. Societies routinely recognise these differences without thereby endorsing fascism. The question is not whether distinctions exist, but whether they are used reasonably and without denying the dignity of those who achieve less.

This leads to a reductio ad absurdum of the more extreme interpretation of the anti-fitness argument. If physical fitness is objectionable because it encourages distinctions between disciplined and undisciplined behaviour, then the logical alternative would be to avoid recognising the benefits of disciplined behaviour at all. Sedentary living, excessive consumption and the neglect of physical health would have to be treated as beyond criticism, not merely because individuals deserve respect regardless of their condition, but because criticism itself might reinforce supposedly oppressive standards.

That conclusion would be absurd. Obesity, type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease and physical inactivity impose enormous burdens upon individuals, families and health systems. There is substantial medical evidence that regular physical activity improves cardiovascular health, metabolic function, muscular strength, mobility and psychological wellbeing. These benefits do not disappear because exercise has sometimes been associated with objectionable political movements or used to stigmatise particular groups.

It would be equally absurd to suggest that illness or disability constitutes moral failure. The point is that health-promoting behaviour remains valuable even when individuals differ greatly in their capacity to undertake it. A society should be capable of encouraging exercise without humiliating those who struggle with their health. Indeed, these objectives are complementary rather than contradictory. Public-health programmes can recognise individual limitations while promoting the benefits of physical activity.

The reductio becomes especially revealing when applied to the wider ideology of personal responsibility. If self-restraint is regarded primarily as a means by which society imposes moral hierarchies, then what becomes of the traditional virtues of moderation, perseverance and delayed gratification? Are these virtues to be abandoned because some individuals possess greater opportunities to cultivate them than others? Or should society attempt to make their benefits more widely accessible?

The sensible answer is surely the latter. Differences in circumstances do not make self-discipline meaningless. They make it necessary to distinguish between personal responsibility and factors beyond individual control. The recognition that poverty, illness and environment influence health does not establish that individual choices are irrelevant. Human behaviour and social circumstances interact, and responsible public policy must acknowledge both.

The broader cultural problem is that some contemporary academic approaches appear increasingly uncomfortable with the language of virtue, merit and personal achievement. Where earlier generations might have regarded physical discipline as a generally desirable characteristic, contemporary criticism sometimes treats the social recognition of discipline as a mechanism of exclusion. The danger is that the legitimate desire to avoid stigmatisation becomes an argument against encouraging the very habits that improve human wellbeing.

There is also a biological dimension to this discussion that cannot simply be dismissed as a social construction. Research in behavioural genetics indicates that characteristics such as body mass index and personality traits associated with conscientiousness have heritable components. Studies of childhood self-control have also found associations with later educational, economic and health outcomes, although the strength and interpretation of these relationships vary, and environmental influences remain substantial.

These findings do not establish that individuals are genetically destined to become disciplined or undisciplined, healthy or unhealthy. Nor do they justify ranking human worth according to inherited characteristics. They do, however, challenge the notion that all differences in behaviour and physical condition can be explained solely through social expectations or institutional power.

Human beings are biological organisms whose development reflects complex interactions between genetic inheritance, environment, culture and individual behaviour. A serious account of health must accommodate all these influences. It cannot simply declare biological differences irrelevant because acknowledging them complicates a preferred political theory.

The question of heredity also raises longer-term issues concerning demographic and social change. Patterns of family formation, education, employment and fertility are influenced by economic incentives and cultural expectations. In societies where prolonged education and career establishment encourage delayed childbearing, fertility patterns may differ between groups pursuing different life strategies. Such differences deserve investigation, although it would be scientifically irresponsible to infer from them that modern societies are straightforwardly selecting against intelligence, discipline or other complex traits.

Human characteristics such as conscientiousness are influenced by many genes and environmental conditions, while reproductive behaviour is shaped by numerous social and economic factors. The available evidence does not support a simple division between genetically disciplined and undisciplined populations. Nevertheless, the broader principle remains important: cultural arrangements have consequences, and biological realities do not disappear merely because contemporary ideology finds them inconvenient.

A society that discourages physical activity, tolerates poor nutrition and neglects the cultivation of self-discipline will face consequences regardless of the language used to justify those choices. The increasing prevalence of obesity and metabolic disease in many Western countries is a serious public-health concern. Its causes include the availability of inexpensive energy-dense foods, sedentary employment, changes in transport, environmental influences, socioeconomic conditions and individual behaviour.

It would be unreasonable to blame these developments upon academic criticism of fitness, which is a comparatively minor influence beside the economic and technological transformation of everyday life. But it is equally unreasonable to allow the fear of appearing judgemental to prevent public discussion of personal habits that contribute to poor health. The appropriate response to obesity is neither moral condemnation nor ideological denial, but a combination of honest health education, improved environments and individual responsibility.

There is another irony in the suggestion that physical fitness represents an instrument of social oppression. Exercise is among the more accessible forms of personal improvement. Although wealth provides advantages in access to facilities, coaching, time and nutrition, many effective forms of physical activity require relatively little equipment. Walking, running, bodyweight exercises and basic strength training can be undertaken without expensive qualifications or institutional approval.

This does not mean that fitness is entirely independent of social class. A person working multiple jobs, caring for children or living with chronic illness may face obstacles that a wealthy professional does not. But physical training remains an area in which sustained effort can produce meaningful improvements without requiring the endorsement of an academic institution or professional credentialing body.

There is something valuable about this relative independence. A person who improves physical strength, endurance or mobility through regular training experiences a form of achievement that cannot simply be conferred by bureaucratic authority. The improvement is practical and measurable. It is not merely a status awarded by an institution, but a change in the individual's actual capacities.

The comparison with academic credentialism is instructive. Modern universities devote considerable attention to questions of hierarchy, privilege and exclusion, yet they themselves operate through elaborate systems of selection, examination, accreditation and professional distinction. Academic careers depend upon qualifications, institutional recognition and competitive assessments of achievement. It would be peculiar to condemn physical fitness for creating distinctions between individuals while treating educational and professional distinctions as entirely legitimate.

The answer, of course, is not to abolish academic standards. It is to recognise that distinctions based upon achievement are not inherently oppressive. They become objectionable when they are used to deny basic human dignity, exclude people unfairly or make unwarranted assumptions about moral character. The same principle applies to physical fitness.

The historical association between physical culture and fascist movements does not establish that exercise possesses an inherently authoritarian character. Fascist regimes certainly celebrated particular ideals of physical strength, national vitality and bodily discipline. But physical training has also been central to democratic societies, socialist movements, religious organisations, labour movements, women's sporting organisations and programmes for people with disabilities.

The Boy Scouts, the YMCA, Olympic sport, military training, community athletics and modern rehabilitation programmes all demonstrate that physical fitness can serve widely differing social purposes. The political meaning of exercise depends upon the values and institutions within which it is practised. A practice embraced by authoritarian governments does not thereby become authoritarian in every other context.

Indeed, the ability to maintain physical independence has particular significance for older people and those recovering from illness or injury. Strength training and appropriate physical activity can help preserve mobility, reduce the risk of falls and support participation in ordinary life. The ideal is not a society of elite athletes, but one in which as many people as possible retain the physical capacity to live independently and enjoy meaningful activity.

From this perspective, the promotion of fitness is not necessarily an expression of social domination. It can be a means of increasing personal freedom. A person who can walk comfortably, lift ordinary objects, maintain balance and undertake daily activities without assistance possesses practical capabilities that contribute to autonomy and quality of life.

This is where the political argument against fitness becomes especially questionable. If the concern is genuinely with human dignity and equality, then improving access to exercise and health-promoting activities should be welcomed. Physical inactivity and preventable illness frequently restrict the opportunities available to disadvantaged people. Encouraging healthier behaviour, while addressing the circumstances that make it difficult, is entirely compatible with a commitment to social justice.

The underlying philosophical dispute concerns the relationship between equality and excellence. A society committed to equal human dignity need not pretend that everyone possesses identical abilities or makes identical choices. Equality before the law and respect for persons are not the same as equality of physical condition, achievement or effort. Confusing these different concepts produces unnecessary conflict between legitimate social objectives.

There is also a moral distinction between recognising virtues and treating those who lack them with contempt. Courage is admirable, but those who experience fear do not thereby lose their dignity. Intellectual achievement is valuable, but people with limited educational opportunities are not morally inferior. Physical discipline deserves recognition, but those who are unfit or overweight should not be subjected to humiliation. These distinctions are entirely intelligible without recourse to theories of fascism.

The Christian tradition, in particular, has long recognised both the importance of self-discipline and the equal moral worth of persons. Temperance, perseverance and responsible stewardship of the body are virtues, but physical strength is not the measure of a person's spiritual value. The strong have obligations towards the weak, and human dignity does not depend upon athletic accomplishment. There is no contradiction between encouraging bodily health and rejecting cruelty towards those who struggle.

This balanced understanding is preferable to an ideological approach that treats the recognition of physical achievement as politically suspect. The problem is not that society admires strength or endurance. It is that admiration can sometimes become arrogance, just as concern for equality can become hostility towards excellence. Neither tendency should be allowed to displace sound judgement.

Purkiss is therefore right to warn against the use of bodily appearance as a simplistic measure of moral character. History provides examples of governments and social movements that have transformed ideals of physical health into instruments of exclusion, racial hierarchy and coercion. Those abuses deserve criticism. But the existence of such abuses does not justify suspicion towards fitness itself, or towards the personal virtues that often contribute to it.

https://nypost.com/2026/11/14/us-news/woke-michigan-professor-stunningly-argues-physical-fitness-leads-to-fascism-thats-racialized/