Peter Singer is undeniably a towering figure in contemporary philosophy, celebrated for his provocative arguments and his role in popularising utilitarianism (greatest good for greatest number) and effective altruism. His influence spans academia, policy, and even pop culture, with ideas permeating movements like effective altruism and shows like The Good Place. Yet, I argue that Singer's fame is, to a significant degree, misplaced. His ethical framework, particularly his commitment to cosmopolitanism, rests on oversimplified positions that have been long refuted or problematised by philosophers before him. While Singer's clarity and courage make him a formidable thinker, his reliance on utilitarian cosmopolitanism ignores deeper complexities about human morality, community, and obligation. This critique will focus on his cosmopolitanism as a prime example of his oversimplification, arguing that it fails to account for the moral significance of proximity, relationships, and community, and that its radical impartiality leads to impractical and counterintuitive conclusions.
Singer's Fame: A Case of Oversimplification
Singer's reputation as a philosophical giant stems not from groundbreaking originality but from his ability to repackage and popularise utilitarian ideas with striking clarity and moral urgency. His ethical framework, as outlined in works like Practical Ethics and Famine, Affluence, and Morality, rests on three pillars: utilitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and rationalism. These ideas, while presented with intellectual rigour, are not novel. Utilitarianism, in its classical form, dates back to Bentham and Mill, and its core premise, that pleasure and pain are the sole intrinsic goods, has been debated and critiqued for centuries. Philosophers like Kant, Nietzsche, and Moore, among others, have long exposed its flaws, from its reductive view of human values to its troubling implications for justice and individual rights. Similarly, cosmopolitanism, the rejection of moral partiality in favour of universal obligations, echoes Stoic and Enlightenment thinkers but has been challenged by communitarians, virtue ethicists, and others who emphasise the moral weight of local ties.
Singer's fame, then, is less about discovering new truths and more about reviving and amplifying these ideas with vivid thought experiments and a knack for public engagement. His famous "drowning child" analogy, for instance, is a powerful rhetorical tool, but it oversimplifies complex moral questions into a seemingly irrefutable call to action. By framing ethical dilemmas in stark, universal terms, Singer sidesteps the nuanced objections raised by earlier philosophers, presenting positions that, while seductive in their simplicity, fail to withstand scrutiny. His cosmopolitanism, in particular, exemplifies this tendency to embrace a position that sounds radical and reasonable but crumbles under philosophical and practical pressure.
The Flaws of Singer's Cosmopolitanism
Singer's cosmopolitanism, as articulated in Famine, Affluence, and Morality, demands that we treat all human suffering equally, regardless of geographical, cultural, or relational distance. He argues that "it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbour's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away." This radical impartiality, rooted in utilitarian principles, insists that our moral obligations extend universally, with no preference for those closer to us. While this view appeals to a sense of global fairness, it is both philosophically flawed and practically untenable, ignoring long-standing critiques from communitarian and deontological perspectives.
Philosophical Weakness: Ignoring Concentric Spheres of Duty: Philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, and Bernard Williams have long argued that morality is inherently relational and context-dependent, rooted in the "concentric spheres" of family, community, and nation. These thinkers, building on ideas from Aristotle and Hegel, contend that our deepest moral obligations arise from proximity and shared bonds. A parent's duty to their child, for instance, is not merely a preference but a fundamental moral priority, grounded in the biological, emotional, and social realities of human life. Singer's cosmopolitanism dismisses this hierarchy, treating all individuals as equally deserving of our resources and care. This view was refuted as early as Kant, who emphasised the categorical nature of duties to specific others, and by communitarians who argue that moral life emerges from particular communities, not abstract universality.
Consider Singer's drowning child analogy. While it intuitively compels us to save a nearby child, it falters when extended to distant strangers. As the original critique illustrates, modifying the scenario to involve a choice between saving one child or preserving resources to save many reveals the tension: most people would prioritise the immediate, visible life over abstract, distant ones. This intuition aligns with critiques from philosophers like Williams, who argued that utilitarianism's impartiality alienates us from our personal projects and relationships, rendering moral life unrecognisable. Singer's cosmopolitanism, by demanding we treat all suffering equally, ignores the moral weight of proximity and relationships, a position long criticised as dehumanising.
Practical Implausibility: The Demands of Radical Impartiality: Singer's cosmopolitanism leads to impractical demands that clash with human psychology and social structures. His argument in The Life You Can Save, that failing to donate to effective charities is morally equivalent to letting a child drown, implies that individuals in affluent societies must sacrifice personal comforts, relationships, and even family obligations to aid distant strangers. This was critiqued by philosophers like Susan Wolf, who argued that such "moral saints" lead impoverished lives, stripped of personal meaning. For example, the case of Thomas, the chess streamer who prioritises his daughter's cancer treatment over charitable donations, illustrates that most people intuitively prioritise family over abstract global duties. Singer's dismissal of this as a moral failing ignores the reality that human flourishing depends on particularistic bonds, a point communitarians like Charles Taylor have emphasised since the 1980s.
Moreover, cosmopolitanism's universal obligations are logistically unfeasible. If everyone in affluent societies redirected their resources to global poverty alleviation, local communities, schools, hospitals, infrastructure, would suffer. Economists like Thomas Pogge have critiqued such approaches, arguing that systemic change, not individual sacrifice, is more effective for global justice. Singer's focus on personal donations sidesteps these structural critiques, reviving a simplistic view of moral agency that was challenged by institutionalist thinkers decades ago.
Counterintuitive Conclusions: The Repugnant Implications: Singer's cosmopolitanism, tied to utilitarianism, leads to conclusions that most find morally repugnant, echoing Derek Parfit's critiques of utilitarianism. If we must maximise global utility impartially, we might justify extreme actions, like a painless nuclear strike on a less happy population to raise average utility, as the original critique notes. While Singer avoids such extremes, his framework implies that local duties (e.g., to family) are subordinate to global ones, a position that clashes with common moral intuitions. Philosophers like Roger Scruton have argued that such impartiality erodes the "little platoons" of family and community that sustain moral life, a critique rooted in Burkean conservatism and echoed in modern communitarianism.
Furthermore, Singer's cosmopolitanism struggles with the problem of moral overload. If every distant stranger's suffering imposes an equal obligation, individuals face an impossible burden, as every dollar spent on personal needs could theoretically save lives elsewhere. This was critiqued by Bernard Williams as "integrity-destroying," forcing people to abandon their personal projects for an unattainable ideal. Singer's response, that we should donate until the sacrifice is "nearly as important" as the harm prevented, lacks a clear boundary, reviving objections from G.E.M. Anscombe, who criticised utilitarianism's vagueness in the 1950s.
Why Singer's Fame Is Misplaced
Singer's cosmopolitanism, while compelling in its call for global empathy, rests on a simplistic utilitarianism that ignores centuries of philosophical critique. His ideas revive Bentham's hedonic calculus and Kantian universalism without adequately addressing their flaws, as exposed by thinkers from Nietzsche to MacIntyre. His fame stems from his ability to present these ideas with vivid, accessible arguments, not from resolving the objections they face. For instance, his cosmopolitanism sidesteps communitarian arguments that morality is rooted in local relationships, a view articulated by Hegel and revived by Walzer in the 1980s. It also ignores practical critiques from Pogge and others that global justice requires institutional reform, not individual heroism.
Singer's thought experiments, like the drowning child, are powerful but misleading, oversimplifying moral dilemmas into binary choices. Philosophers like Frances Kamm have long argued that such hypotheticals obscure the complexity of moral agency, a critique that applies to Singer's cosmopolitanism. His radical impartiality, while intellectually bold, dismisses the moral significance of community and relationships, a position refuted by earlier thinkers who saw morality as emerging from human sociality, not abstract reason.
Conclusion
Peter Singer's fame as a philosopher is partly misplaced, rooted in his revival of long-debated utilitarian and cosmopolitan ideas rather than in resolving their inherent flaws. His cosmopolitanism, demanding equal concern for all regardless of distance or relationship, ignores the moral priority of proximity and community, a critique advanced by communitarians and deontologists for decades. While his arguments are clear and provocative, they oversimplify complex ethical questions, leading to impractical and counterintuitive conclusions. Singer's influence is undeniable, but his ethical framework fails to withstand the scrutiny of philosophical history, making his fame more a testament to his rhetorical skill than to the enduring truth of his positions.