The warning from exiled Hong Kong legislator Ted Hui that Australia could be next in the Chinese Communist Party's campaign of intimidation should not surprise anyone who has been paying attention. Australia has been in Beijing's strategic crosshairs for years. The question is not whether the Chinese Communist Party would like to extend its influence over Australian political and economic life, but how far that influence has already penetrated, and whether Australia's political class possesses the determination to resist it.
Speaking to The Epoch Times on November 16, 2026, Hui, who now lives in Adelaide, warned that the CCP's repression of political opponents would not remain confined to Hong Kong or mainland China. His remarks followed the November 5 sentencing of prominent Hong Kong democracy activist Joshua Wong to ten years' imprisonment under the territory's National Security Law. Wong, now thirty, had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to collude with foreign forces. He has been imprisoned since 2020, and the latest sentence means that he may remain behind bars until late 2036.
Wong's supposed offence illustrates the fundamental difference between the political philosophy of the CCP and that of a free society. In a functioning liberal democracy, campaigning for international sanctions against a government is ordinarily a matter of political expression. In Hong Kong, under Beijing's national security framework, such activity can attract a lengthy prison sentence. The authorities maintain that Wong received an independent judicial hearing and that foreign criticism constitutes interference in China's internal affairs. Yet this defence avoids the central issue: whether the law itself criminalises political activity that ought to be protected.
Hong Kong was once held up as proof that Chinese sovereignty and Western-style civil liberties could coexist. The principle of one country, two systems, established before the 1997 handover, supposedly guaranteed substantial autonomy and the continuation of Hong Kong's distinctive institutions. The subsequent dismantling of political opposition, suppression of independent civil society and prosecution of democracy activists have made a mockery of those assurances. What happened to Hong Kong should be studied carefully by every Australian who believes that commercial agreements and diplomatic promises provide reliable protection against authoritarian ambitions.
Ted Hui understands this process because he has lived through it. His warning is that Beijing's ambitions extend beyond the territory it directly governs. He fears that economic coercion, ideological influence and political interference could progressively undermine Australia's independence. He has called for sanctions against officials responsible for imprisoning political dissidents, arguing that diplomatic statements alone are inadequate.
There is already a substantial Australian history supporting concern about Chinese state interference. The controversy surrounding former Labor senator Sam Dastyari, who resigned in 2017 following revelations concerning his dealings with a Chinese political donor and comments inconsistent with his party's South China Sea policy, demonstrated the vulnerability of Australian politics to relationships involving money and foreign influence. That episode did not establish that every Chinese political donor was an agent of Beijing. It did, however, reveal how political access and financial relationships could create serious questions about national loyalty and independence.
The broader problem was recognised in the Australian government's foreign interference reforms of 2018. These laws were not introduced in response to an imaginary threat. They reflected growing concern about covert foreign political activity, interference in democratic institutions and the exploitation of Australia's openness by authoritarian governments. Although the legislation applies to foreign interference generally, concern about the activities of the Chinese party-state was an important part of the political background.
The economic dimension is equally instructive. After Australia called for an independent international investigation into the origins of COVID-19 in 2020, Beijing imposed or maintained a series of trade restrictions affecting Australian products, including barley, wine and coal. China disputed Australia's characterisation of some of these measures, presenting them as legitimate trade or regulatory actions. Nevertheless, the broader diplomatic confrontation demonstrated how economic dependence could become a source of political vulnerability.
The lesson was unmistakable. A country that becomes excessively dependent upon an authoritarian power for export markets, critical imports or industrial supply chains risks discovering that economic relationships are not insulated from political disagreements. Trade is desirable, but dependency is dangerous. A sovereign nation must retain the capacity to disagree with a major trading partner without fearing economic punishment.
This is especially important for Australia, whose mineral wealth, strategic location and alliance with the United States make it a significant participant in the Indo-Pacific balance of power. Beijing has obvious reasons to prefer an Australia that is economically accommodating, diplomatically cautious and reluctant to support regional arrangements that constrain Chinese military expansion. That does not mean every commercial relationship with China is sinister. It means that the strategic interests of the CCP cannot simply be assumed to coincide with Australia's interests.
There is also the less visible problem of transnational repression. Hong Kong authorities have issued arrest warrants and offered substantial bounties for exiled democracy advocates living in Western countries, including Australia. Hong Kong's National Security Law asserts an extraordinary extraterritorial reach, claiming application to certain conduct committed outside Hong Kong, including by foreign nationals. Australia is not obliged to recognise such political claims as legitimate exercises of authority within its own territory.
The implications extend beyond the immediate targets. When dissidents living in Australia fear that their relatives overseas may be questioned, threatened or punished because of their political activities, freedom of expression is compromised without a single Australian law being changed. Intimidation becomes a mechanism of censorship. A person may possess the formal right to criticise Beijing while facing consequences that make exercising that right personally dangerous.
The Australian Senate's September 2026 inquiry into transnational repression is therefore particularly significant. Reports of overseas officials monitoring demonstrations, harassment of community figures and pressure upon relatives abroad raise questions about whether Australian sovereignty is being respected in practice. A foreign government should not be permitted to determine which political opinions may safely be expressed by people living under Australian law.
Here an essential distinction must be maintained. The Chinese Communist Party is not the Chinese people. Indeed, some of the most courageous opponents of the CCP are Chinese citizens and members of the Chinese diaspora who have experienced its repression firsthand. They deserve protection, not suspicion based upon their ethnicity. Conflating the Chinese people with the party-state would be both unjust and strategically foolish, since it would alienate precisely those people whose testimony can expose authoritarian practices.
The Australian government's response to Wong's sentencing has so far included joining nine other governments in condemning the use of Hong Kong's national security legislation against political expression. This is welcome, but Hui is correct to question whether statements alone are sufficient. Diplomatic protests have their place, yet an authoritarian government accustomed to international criticism may calculate that the political and economic costs of repression remain manageable.
Targeted sanctions against officials credibly implicated in serious human rights abuses deserve consideration, subject to proper evidence and legal safeguards. So do stronger protections for threatened dissidents, transparency concerning foreign political influence and more rigorous scrutiny of strategic infrastructure and sensitive technologies. None of these measures requires hostility toward ordinary Chinese citizens or the abandonment of legitimate trade. They require recognition that commercial engagement cannot substitute for national security policy.
But there is another dimension to this problem that receives insufficient attention: the psychological weakness of Western political leadership. The CCP's system is organised around the preservation of party power. It does not share the liberal assumption that political authority should be limited by independent institutions, competing centres of power and the rights of individuals to criticise their rulers. Its leaders understand that political influence can be exercised through incentives, dependencies, institutional relationships and the calculated exploitation of weakness.
Western governments, by contrast, often behave as though every disagreement can eventually be resolved through dialogue, economic cooperation and diplomatic goodwill. Such instruments are valuable, but only when accompanied by a realistic understanding of the other party's objectives. Negotiation without leverage can become accommodation. Accommodation without limits can become submission.
Australia's political and business establishments have long been tempted by the prospect of enormous Chinese markets. For decades, the assumption was that deeper economic integration would gradually encourage political liberalisation in China. The experience of Hong Kong should have destroyed any complacency surrounding that proposition. Economic modernisation has not prevented the CCP from strengthening its mechanisms of political control. Nor has international commercial integration prevented Beijing from using economic pressure in diplomatic disputes.
The greatest danger is not necessarily some dramatic confrontation in which Australia is ordered to surrender its sovereignty. It is the gradual normalisation of self-censorship. Universities may become reluctant to host controversial discussions. Businesses may avoid statements that could endanger commercial relationships. Political figures may soften criticism to preserve diplomatic access. Institutions may quietly calculate that defending certain freedoms is simply too expensive.
Each individual compromise may appear minor and defensible. Collectively, they can produce a political culture in which the preferences of an authoritarian foreign power acquire influence without ever being formally acknowledged. That is a far more subtle danger than military invasion, and potentially a more enduring one.
Australia must also recognise that authoritarian influence is not defeated merely by expanding domestic surveillance powers. A government that invokes the foreign interference threat to justify indiscriminate monitoring of its own citizens risks undermining the liberties it claims to defend. The proper response is targeted investigation of unlawful interference, transparency, institutional resilience and the protection of political freedom. It would be a bitter irony if defending Australia against the CCP became an excuse for importing elements of its political philosophy.
Ultimately, the issue is one of national character. Does Australia regard freedom of speech, political independence and the rule of law as principles worth defending when doing so carries economic and diplomatic costs? Or are these values merely ceremonial declarations, to be quietly abandoned whenever powerful interests demand accommodation?
Ted Hui's warning deserves attention because Hong Kong provides a concrete example of how quickly political liberties can deteriorate when concentrated power faces insufficient resistance. Australia is not Hong Kong, and the two political systems are fundamentally different. The CCP does not possess the legal authority here that it exercises in Hong Kong. But that difference is precisely what Australians must preserve.
The CCP has regarded Australia as a strategically important country for many years. Its interest in shaping Australia's political environment is neither new nor mysterious. What remains uncertain is whether Australian leaders will consistently recognise the distinction between maintaining a productive relationship with China and allowing the Chinese Communist Party to influence Australia's sovereign decisions.
Joshua Wong's imprisonment is a warning about the consequences of unchecked authoritarian power. Ted Hui's message is that Australians should not imagine themselves immune from pressure simply because they live thousands of kilometres from Beijing. The defence of liberty begins well before the prison doors close. It begins when a nation refuses to permit intimidation, economic dependency and political convenience to determine what its citizens may say, think or believe.
https://www.theepochtimes.com/world/australia-could-be-next-exiled-hk-lawmaker-warns-of-ccp-threat-after-wong-sentence-6125349