In his January 18, 2026, article "We All Know the Problem," Peter Smith delivers a scathing indictment of Australia's proposed hate speech legislation, framing it as yet another assault on free speech that accelerates the slide toward authoritarianism. Drawing on Orwellian dystopias and Christian traditions of liberty, Smith argues that these laws — encompassing criminal penalties for promoting hatred based on race, ethnicity, or origin — represent not a safeguard against antisemitism but a "dagger in the heart of freedom." He warns of thought crimes, ministerial overreach in banning "hate groups," and the futility of legislating away deep-seated prejudices, advocating instead for immigration reforms to preserve societal values. Smith's pessimism is stark: even "centre-Right" voices have buckled, mistaking suppression for solution.
From the perspective of John Stuart Mill, the 19th-century philosopher whose seminal work On Liberty (1859) remains the cornerstone of liberal thought on free expression, Smith's critique is not merely persuasive — it's prescient. Mill's harm principle posits that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Speech, as a form of opinion, should be unfettered unless it directly incites harm. Below, I outline Smith's key arguments and bolster them with Millian reasoning, demonstrating how these laws risk eroding the very foundations of a free society.
1. The Insidious Erosion of Free Speech as Authoritarian Triumph
Smith opens by decrying the legislation as an "imposition on free speech," emblematic of government's inexorable march toward servitude. He notes that few MPs have even read the 500-page bill, yet it promises up to 10-12 years' imprisonment for "publicly promoting or inciting hatred" where a "reasonable targeted person" might fear harassment or violence. This, he argues, creates a vague threshold ripe for abuse, turning interpretation — especially of religious texts — into a prosecutable offense.
Mill would applaud Smith's realism here. In On Liberty, Mill warns against the "tyranny of the majority," where societal pressures or laws stifle dissenting views, even if they're unpopular or offensive. The proposed laws' focus on "ideas of superiority" or "hatred" dissemination echoes Mill's concern that suppressing opinions hinders the "marketplace of ideas." Truth, Mill argues, emerges not from censorship but from robust debate: "If the opinion is right, [people] are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose... the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error." Smith's satirical jab at the editorialist's take on religious exemptions — "Yes, your Honour, [X] had a particularly hateful look on his face" — highlights the absurdity: who defines "hateful" interpretation? Mill would see this as inviting arbitrary state intervention, where the harm principle is stretched to cover mere emotional discomfort rather than tangible injury.
2. The Fallacy of 'Thought Crimes' and the Price of Freedom
Central to Smith's piece is the Orwellian spectre of "thought crimes," where expressing bigotry — antisemitic or otherwise — becomes criminalised. He insists that in a free society, people must have the "legal right to be antisemitic, anti-anything," as long as it doesn't incite imminent violence. Citing the U.S. Brandenburg test (speech prohibitable only if intending and likely to produce "imminent lawless action"), Smith contrasts it with Australia's existing Section 18C, which outlaws mere "insult" or "humiliation" based on race — already a "subversion of free speech," now amplified with criminal teeth.
This aligns seamlessly with Mill's absolutism on opinion. Mill contends that "all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility," as no authority—governmental or societal — can claim perfect judgment on what constitutes harmful ideas. Antisemitism, as Smith notes, has persisted for millennia; legislating it away won't excise it from "disordered minds" but will drive it underground, potentially radicalising it further. Mill's harm principle draws a bright line: opinions, even vile ones cause no direct harm warranting coercion. Freedom isn't costless, as Smith reminds us; it demands enduring offense to preserve the greater good of unfettered discourse. Pinning hopes on exemptions for religious texts, as the bill does, or now did, only underscores the hypocrisy — why shield the Koran but not secular bigotry? Mill would argue this selective protection fosters a chilling effect, deterring spiritual leaders from authentic expression and impoverishing intellectual progress.
3. Misguided Solutions: Banning Groups and Ignoring Root Causes
Smith skewers the bill's provision empowering the Home Affairs Minister to ban "hate groups," with penalties up to 15 years for leaders and 7 for members. He points out that existing laws already prohibit 31 terrorist organizations (26 Islamic), rendering new powers redundant. Targeting groups like the Nationalist Socialist Network or Hizb ut-Tahrir, he argues, won't prevent ideological rebirths. They could re-start under entirely new names, and keep doing it after the next ban, and the next. Or just go underground as European groups have done, with cell groups. Instead, Smith urges addressing antisemitism's "principal cause" in Australia: unchecked importation of "radical values" via immigration. Rather than curtailing freedoms, halt radical inflows, deport non-citizens who reject Australian norms, and defund institutions preaching radicalism.
Here, Mill's philosophy provides a nuanced endorsement. While Mill championed individual liberty, he recognized societal self-preservation: a community may restrict entry to those threatening its cohesion, much as a private club (like Smith's Catholic Church analogy) can exclude members. Immigration controls, per Mill, aren't coercive over individuals already present but a prophylactic against harms like cultural fragmentation. Banning groups via ministerial fiat, however, smacks of the overreach Mill decried — assuming infallibility in labelling "hate" without due process. Smith's quip about his conservative coffee group falling afoul illustrates the slippery slope: today's neo-Nazis could become tomorrow's dissenters. Mill's marketplace demands that even extremist ideas compete openly, lest suppression breed resentment and validate their grievances.
4. The Broader Millian Imperative: Reversing the Tide
Smith's pessimism — that occasional leaders like Thatcher or Reagan offer only "temporary hiccups" against authoritarian creep — resonates with Mill's fear of societal stagnation. Without free speech, Mill warns, humanity risks "Chinese stationariness," where conformity halts progress. Australia's laws, by prioritising "protection" from offense over liberty, exemplify this: they won't douse "anti-Semitic fires" but fan authoritarian flames. The Greens' selective outrage, shielding pro-Palestinian allies while ignoring free society principles, further erodes impartiality.
In supporting Smith from a Millian vantage, we see a clarion call for vigilance. These laws subvert the harm principle by conflating speech with action, suppress the marketplace of ideas, and invite majority tyranny. True remedies lie not in censorship but in fostering assimilation through value-aligned immigration and robust debate. As Mill implored, "Let us add one more word on the subject of... the liberty of thought and discussion." Smith's article is that word — a timely reminder that freedom's price is eternal defense against well-intentioned encroachments. If we heed it, perhaps the tide can yet be turned; ignore it, and Orwell's 1984 becomes our reality, which is what globalist socialism wants.
https://quadrant.org.au/news-opinions/anti-semitism/we-all-know-the-problem/