Australia's upcoming 2035 emissions reduction target, expected to be announced by September 2025, has sparked intense debate. The Climate Change Authority's draft advice suggests a 65–75% cut in emissions from 2005 levels, with some analyses, like that from Monash University's Climateworks Centre, claiming reductions as high as 85% are feasible. Proponents argue this ambition is not only achievable but economically advantageous, positioning Australia as a renewable energy superpower. However, this optimistic narrative glosses over significant structural, social, and economic challenges that could derail these lofty goals. While the vision of a net-zero economy is compelling, the path to achieving it is far more complex than the rhetoric suggests.
The optimistic view hinges on rapid advancements in electrification, renewable energy, and emerging technologies like hydrogen and carbon capture. For instance, the suggestion to electrify buildings and boost electric vehicle (EV) uptake assumes seamless scalability. Yet, Australia's electricity grid remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with coal still accounting for a significant portion of power generation as of 2025. Transitioning to renewables at the pace required for 85% emissions cut, demands unprecedented investment in grid infrastructure, storage solutions, and transmission lines, none of which can be deployed overnight.
EV adoption, while growing, faces practical hurdles. Australia's vast geography and limited charging infrastructure outside urban centres make widespread uptake challenging, particularly for rural and regional communities. The optimistic modelings also underestimates supply chain constraints for batteries and critical minerals, which are subject to global competition and price volatility. Similarly, relying on hydrogen for industrial decarbonisation is speculative, as the technology remains in early stages, with high costs and energy inefficiencies limiting its scalability by 2035.
The Conversation article emphasises the need for "social license" to support renewable energy projects but downplays the depth of community resistance. Large-scale wind and solar farms, as well as transmission lines, often face opposition from local communities concerned about land use, environmental impacts, and visual aesthetics. Programs in Victoria and NSW to share benefits with host communities are a step forward, but scaling these efforts nationwide requires time, trust-building, and significant funding. The optimistic narrative assumes community buy-in will materialise swiftly, which is far from guaranteed given historical pushback against renewable projects.
Politically, the 2035 target faces a polarised landscape. While state and territory governments have set ambitious goals, federal-state coordination is notoriously fraught. The Safeguard Mechanism and National Electricity Market reforms are critical but have been bogged down by competing interests in the past. The assumption that federal and state policies will align seamlessly, ignores the risk of policy reversals, particularly if political leadership changes or economic pressures mount.
The claim that a strong 2035 target will unlock trillions in global investment is oversimplified. Australia's ability to produce "green" commodities like iron and steel depends on global demand, which is uncertain. While policies like the Future Made in Australia initiative signal intent, they cannot single-handedly create markets for green products. International trade agreements and harmonised standards, as suggested, are complex and slow to negotiate, often taking years to bear fruit. Betting on these to drive economic benefits by 2035 is optimistic to the point of naivety.
Moreover, the transition carries economic risks for fossil fuel-dependent regions. Communities in coal-heavy areas like Queensland and New South Wales face job losses and economic disruption. The optimistic view assumes a smooth transition to new industries, but retraining programs and economic diversification take decades, not years. Without robust federal support, these regions could become pockets of economic decline.
The article's suggestions for agriculture, such as algae in livestock feed and alternative fertilisers, lack scalability. Australia's agricultural sector is diverse and geographically dispersed, making uniform adoption of new practices difficult. Carbon capture in soil and large-scale tree planting also face practical limits. Suitable land is often contested for food production or urban development, and tree planting must be carefully managed to avoid ecological imbalances, such as monoculture plantations or increased fire risks. These solutions, while innovative, are not silver bullets and require long-term investment and research to deliver meaningful emissions reductions.
The assertion that renewable energy and energy-efficient homes will lower household costs is misleading in the short term. While renewables are cheaper than new coal plants, the upfront costs of grid upgrades, home retrofits, and EV purchases are substantial. Many Australian households, already grappling with cost-of-living pressures, may struggle to afford these transitions without significant subsidies. The optimistic view sidesteps the reality that benefits like lower energy bills or more comfortable homes are unevenly distributed, often favouring wealthier households who can afford upfront investments.
Australia's 2035 emissions target path to 65–85% reductions is riddled with obstacles that require sober acknowledgment. Technological optimism must be tempered by realistic timelines for deployment and scalability. Social and political challenges demand proactive engagement, not assumptions of automatic alignment. Economic benefits are possible, but hinge on global factors beyond Australia's control and require careful management of domestic trade-offs.
It is but one more myth of zero net.